The Orthogenetic Principle in the Perception of “Forests” and “Trees”?

This study explores possible links between ontogenetic and microgenetic change (Werner, 1948, 1957) in the perception of stimuli with multiple levels of structure. Visual search for targets defined by local versus global structure was examined in observers aged 6, 8, 10, and 22 years. Perceptual access to each level of structure was varied by using pattern elements of same (easy) or opposite contrast polarity (hard); attentional processes were isolated from sensory processes by varying the number of display items. The results showed large improvements with age in search rates for global targets, with search rates for local targets being more constant over age. This pattern held regardless of whether perceptual access to a target was easy or hard. These results support the view that the perception of local and global structure involves different underlying processes.     

“真实无妄”和“真诚不欺”——程颐关于“诚”的本体理论建构

“诚”在程颐易学中是与“天理”等同的本体范畴,即“诚者,实理也”。程颐释“诚”为无妄和不欺两个方面。天道之“诚”为真实无妄,天地流转、化育万物的过程是无妄的,无妄则必然不欺;人道之“诚”为“真诚不欺”,不欺于天地鬼神,不欺人也不自欺,是人伦最基本的道德规范,也是君道感通天下而治天下的惟一途径,做到绝对不欺亦是无妄。程颐基于《周易》从天道、人道两方面对“诚”进行了全方位解读,并将天人合一的最高境界描述为“诚”,由此建构了关于“诚”的本体理论。     

预测加工：走出两代认知科学的历史僵局

表征-计算观与具身行动观对认知的本质几乎做了截然相反的强调。近年来,预测加工理论的发展为统一两代认知科学提供了契机。预测加工是层级预测加工与主动预测加工这两大理论部件的合称,前一部件主要继承了第一代认知科学中的层级计算加工进路,后一部件则发扬了第二代认知科学中与行动有关的理论,这两大理论部件被视为同一个统一整合理论的两个不同方面。在当代,预测加工被认为有望成为未来认知科学的新范式。     

A Precautionary Tale: Separating the Infant from the Fetus

This article confronts growing conservative opposition to abortion based on the claim that abortion is morally equivalent to infanticide. By examining the relationship between moral skepticism and precautionary ethics the article promotes a completely permissive position on abortion from conception to birth while consistently rejecting the possibility that such a position entails permissive implications for infanticide. The article introduces and traces the implicit relationship between moral skepticism, the precautionary principle and political liberalism.

Quantum mechanics and violations of the sure-thing principle: The use of probability interference and other concepts

The use of quantum mechanical concepts in social science is a fairly new phenomenon. This paper uses one of quantum mechanics’ most basic concepts, probability interference, to explain the violation of an important decision theory principle (the ‘sure-thing principle’). We also attempt to introduce other quantum mechanical concepts in relation to the sure-thing principle violation.     

Absence of evidence and evidence of absence: evidential transitivity in connection with fossils,fishing, fine-tuning,and firing squads

“Absence of evidence isn’t evidence of absence” is a slogan that is popular among scientists and nonscientists alike. This article assesses its truth by using a probabilistic tool, the Law of Likelihood. Qualitative questions (“Is E evidence about H?”) and quantitative questions (“How much evidence does E provide about H?”) are both considered. The article discusses the example of fossil intermediates. If finding a fossil that is phenotypically intermediate between two extant species provides evidence that those species have a common ancestor, does failing to find such a fossil constitute evidence that there was no common ancestor? Or should the failure merely be chalked up to the imperfection of the fossil record? The transitivity of the evidence relation in simple causal chains provides a broader context, which leads to discussion of the fine-tuning argument, the anthropic principle, and observation selection effects.     

INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL DEMOCRACY AND EXCLUSION

Abstract: Does democracy or popular sovereignty imply exclusion and drawing borders? And if so, what type of exclusion and borders, and what kind of justification can we give for them? Moreover, if democracy really requires some kind of exclusion, is global democracy then a paradoxical union of two contradictory ideals? Can we create a demos on the global level? The focus of this collection of essays is on this potential conflict and its underlying values.     

FEDERATIVE GLOBAL DEMOCRACY

Abstract: In this essay a set of principles is defended that yields a determinate allocation of sovereign competences across a global system of territorially nested jurisdictions. All local sovereign competences are constrained by a universal, justiciable human rights regime that also incorporates a conception of cross-border distributive justice and regulates the competence to control immigration for a given territory. Subject to human rights constraints, sovereign competences are allocated according to a conception of global democracy. The proposed allocation scheme can accommodate substantial local autonomy while at the same time ensuring that everyone has a voice in the political decisions that affect his or her interests. The relevant class of affected interests is fully specified. Relevant affects are of two kinds: those that impose norms of governance on individuals, and those that impose external costs on them. The favored sense of "an external cost" is developed and defended.     

How and how not to make predictions with temporal Copernicanism

Gott (Nature 363:315–319, 1993) considers the problem of obtaining a probabilistic prediction for the duration of a process, given the observation that the process is currently underway and began a time t ago. He uses a temporal Copernican principle according to which the observation time can be treated as a random variable with uniform probability density. A simple rule follows: with a 95% probability,

The disjunction effect reexamined: Relevant methodological issues and the fallacy of unspecified percentage comparisons

Leonard J. Savage’s sure-thing principle (1954) is a key assumption of the consequentialist conception of decision making under uncertainty, which more-or-less assumes that decision makers are rational and thorough. The sure-thing principle states that if some option x is preferred given some other event A occurs, and if option x is preferred given this event A does not occur, then x should be preferred even when the outcome of A is unknown. Tversky and Shafir [Tversky, A., &; Shafir, E. (1992). The disjunction effect in choice under uncertainty. Psychological Science, 3(5) 305–309] claim that this basic principle is frequently violated in two-step gambles. They call such violations disjunction effects. Kuhberber, Komunska, and Perner [Kuhberber, A., Komunska, D., &; Perner, J. (2001). The disjunction effect: does it exist for two step gambles? Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 85(2) 250–264] attempted to replicate Tversky and Shafir’s findings and claim their results show that people do not violate the sure-thing principle in repeated gambles. This article evaluates Kuhberger, Komunska, and Perner’s claims, suggesting they did not appropriately analyze their results, and further provides evidence that people do regularly violate the sure-thing principle in two-step gambles, providing further evidence for the reality of disjunction effects.