组织变革的多样性管理:一种系统性框架

组织的变革是组织发展的一个关键。但是研究表明,对于组织变革的管理相对比较薄弱．而在方法论上的一些探索有助于解决组织变革管理薄弱的问题。本文将简要阐述在组织变革管理中所应用的一些方法及其不足,并就系统观以及与组织变革管理相关的问题作一些讨论。在组织变革过程中系统性框架的应用将有助于解决组织多纬度变革的差异及其多纬度变革间的相互作用问题。因此．系统性框架对于理解和管理组织的变革是非常有作用的。     

Verisimilitude and the Dynamicsof Scientific Research Programmes

Some peculiarities of the evaluation of theories within scientific research programmes (SRPs) and of the assessing of rival SRPs are described assuming that scientists try to maximise an ‘epistemic utility function’ under economic and institutional constraints. Special attention is given to Lakatos' concepts of ‘empirical progress’ and ‘theoretical progress’. A notion of ‘empirical verisimilitude’ is defended as an appropriate utility function. The neologism ‘methodonomics’ is applied to this kind of studies. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Grasping psychoanalysts’ practice in its own merits1

The central objective of this presentation is to reflect on the obstacles involved in the task proposed by the Chicago Congress, which is to explore convergences and divergences in psychoanalytic practice. The author discusses two major obstacles. First, the epistemological and methodological problems in relation to the construction of theory in psychoanalysis and especially the inaccessibility, in any reliable way, of what psychoanalysts really do in the intimacy of their practice. He proposes to separate, at least in part, theory from practice in psychoanalysis, in an attempt to grasp psychoanalysts' practice in its own merits. He then outlines a phenomenology of the practice of psychoanalysis, which reveals that, in their work with patients, analysts are guided more by practical reasons than theoretical reasons; that is, their interventions are predictions rather than explanations. Since these practical reasons need to be validated constantly in the analytic relationship based on their effects, he discusses the subject of validation in the clinical context of the core theory of therapeutic change in psychoanalysis, that is, the conditions required for clinical practice to satisfy the thesis of an inseparable union between gaining knowledge and cure. He ends by challenging the core of the psychoanalytic theory of change, arguing that it neither does justice to the practice of psychoanalysts nor to contemporary knowledge of processes and mechanisms of therapeutic change. Finally, he proposes that we detach practice from theory, in order to study the former in its own merits, utilising a plurality of methods ranging from systematic investigation to the recent methodology of the Working Party.     

社会建构论与心理学理论的未来发展

社会建构论是当代西方心理学中的一股重要学术思潮。它认为知识不是一种科学发现,而是一种社会建构。知识的生产过程不是个体理性决定的,而是一种文化历史的过程,是社会协商和互动的结果。有关心理现象的分类、心理活动的形式方面的知识都是一定文化历史条件的产物。从社会建构论的视角看心理学的研究成果会有许多新的收获。从社会建构论的观点来看,理论不是经验事实的概括和抽象,而是一种社会建构。理论先于经验观察,也高于经验观察,这种观点将理论建构置于经验工作之首,为心理学理论的未来发展开辟了全新的视角。     

具体情绪对个体建议采纳的影响

通过两个实验探讨了不同评价倾向的情绪对个体建议采纳的影响。实验1采用视频片段诱发被试的恐惧和愤怒情绪,实验2则采用视频片段诱发悲伤和厌恶情绪,根据JAS范式,两个实验均采用硬币估计任务来衡量建议采纳程度。结果表明:(1)不同情绪对建议采纳程度的影响不同,恐惧情绪状态下被试的建议采纳程度要高于愤怒情绪和中性情绪状态下的被试;(2)与厌恶情绪和中性情绪状态下被试相比,悲伤情绪状态下的被试有更多的建议采纳行为。本研究在一定程度上支持了情绪的评价倾向理论。     

后现代心理学思想的基本观点

在后现代文化思潮的冲击下,一些从事后现代心理学思想研究的心理学工作者。扬弃了科学主义心理学家的原则方场和研究范式,超越了其理论误区和视界局限。由于他们的方法论基础大相径庭．所以在心理学的专业知识、研究对象、探究方法、临床应用、科学定位等诸多方面,二者存在着明显的分歧。     

基于组织的自尊的情境化与适用性

基于组织的自尊(OBSE)是组织情境下个人对自身能力和价值的评价, 对员工的工作态度、行为和绩效有重要的影响。在回顾最近研究的基础上, 总结了基于组织的自尊的情境化测量与结构。在整合现有相关研究和理论的基础上, 构建了基于组织的自尊情境化研究的法理性框架。针对国内外基于组织的自尊研究的差异, 结合中国情境的特殊性, 对“基于组织的自尊”概念在中国情境下语义差异、语义等值和情境适用性进行了讨论。最后, 对基于组织的自尊未来的情境化研究以及在中国情境下的发展进行了展望。     

On A Different Ground: From Contests Between Monologues To Dialogical Contest

Feeling that they must aim for certainty in their claims, each side presents its version of reality, monologically, simply for acceptance or rejection by the other. In this form of argumentation, one individualistically formulated, systematic, finished version is pitted (in an essentially Neo-Darwinian struggle) against another. By its very nature, such a form of rational argumentation prevents the construction of a shared version of things; it is not dialogical. In attempting to recover what has been rendered rationally-invisible by our modern modes of (monological) reasoning, I first explore the "structures of passion and feeling" (Raymond Williams) embodied in the ways in which people in a community interrelate themselves. Attention to such structures illuminates the nature of argument in a novel, dialogical, light: those who share in such structures do not share in a system of foundational principles or a logical framework, but in a "living tradition" (MacIntyre) or "living ideology" (Billig et al.). Bakhtins concept of the utterance is then explored as the basic unit for understand dialogical communication and argument within such living traditions.     

Practical Arguments for Theoretical Theses

Pascals wager is expounded as a paradigm case of a practical,decision-theoretical argument for acting as if a proposition is true when wehave no theoretical reasons to accept or reject it (1.1.–1.2.). Thoughthe paradigm is fallacious in various respects there are valid and adequatearguments for acting as if certain propositions are true: that theoreticalentities exist, that there are material perceptual objects, that the worldis uniform across time (1.3). After this analysis of examples the authorsgeneral approach for developing criteria for the validity and adequacy oftypes of argument (2.1.) is applied: Having discussed some problems(2.2.–2.3.), a general epistemic principle for such pascal argumentsis developed, which characterizes their premisses and, if introduced as anadditional premiss, can make them deductively valid (2.4).     

Irrational action and irrational belief

Many philosophers agree with Socrates that it is not possible to perform an akratic action consciously and freely. They take this view because they assimilate the internal irrationality of such a performance to the internal irrationality of drawing a theoretical conclusion which contadicts one's premisses. This article develops some arguments against that assimilation. The extreme cost of theoretical self-contradiction is forming the belief both that something is so and that it is not so. This is impossible for anyone who understands what he is doing, and the impossibility can be explained: nothing could conceivably make such a conjunction of beliefs true. But the conjunction of a value-judgement judgment and an action that gets against it is different. Although it too is internally irrational, there is no property like truth which the value-judgement and his action ought both to possess, but cannot both possess. This article proposes a different model for akratic action, which might serve as a basis for disagreement with Socrates' view of it.