儿童欺骗的情境依赖

采用竞争游戏的方式研究3～6岁儿童在外显和隐蔽情境里的欺骗。结果表明4、5岁儿童行为上的隐蔽欺骗和错误信念理解显著相关;3岁儿童语言上的外显欺骗（说谎）和错误信念理解显著相关;各年龄段儿童行为上的外显欺骗和错误信念理解没有显著相关。和Cartson（1998）的研究结果不一致的是,本研究中4、5、6岁儿童的隐蔽欺骗人数显著超过外显欺骗人数。结果提示,语言上的外显欺骗（说谎）不仅和儿童的执行功能有关,还可能和欺骗时的情境压力有关。     

幼儿心理理论与情绪理解发展及关系的研究

本研究采用横断设计,以北京市某幼儿园大、中、小班共98名幼儿为被试,通过对其心理理论、情绪理解及语言能力的测试,考察幼儿心理理论和情绪理解的发展状况以及二者之间的关系。研究结果表明：(1)幼儿的心理理论和情绪理解在3～5岁期间发生了巨大的变化,在5岁的时候大多数的幼儿已经基本上具备了心理理论和情绪理解的能力,4岁是幼儿心理理论和情绪理解能力发展的关键年龄;(2)幼儿的心理理论和情绪理解的相关显著,即使在控制了语言和年龄的影响后,心理理论能力仍然和情绪理解能力在总体上相关显著;(3)在排除了语言和年龄的影响后,对他人错误信念的理解能力和情绪观点采择能力的相关也仍然显著。     

纳西族和汉族儿童情绪理解能力的发展

选取3～5岁的纳西族儿童107人,3～5岁的汉族儿童90人,使用情绪理解任务系统地考察了他们情绪理解的发展,同时还测量了两个民族儿童的错误信念理解和语言能力。结果表明,两个民族儿童情绪理解能力具有相似的发展规律,但完成各任务的成绩有显著差异,提示了两个民族儿童情绪理解能力发展的不同步性。研究还发现,心理理论社会知觉成分与认知成分随年龄的增长相互促进和相互制约,并且都与语言能力有关。     

I get so lonely,baby: The effects of loneliness and social isolation on romantic dependency

Individuals lacking fulfilling interpersonal interactions may experience feelings of loneliness. Consequently, these individuals may over-rely on their romantic partners to fulfill the need to belong. This study examined the effects of loneliness and social isolation on dependency on a romantic partner in a sample of college students (N = 104). Participants who were in a romantic relationship completed measures of loneliness, social isolation, and romantic dependency near the beginning of the semester (Time 1) and approximately 6 weeks later toward the end of the semester (Time 2). Toward the beginning of the semester, there were no significant predictors of dependency. Toward the end of the semester, individuals who reported higher social isolation reported higher levels of dependency. Time 1 dependency also predicted Time 2 dependency. Future methodological directions and suggestions regarding the examination of perceptions of loneliness and relationship expectations are discussed.     

Does theoretical background influence therapists' attitudes to therapist self‐disclosure? A qualitative study

Aims: This study investigated therapists' attitudes towards therapist self‐disclosure over different theoretical orientations and to establish how classical theoretical background and training effected and informed practice. Classical theoretical background was intended to refer to traditional Psychodynamic understanding. Method: Participants were experienced therapists drawn from four groups by a recruitment screening measure. Three groups were from the students’ cohort within a university Masters programme in Psychological Therapies. Participants were practicing from CBT, Systemic and Psychodynamic orientations. A further group was drawn from Person‐Centred therapist/trainers at a further education College. Data was gathered using focus groups and analysed using thematic analysis. Findings: Three major and one lesser theme emerged. These revealed that there was a spectrum of willingness to disclose throughout all groups, classical training influenced all participants; total restriction of TSD was impracticable and attitudes were affected by concerns for the therapeutic relationship. Implications for practice: TSD needs to be more thoroughly explored within therapy training and supervision. A structured framework could help inform practice. Conclusions: The study supported the idea that Classical Training influenced TSD.     

幼儿生气和伤心情绪情景理解

考察三类成人（113名幼儿母亲、42名幼儿教师、221名大学生）对西方研究者常用的22个生气和伤心情景中幼儿情绪的推断;以中国成人的情绪情景理解为标准,进一步考察120名4-6岁幼儿生气和伤心情景理解能力的发展。结果表明：三类成人一致推断的6个生气情景和6个伤心情景,与西方研究者的界定基本一致;幼儿的伤心情景理解能力显著高于生气情景理解能力;4岁幼儿的伤心情景理解能力显著低于5岁和6岁幼儿     

Action understanding as inverse planning

Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an “intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a “teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent.     

Comprehension of the representational mind in infancy

A broad array of infant studies are reviewed that appear to be consistent with the idea that belief understanding specifically, and mental attribution generally, emerge much earlier than previously acknowledged. We first examine existing false-belief research, which, while confirming that children under 4 years perform poorly on standard tests, suggests nevertheless that they have more implicit understanding of beliefs than they can express. After surveying theories that both favor and reject early development of theory of mind (TOM), we address two recent bodies of visual fixation research that provide support for the possibility of knowledge and belief attribution in infancy. The first indicates that infants of 13–15 months are sensitive to others’ false beliefs (and therefore have a representational TOM), the second, that by 12 months or younger infants have two antecedently related psychological understandings: (a) that when agents look they “see” and (b) that seeing plays a presumptive role in producing knowledge. This raises the broader question of whether “mentalism” might be part of core knowledge, which takes us to the earliest manifestation of psychological attribution, the construal of agentive behavior as intentional. Contrary to previous assumptions, recent studies indicate that infants of 3–9 months do not accord intentionality exclusively to humans or to self-propelled objects but rather to any entity that: (1) chooses flexibly among means and ends, (2) responds non-randomly to social overtures, and (3) reacts rationally to changing circumstances (i.e., that is not a mere automaton but is selectively and adaptively responsive to the environment). Other evidence is then examined which suggests that infants begin to construe these and other behaviors in mentalist rather than teleological terms much earlier than expected. Finally, the implications of this empirical record for domain-specific and domain-general theories of TOM are considered.