The Relation between Mind‐mindedness in Mothers with Borderline Personality Disorder and Mental State Understanding in their Children

This study investigated relations between mind‐mindedness in mothers with borderline personality disorder (BPD) and mental state understanding in their children. Participants were 20 mothers with BPD and 19 mothers without personality disorder and their children, aged 39–61 months. Children's mental state understanding was examined via a battery of theory of mind and emotion labelling tasks. Maternal mind‐mindedness was assessed by mothers' use of mental state references to describe their children relative to other attributes. Maternal BPD was associated with fewer references to children's mental states as well as poorer levels of mental state understanding in their children. Findings lend some empirical support to recent theoretical suggestions that BPD is associated with a reduced capacity for mentalization, as well as reduced capacity for mental state understanding in children of mothers with BPD. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Response to “Turning Words and Twisting Truths”

SUMMARY

Too often, in discussions of psychotherapy, the techniques are given undue emphasis. Research suggests that the same techniques are differentially effective when used by equally trained and supervised therapists. Not only are some therapists more effective, irrespective of the type of therapy they practice, but some, because of their personal qualities, may actually harm those with whom they work. This research reflects the vast importance of the ubiquitous element in therapy, that of the “person” of the therapist. The question, then, follows, how may personhood be developed? This question is explored as it relates to both breadth and depth of life experience.     

The interplay of bottom-up and top-down mechanisms in visual guidance during object naming

An ongoing issue in visual cognition concerns the roles played by low- and high-level information in guiding visual attention, with current research remaining inconclusive about the interaction between the two. In this study, we bring fresh evidence into this long-standing debate by investigating visual saliency and contextual congruency during object naming (Experiment 1), a task in which visual processing interacts with language processing. We then compare the results of this experiment to data of a memorization task using the same stimuli (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, we find that both saliency and congruency influence visual and naming responses and interact with linguistic factors. In particular, incongruent objects are fixated later and less often than congruent ones. However, saliency is a significant predictor of object naming, with salient objects being named earlier in a trial. Furthermore, the saliency and congruency of a named object interact with the lexical frequency of the associated word and mediate the time-course of fixations at naming. In Experiment 2, we find a similar overall pattern in the eye-movement responses, but only the congruency of the target is a significant predictor, with incongruent targets fixated less often than congruent targets. Crucially, this finding contrasts with claims in the literature that incongruent objects are more informative than congruent objects by deviating from scene context and hence need a longer processing. Overall, this study suggests that different sources of information are interactively used to guide visual attention on the targets to be named and raises new questions for existing theories of visual attention.     

Action simulation in the human brain: Twelve questions

Although the idea of action simulation is nowadays popular in cognitive science, neuroscience and robotics, many aspects of the simulative processes remain unclear from empirical, computational, and neural perspectives. In the first part of the article, we provide a critical review and assessment of action simulation theories advanced so far in the wider literature of embodied and motor cognition. We focus our analysis on twelve key questions, and discuss them in the context of human and (occasionally) primate studies. In the second part of the article, we describe an integrative neuro-computational account of action simulation, which links the neural substrate (as revealed in neuroimaging studies of action simulation) to the components of a computational architecture that includes internal modeling, action monitoring and inhibition mechanisms.     

Habermas and validity claims

At the heart of Jürgen Habermas’s explication of communicative rationality is the contention that all speech acts oriented to understanding raise three different kinds of validity claims simultaneously: claims to truth, truthfulness, and normative rightness. This paper argues that Habermas presents exactly three distinct, logically independent arguments for his simultaneity thesis: an argument from structure; an argument from criticizability/rejectability; and an argument from understanding/reaching understanding. It is further maintained that the simultaneity thesis receives cogent support only from the Argument from understanding/reaching understanding, and only if the notion of ‘understanding’ is expanded to that of ‘agreement’.     

Children's Understanding of Behavioral Consequences of Epistemic States: A Comparison of Knowledge,Ignorance, and False Belief

The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3–7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research.     

D.H. Lawrence's The daughter-in-law: Transforming a family system

Abstract

D.H. Lawrence's play The daughter-in-law, written in 1912, explores underlying, implicit conflict within a family. Set in a small mining town in England, the family consists of Mrs. Gascoyne, her sons Luther and Joe, and her daughter-in-law, Minnie, Luther's wife. The central conflict is between Mrs. Gascoyne and Minnie, who challenges her mother-in-law's control over her sons, who also compete with each other for the love and recognition of their mother. Joe, the youngest son, perturbs the family system and acts as a mediator, functioning as a family therapist. He sets a process in motion through which the rigid family alliances are challenged and ultimately realigned. Mrs. Gascoyne's self-image as a perfect, self-sacrificing, self-righteous mother ultimately is transformed, and she accepts Minnie as a family member. Brandchaft's concept of “pathological accommodation” explicates how enmeshed family members can collide, and thereby stultify their personal development. As Joe plays his role of “family therapist,” the family dynamic changes. Through the process of rupture and repair, each family member begins to recognize the needs of the other, and thereby a path for differentiation, individuation, and autonomy becomes possible for them.     

‘Who owns my pain?’ An aspect of the complexity of working with looked after children

This paper underlines the difficulties of working with looked after children and their carers. The author discusses a particular approach to respond to the complexity of looked after children's emotional difficulties, and their impact on the network of professionals making decisions about their life in care. As their own parents are no longer in a position to take responsibility for them, their trauma and past abuse make for a lack of clarity amongst this network when establishing the responsible role in loco parentis. In order to provide effective therapeutic work with these children, it is crucial to consider their disturbance as affecting the network around them. Enabling the network to understand and process powerful feelings around the child enhances its self-reflective function, so crucial for thinking about the child's needs and emotional development.     

A taste of reflecting practice

This article describes a training exercise in which students who are new to systemic practice but have some experience in therapeutic work in other modalities were invited to experience reflecting practice. The students were asked to follow a role‐played therapy session by offering reflections on the connections felt to a ‘family’ member. The students stood beside the ‘family member’, reflected on the problems and accounted for the connections felt in terms of particular resonances felt. The students thus experienced a therapeutic use of self congruent with the reflecting team approach and the therapeutic position adopted in reflecting practice.     

Metascientific foundations for pluralism in psychology

In this paper, I explore the metascientific basis for pluralism in psychology. In the first half, I outline the two levels of the metaparadigm: the epistemological and the methodological. The epistemological level includes the dichotomy between an internal, first-person point of view and an external, third-person one. The methodological level includes the dichotomy between explanation and understanding. The continuing debate regarding methodology, explanation versus understanding, has distinguished the human sciences from the natural sciences. Similarly, the continuing debate regarding the epistemological point of view has distinguished psychology from other sciences. I illustrate these points by placing various trends in psychology into the two-dimensional space formed by the two coordinate axes depicting the methodological and the epistemological dimensions. Each quadrant represents one definition of the object of psychology: quadrant 1 (internal, first-person - explanation) represents “consciousness;” quadrant 2 (internal, first-person - understanding) represents “experiences;” quadrant 3 (external, third-person - understanding) represents “meaningful acts and expressions;” and quadrant 4 (external, third-person - explanation) represents “behaviors and higher processes of the brain.” All of the trends within the history of psychology can be placed within this two-dimensional space. In the second half of the paper, I introduce the third level of the metaparadigm: the metapsychological level. This level includes the three different, and incompatible conceptions of humans: the first-person, the second-person, and the third-person conceptions. A third-person conception of humans is most compatible with trends placed in quadrant 4. A second-person conceptualization is most congruent with quadrant 3, and so on. Thus, the unification of psychologies emerges as not only difficult but actually unreasonable, because the plurality of psychological paradigms originates from the epistemological, methodological, and metapsychological levels of the metaparadigm.