Toddlers’ social evaluations of agents who act on false beliefs

Mature social evaluations privilege agents’ intentions over the outcomes of their actions, but young children often privilege outcomes over intentions in verbal tasks probing their social evaluations. In three experiments (N = 118), we probed the development of intention-based social evaluation and mental state reasoning using nonverbal methods with 15-month-old toddlers. Toddlers viewed scenarios depicting a protagonist who sought to obtain one of two toys, each inside a different box, as two other agents observed. Then, the boxes’ contents were switched in the absence of the protagonist and either in the presence or the absence of the other agents. When the protagonist returned, one agent opened the box containing the protagonist's desired toy (a positive outcome), and the other opened the other box (a neutral outcome). When both agents had observed the toys move to their current locations, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box containing the desired toy. In contrast, when the agents had not seen the toys move and therefore should have expected the desired toy's location to be unchanged, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box that no longer contained the desired toy. Thus, the toddlers preferred the agent who intended to make the protagonist's desired toy accessible, even when its action, guided by a false belief concerning that toy's location, did not produce a positive outcome. Well before children connect beliefs to social behavior in verbal tasks, toddlers engage in intention-based evaluations of social agents with false beliefs.     

Philosophy and the real reasons for action: G. H. von Wright's understanding explanations

According to the received view, philosophy of action took a justified turn towards causalism because anti-causalists failed the causalist challenge about efficacious reasons. This paper contests that view by examining the ways in which Georg Henrik von Wright responded to causalism in his later philosophy. First, von Wright attacked the subjectivism of causalism by arguing for an objectivist view that construes reasons not as subjective mental states but as external facts of the agent's situation. Second, von Wright fundamentally disagreed with the view of philosophical inquiry that underpinned causalism. For von Wright, the task of philosophy was conceptual: to explicate what one is looking for when one is looking for the real reasons for action. In contrast, for causalists the task was ontological: to determine what kind of item in the world the real reason for action is. Examining von Wright's account contributes to contemporary assessments of the metaphilosophical dimension of the reasons/causes debate.     

1- and 2-year-olds’ expectations about third-party communicative actions

Infants expect people to direct actions toward objects, and they respond to actions directed to themselves, but do they have expectations about actions directed to third parties? In two experiments, we used eye tracking to investigate 1- and 2-year-olds’ expectations about communicative actions addressed to a third party. Experiment 1 presented infants with videos where an adult (the Emitter) either uttered a sentence or produced non-speech sounds. The Emitter was either face-to-face with another adult (the Recipient) or the two were back-to-back. The Recipient did not respond to any of the sounds. We found that 2-, but not 1-year-olds looked quicker and longer at the Recipient following speech than non-speech, suggesting that they expected her to respond to speech. These effects were specific to the face-to-face context. Experiment 2 presented 1-year-olds with similar face-to-face exchanges but modified to engage infants and minimize task demands. The infants looked quicker to the Recipient following speech than non-speech, suggesting that they expected a response to speech. The study suggests that by 1 year of age infants expect communicative actions to be directed at a third-party listener.     

Children's Developing Intuitions About the Truth Conditions and Implications of Novel Generics Versus Quantified Statements

Generic statements express generalizations about categories and present a unique semantic profile that is distinct from quantified statements. This paper reports two studies examining the development of children's intuitions about the semantics of generics and how they differ from statements quantified by all, most, and some. Results reveal that, like adults, preschoolers (a) recognize that generics have flexible truth conditions and are capable of representing a wide range of prevalence levels; and (b) interpret novel generics as having near‐universal prevalence implications. Results further show that by age 4, children are beginning to differentiate the meaning of generics and quantified statements; however, even 7‐ to 11‐year‐olds are not adultlike in their intuitions about the meaning of most‐quantified statements. Overall, these studies suggest that by preschool, children interpret generics in much the same way that adults do; however, mastery of the semantics of quantified statements follows a more protracted course.     

Exploiting Listener Gaze to Improve Situated Communication in Dynamic Virtual Environments

Beyond the observation that both speakers and listeners rapidly inspect the visual targets of referring expressions, it has been argued that such gaze may constitute part of the communicative signal. In this study, we investigate whether a speaker may, in principle, exploit listener gaze to improve communicative success. In the context of a virtual environment where listeners follow computer‐generated instructions, we provide two kinds of support for this claim. First, we show that listener gaze provides a reliable real‐time index of understanding even in dynamic and complex environments, and on a per‐utterance basis. Second, we show that a language generation system that uses listener gaze to provide rapid feedback improves overall task performance in comparison with two systems that do not use gaze. Aside from demonstrating the utility of listener gaze in situated communication, our findings open the door to new methods for developing and evaluating multi‐modal models of situated interaction.     

Therapists' positive emotions in‐session: Why they happen and what they are good for

Aim: The therapist's feelings play a remarkable role in contemporary models of psychotherapy. However, these models are biased towards negative feelings. The present study explores therapists' personal experience with positive emotion in‐session. Method: A grounded theory analysis was conducted of interviews with 26 Brazilian psychotherapists. Results: Clinicians derive positive affect from the client's input in treatment, from their own input, and from the personal relationship with the client. Therapist positive emotion adds to the material that can be worked on in‐session by providing interpersonal events in the relationship with the client. It can improve therapist input in treatment by increasing in‐session awareness, resourcefulness and daring and by cuing efforts for professional development. It enhances involvement in the relationship with the client by prompting compassion and closeness in the dyad. Its effects may spill over and contribute to the therapist's personal thriving. Discussion: These results are discussed in light of what positive psychology can add to current work on therapist effects in the treatment process.     

Not starting psychotherapy is more often initiated by the therapist than the patient

The phenomenon of not starting psychotherapy is seldom investigated. The present study of psychotherapy in the Swedish mental health services differentiates between patients applying for and being offered psychotherapy but choosing not to start (n = 69), patients recommended to receive no treatment, another type of treatment or treatment at another clinic (n = 133), and therapy starters (n = 1294). After the initial assessment, nearly twice as many patients did not start based on the therapist’s decision than on the patient’s. Cases of not starting psychotherapy decided by the therapist were more frequent among patients whose occupational status was less stable, presented a danger to others, had lower levels of initial therapeutic alliance, and by therapists with lower levels of psychotherapy training and those at less structured and more unstable clinics. Patients choosing not to start therapy had lower levels of mental ill-health than both starters and therapist-initiated nonstarters. The most frequently presented reason for a patient-initiated decision to not start therapy was “patient wished another treatment or therapist,” whereas the most common therapist-initiated reason was “recommended or referred to another treatment or clinic”.     

The touch of King Midas: Collingwood on why actions are not events

It is the ambition of natural science to provide complete explanations of reality. Collingwood argues that science can only explain events, not actions. The latter is the distinctive subject matter of history and can be described as actions only if they are explained historically. This paper explains Collingwood’s claim that the distinctive subject matter of history is actions and why the attempt to capture this subject matter through the method of science inevitably ends in failure because science explains events, not actions. It argues that Collingwood’s defence of the methodological autonomy of history vis-à-vis natural science is not based on a commitment to human exceptionalism, i.e. the exclusion of human beings and their doings from the rest of nature, but on the view that explanations which appeal to norms are different in kind from explanations which appeal to empirical regularities. Given the close relationship between the method and the subject matter of a form of inquiry, actions elude any attempt to explain them through the scientific method because the application of this method entails that what is thus explained is not an action but an event.