On the countertransference of the patient: Transformations of the psychoanalyst's 'theoretical self' and their possible articulations with the vicissitudes of the analytic relationship

In this paper the author examines one of the many levels of the analyst/analysand relationship: the possible interaction between the analyst's mental routes in relation to theories (also meant, but not only, as internal objects) and the vicissitudes of the psychoanalytic relationships with his patients. The author assumes that an important variable affecting the transformation of certain therapeutic relationships is the change that takes place in the relationship between the analyst and that part of his internal world where his theories find their place. He names this part of his internal world 'theoretical self', and 'precipitates of the analyst's theoretical self' those complex formations, akin to more or less cohesive conglomerates, that are formed by his relationship to theories and to psychoanalytic institutions, and by the various, 'personal' internalised objects. The psychoanalyst will relate to these precipitates in a variety of ways, and he will make use of them mostly at an unconscious level in his analytical work; and his patient is likely to 'react' to them, almost chemically. The author also offers some working indications: the psychoanalyst, despite his knowledge of some aspects of his own countertransference, is in fact lacking in knowledge, unless he constantly does some extra work focusing on how his mental position (i.e. the relationship with the precipitates of his theoretical self) may intervene in any of the therapeutic relationships that he establishes-not necessarily in the same way in each of them. The author also illustrates his reflections and conceptualisations by reporting dreams and excerpts from sessions taken from three psychoanalytic treatments in the course of several years.     

H管理理论探索

H管理理论是我国学者提出的具有中国特色的管理理论。本文针对H管理理论的主要思想、构成内容进行了探索 ,着重考察了H管理理论中的人格学说 ,并对该理论的理论基础和实践基础进行了分析和论证 ,最后指出H管理理论的理论意义和实践意义 ,以及以后需要完善之处。     

Testing the significance of the successive components in redundancy analysis

In this paper we study the interrelationships between two sets of data measured on the same subjects via redundancy analysis. We consider redundancy analysis from an inferential point of view. Under the hypothesis of multinormality, tests of significance are obtained for each successive redundancy component so that only the significant factors are retained for prediction purposes. An example illustrates the method. The authors would like to thank the Editor and the referees for their helpful comments. This research has been partly financed by NSERC (Canada).     

Verisimilitude and the Dynamicsof Scientific Research Programmes

Some peculiarities of the evaluation of theories within scientific research programmes (SRPs) and of the assessing of rival SRPs are described assuming that scientists try to maximise an ‘epistemic utility function’ under economic and institutional constraints. Special attention is given to Lakatos' concepts of ‘empirical progress’ and ‘theoretical progress’. A notion of ‘empirical verisimilitude’ is defended as an appropriate utility function. The neologism ‘methodonomics’ is applied to this kind of studies. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

心理治疗结果的临床显著性分析方法

心理治疗结果研究中,如何对结果测量数据进行统计分析,是非常重要的环节之一。研究者发现,不能简单使用统计显著性来考察心理治疗的结果,因而引入了临床显著性的概念以便更准确地从临床角度考察治疗的情况。在验证临床显著性改变中,西方学者提出了JT法、GLN法、EN法和HA法等统计分析方法,这些方法都试图更准确地分析临床显著性,但在心理治疗结果研究中,这些方法仍然存在概念明确性、标准和数据收集完善性等方面的问题。因此今后的研究应该关注方法的创新或修订,还是关注数据解释是目前西方关于临床显著性分析方法的两大争论。国内也应在心理治疗结果的研究中引入临床显著性分析方法,同时还应考虑效果评价指标的设立和有效测量工具编制的问题,为正确评价心理治疗结果服务,并最终为提高心理治疗效果服务。     

Grasping psychoanalysts’ practice in its own merits1

The central objective of this presentation is to reflect on the obstacles involved in the task proposed by the Chicago Congress, which is to explore convergences and divergences in psychoanalytic practice. The author discusses two major obstacles. First, the epistemological and methodological problems in relation to the construction of theory in psychoanalysis and especially the inaccessibility, in any reliable way, of what psychoanalysts really do in the intimacy of their practice. He proposes to separate, at least in part, theory from practice in psychoanalysis, in an attempt to grasp psychoanalysts' practice in its own merits. He then outlines a phenomenology of the practice of psychoanalysis, which reveals that, in their work with patients, analysts are guided more by practical reasons than theoretical reasons; that is, their interventions are predictions rather than explanations. Since these practical reasons need to be validated constantly in the analytic relationship based on their effects, he discusses the subject of validation in the clinical context of the core theory of therapeutic change in psychoanalysis, that is, the conditions required for clinical practice to satisfy the thesis of an inseparable union between gaining knowledge and cure. He ends by challenging the core of the psychoanalytic theory of change, arguing that it neither does justice to the practice of psychoanalysts nor to contemporary knowledge of processes and mechanisms of therapeutic change. Finally, he proposes that we detach practice from theory, in order to study the former in its own merits, utilising a plurality of methods ranging from systematic investigation to the recent methodology of the Working Party.     

社会建构论与心理学理论的未来发展

社会建构论是当代西方心理学中的一股重要学术思潮。它认为知识不是一种科学发现,而是一种社会建构。知识的生产过程不是个体理性决定的,而是一种文化历史的过程,是社会协商和互动的结果。有关心理现象的分类、心理活动的形式方面的知识都是一定文化历史条件的产物。从社会建构论的视角看心理学的研究成果会有许多新的收获。从社会建构论的观点来看,理论不是经验事实的概括和抽象,而是一种社会建构。理论先于经验观察,也高于经验观察,这种观点将理论建构置于经验工作之首,为心理学理论的未来发展开辟了全新的视角。     

Practical Arguments for Theoretical Theses

Pascals wager is expounded as a paradigm case of a practical,decision-theoretical argument for acting as if a proposition is true when wehave no theoretical reasons to accept or reject it (1.1.–1.2.). Thoughthe paradigm is fallacious in various respects there are valid and adequatearguments for acting as if certain propositions are true: that theoreticalentities exist, that there are material perceptual objects, that the worldis uniform across time (1.3). After this analysis of examples the authorsgeneral approach for developing criteria for the validity and adequacy oftypes of argument (2.1.) is applied: Having discussed some problems(2.2.–2.3.), a general epistemic principle for such pascal argumentsis developed, which characterizes their premisses and, if introduced as anadditional premiss, can make them deductively valid (2.4).     

Evaluating performance in continuous experiments with feedback to subjects

Consider an experiment in which a subject guesses repeatedly at a randomly chosen target on a continuum. To guarantee a positive probability of success, the continuum is partitioned into a finite but large number of segments. The subject is given directional feedback. General guessing strategies are characterized, and an optimal strategy is identified. The hypothesis that the subject's performance can be explained by chance alone is of interest in such experiments. A test is developed based on comparing the subject's performance to expected performance using the optimal strategy. A skill-scoring procedure is developed for assessing a subject's performance in light of the strategy used, and a test based on skill-scoring is advanced.Research by the first author is supported in part by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under grant AFOSR 77-3180.The authors wish to thank the referees for remarks that led to improvements in both content and clarity.     

Irrational action and irrational belief

Many philosophers agree with Socrates that it is not possible to perform an akratic action consciously and freely. They take this view because they assimilate the internal irrationality of such a performance to the internal irrationality of drawing a theoretical conclusion which contadicts one's premisses. This article develops some arguments against that assimilation. The extreme cost of theoretical self-contradiction is forming the belief both that something is so and that it is not so. This is impossible for anyone who understands what he is doing, and the impossibility can be explained: nothing could conceivably make such a conjunction of beliefs true. But the conjunction of a value-judgement judgment and an action that gets against it is different. Although it too is internally irrational, there is no property like truth which the value-judgement and his action ought both to possess, but cannot both possess. This article proposes a different model for akratic action, which might serve as a basis for disagreement with Socrates' view of it.