The Anthropic Principle: Life in the Universe

The anthropic principle, that the universe exists in some sense for life, has persisted in recent religious and scientific thought because it derives from cosmological fact. It has been unsuccessful in furthering our understanding of the world because its advocates tend to impose final metaphysical solutions onto what is a physical problem. We begin by outlining the weak and strong versions of the anthropic principle and reviewing the discoveries that have led to their formulation. We present the reasons some have given for ignoring the anthropic implications of these discoveries and find these reasons wanting—a real phenomenon demands real investigation. Theological and scientific solutions of the problem are then considered and criticized; these solutions provide dead ends for explanation. Finally, we pursue the path that explanation must follow and look at the physical details of the problem. It seems clear that the anthropic principle has been poorly framed. Removing the ambiguities surrounding the meaning of "life" may lead to more profitable investigations.     

普遍的正义如何可能——柏拉图正义论及发微

柏拉图试图解决正义是什么、正义如何可能和正义是何种价值这样一些根本问题 ,其提问题的方式、解决路径都是柏拉图式的。有借鉴意义的是正义植根于心灵深处的土壤以及社会供给正义的途径。实现正义是一个艰难且复杂的社会历史过程 ,推进民主进程、使正义理念扎根于民众的日常生活深处 ,相对正义的社会才会被建立起来 ,基于此种理念之上的用以保证、体现和实现正义的制度才会被设计出来。     

Learner control of the pacing of an online slideshow lesson: Does segmenting help?

How can we improve the instructional effectiveness of an online slideshow lesson? In the present study, college students received a 12‐slide multimedia slideshow lesson on how a geographic information system works. In a 2 × 2 design, the lesson was presented one complete slide at a time (large segment) or added one section of the slide at a time (small segment) when the student pressed the CONTINUE key, and the words were presented in printed form (text) or spoken form (voice). Students performed significantly better on a transfer posttest when the lesson was paced in small segments rather than large segments (d = 0.34); there was no effect or interaction involving modality. The small‐segment version was rated as less difficult than the large‐segment version (d = 0.43). The segmenting principle was supported in the context of online slideshows.     

My Ordinary Anti-Sceptical Beliefs Are Not Insensitive

An orthodox sceptical hypothesis claims that one’s belief that “I am not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)” (or any other ordinary anti-sceptical belief) is insensitive. A form of sensitivity-based scepticism, can thus be constructed by combining this orthodox hypothesis with the sensitivity principle and the closure principle. Unlike traditional solutions to the sensitivity-based sceptical problem, this paper will propose a new solution—one which does not reject either closure or sensitivity. Instead, I argue that sceptics’ assumption that one’s ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs are insensitive will give rise to self-contradiction. The orthodox sceptical hypothesis is thus revealed to be incoherent and arbitrary. Given that there is no coherent reason to presuppose our ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs to be insensitive, the argument for sensitivity-based scepticism can thus be blocked at a lower epistemological cost.     

手术戒毒:"非常规"医疗探索下的社会视阈

"手术戒毒"是以一种"非常规"的方式毁损一部分人脑记忆和意识,来探索戒断毒瘾的有效途径."非常规"的手术戒毒挑战了长久以来公众对毒品的"常规"认识以及现行的戒毒政策和方法,从技术、伦理以及观念、权益、法律规制和政策支持等社会层面考量了这一项"非常规"手术.     

Parental refusals of medical treatment: the harm principle as threshold for state intervention

Minors are generally considered incompetent to provide legally binding decisions regarding their health care, and parents or guardians are empowered to make those decisions on their behalf. Parental authority is not absolute, however, and when a parent acts contrary to the best interests of a child, the state may intervene. The best interests standard is the threshold most frequently employed in challenging a parent's refusal to provide consent for a child's medical care. In this paper, I will argue that the best interest standard provides insufficient guidance for decision-making regarding children and does not reflect the actual standard used by medical providers and courts. Rather, I will suggest that the Harm Principle provides a more appropriate threshold for state intervention than the Best Interest standard. Finally, I will suggest a series of criteria that can be used in deciding whether the state should intervene in a parent's decision to refuse medical care on behalf of a child.     

A Critique of Frankfurt-Libertarianism

Most libertarians think that some version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is true. A number of libertarians, which I call ‘Frankfurt-libertarians,’ think that they need not embrace any version of PAP. In this paper, I examine the writings of one such Frankfurt-libertarian, Eleonore Stump, for her evaluation of the impact of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP. I show how, contrary to her own claims, Stump does need a PAP-like principle for her account of free action. I briefly argue that this discussion also goes some distance to showing that any Frankfurt-libertarian is in a similar position regarding the need for some PAP-like principle. If I am correct, then Frankfurt-libertarians must either renounce their incompatibilism or concede that FSCs fail to show all PAP-like principles to be false.

A hierarchical model of operational anticipation windows in driving an automobile

Driving an automobile is an example of a goal-directed activity with high complexity in which different behavioral elements have to be integrated and brought into a sequential order. On the basis of the reafference principle and experimental results on temporal perception and cognitive control, we propose a hierarchical model of driving behavior, which can also be adapted to other goal-directed activities. Driving is conceived of as being controlled by anticipatory neuronal programs; if these programs are disrupted by unpredictable stimuli, which require an instantaneous reaction, behavioral control returns after completion of the reactive mode to the anticipatory mode of driving. In the model different levels of anticipation windows are distinguished which, however, are interconnected, in a bi-directional way: (a) Strategic level with a representation of the driving activity from the beginning to reaching the final goal; (b) Segmented tactical level with the sequence of necessary milestones to reach the goal; (c) Maneuver level where actions like passing another car or keeping a lane are controlled; (d) Short-term integration level of a few seconds which allows immediate anticipations; and (e) Synchronization level for sensorimotor control and complexity reduction within neuronal assemblies. A flow diagram schematically describes different driving situations stressing the anticipatory mode of control. In a pilot experiment with 20 subjects using a virtual driving situation in a car simulator predictions of the model could be verified, i.e., subjects showed a significant preference for the anticipatory mode of driving.     

Rawls and Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients: A Reply to Maio

In his paper, “The Relevance of Rawls’ Principle of Justice for Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients” (Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2002):45–53), Giovanni Maio has developed athought-provoking argument for the permissibility of non-therapeutic research on cognitively impaired patients. Maio argues that his conclusion follows from the acceptance of John Rawls’s principles of justice, specifically, Rawls’s “liberty principle” Maio has misinterpreted Rawls’s “libertyprinciple” – correctly interpreted it does notsupport non-therapeutic research on cognitivelyimpaired patients. Three other ‘Rawlsian’ arguments are suggested by Maio’s discussion –two “self-respect” arguments and a “presumed consent” argument – but none of them are convincing. However, an alternative argument developed from Rawls’s discussion of “justice in health care” in his most recent book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, may justify certain kinds of non-therapeutic research on some cognitively impaired patients in special circumstances. We should not expect anything more permissive from a liberal theory of justice. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.