Conceptual preference for thematic or taxonomic relations: A nonmonotonic age trend from preschool to old age

Two experiments examined the development of conceptual preference for either thematic (functional) or taxonomic relationships in a match-to sample task. In Experiment 1 twenty subjects from each of five age groups—preschool to old age—completed a method of triads preference test where they were forced to choose a thematic or taxonomic match. Young and old individuals preferred the thematic parings while school age and college adults preferred the taxonomic matches. Although the Age × Preference relation was pronounced, the majority of subjects at all ages could provide adequate justification of both the preferred and nonpreferred relationship. In addition, kindergarten subjects in Experiment 2 could readily be trained to respond on the basis of the nonpreferred mode. These data suggest that the pervasive shift in conceptual responding from syntagmatic to paradigmatic, thematic to taxonomic, etc., represents a change in preference rather than a shift to a fundamentally new way of organizing knowledge.     

Children's strategy preferences for resolving contradictory story information under two social conditions

This paper attempted to examine how children, when confronted with a literary implicature, resolve this implicature under two types of social conditions. More specifically, this paper identified five types of strategies which people employ to resolve text anomalies arising when old information in a story setting is incompatible with new information in a story ending. Two experiments demonstrated that third graders (8.4 and 8.6 years) and sixth graders (12.5 and 12.8 years) consistently selected certain strategies for resolving old and new, empirical and value, contradictory information. Although third and sixth graders demonstrated a similar strategy preference for resolving contradictory old and new information in formal conditions, the principal difference was that third graders modified old information to fit new information while sixth graders modified new information to fit old information. In contrasting the formal and informal conditions, third graders shifted their strategy preferences so as to minimize the amount of text restructuring in the formal condition; sixth graders, on the other hand, shifted their strategy preferences so as to maximize the amount of text restructuring in informal conditions. These findings suggest that story schema structures are more interpretive than story grammar psychologists presently assume.     

Development of cerebral dominance: dichotic listening asymmetry in normal and learning-disabled children

The magnitude of the dichotic right-ear advantage was assessed in 48 normal and 48 learning-disabled children representing an age range of approximately 5 years. All subjects were matched according to age, sex, and handedness. An analysis of results indicated a significant right-ear advantage in both the normal and learning-disabled children, but revealed no developmental trends for either group. Differences observed in the performance of the learning-disabled and normal children may reflect variability in selective attention rather than differences in the degree of cerebral lateralization. These results suggest a need for a reconceptualization of the causative factors affecting children with learning disorders and lend support to the notion that cerebral lateralization is not a developmental phenomenon.     

Reward and number of choices in children's probability learning: An attempt to reconcile conflicting findings

Five event schedules (75:0, 75:25, 75:0:0, 72:25:0, 75:12.5:12.5) were examined in a size discrimination task with penny rewards and plastic token markers. The subjects were 100 fourth graders (mean age = 9.4 years) and 100 undergraduates of both sexes. Whether or not the event probabilities summed to unity proved to be a more important determiner of terminal performance than the number of response alternatives in the task (p < .01). Females maximized more than males (p < .001) and college students more than fourth graders (p < .001). Greater maximization was exhibited by fourth graders in the reward condition (p < .01). These reward effects appeared to be more consistent with a detrimental-effects-of-reward interpretation than either utility or expectancy interpretations.     

Evaluation of infant vocal conditioning.

The use of the operant conditioning paradigm, as it has been applied to infant social, vocal behavior, reflects a failure to take into account the social nature of human infants over and above the rigid theoretical rationale of the paradigm. It is argued that: (1) the baseline procedure used in operant conditioning studies is methodologically and conceptually invalid; (2) the reinforcing stimulus used in social conditioning studies elicits the very response that it is assigned to reinforce; and (3) the effect of the response-reinforcer relationship is not the reinforcement (strengthening) of vocal response rate.     

Discriminative infant smiling to orientations of talking faces of mother and stranger.

Thirty-two infants aged 14 and 20 weeks were presented with a live face in each of eight conditions, which consisted of all combinations of (a) a 0° or 90° orientation; (b) familiar face (the infant's mother) or distinctively unfamiliar face; and (c) talking or silent context. The previous findings that younger infants smile longer at 0° than at 90° faces and that this differential responsiveness to orientation wanes with increasing age were replicated; the hypothesis that older infants would smile longest at their mothers' talking faces in the 0° orientation was confirmed. In addition, infants of both ages smiled more at their mothers than at the stranger, although this effect interacted with orientation and sex of the infant.     

Imaging,empathy, and causal attribution

Three studies were conducted to test whether imagery accounts for the effects of empathy on attributions, that is, whether attributers construct and scan a mental image of social scenarios the same way that actual participants scan a real environment. According to this interpretation, attributers “see” the world as the participant does and make vicarious attributions. An alternative interpretation holds that subjects base vicarious attributions on recreating the motivations and affect of the actor, so that imaging is irrelevant to empathy and attributions. In the first study, subjects who imagined a story from the perspective of a particular character later showed differential recall of story details as a function of role, but not differential attributions. In Experiment 2, role-taking subjects showed clear effects of imaged perspective on recall for story details, but no effects on attributions of causality for an accident. Further, recall and attribution were uncorrelated. In the last study, empathy and imagery role-taking instructions produced independent effects: imagers showed pronounced perspective-relevant recall and empathizers did not. Neither showed unambiguous vicarious attributions. Recall and attribution were again uncorrelated. These studies suggest that the imagery explanation of empathy effects is untenable, and imply that the recall of perspective-relevant details is unlikely to mediate attributions of causality in imaginary scenarios.     

Facial and vocal cues of deception and honesty

Facial expressions and vocal cues (filtered speech) of honest and deceptive messages were examined in posed and spontaneous situations. The question of interest was the degree to which nonverbal cues transmit information about deception. Results indicated that (a) for both the facial and vocal channels, posing (as compared to spontaneous behavior) produced a higher level of communication accuracy; (b) facial expressions of deceptive (as compared to honest) messages were rated as less pleasant, while vocal expressions of deception were rated as less honest, less assertive, and less dominant, particularly in the posed condition; (c) the sender's ability to convey honesty was negatively correlated with his/her ability to convey deception, suggesting the existence of a demeanor bias—individual senders tend to appear and sound consistently honest (or dishonest) regardless of whether they deliver an honest or a deceptive message; (d) in the posing condition, the sender's abilities to convey honesty/deception via facial and vocal cues were positively and significantly correlated, whereas in the spontaneous condition they were not; and (e) senders whose full (unfiltered) speech indicated more involvement with their responses were judged as more honest from both their vocal (filtered speech) and facial cues, in both the honest and deceptive conditions.     

Selective perception of events

Two hundred and twelve subjects were given one of two interpretive sets prior to viewing an event. Following observation, the first interpretation was discredited, and subjects were asked to interpret the event they had seen under the contrasting set. Some subjects were only provided with the alternate interpretation, while others were also given an opportunity to view the event a second time. Both the perceptual segmentation and the subjects' impressions of the participants in the event were assessed. Results disclosed that (1) the two sets produced both differing perceptual organization and differing impressions of the participants; (2) reversing the sets produced a reversal of the impressions of the participants only when accompanied by a second viewing; and (3) the reversal of the impressions was accompanied by a shift in the perceptual organization of the event. It was concluded that observers may differ in their initial perception of an event as the result of differences in prior expectations, and that the resulting biased sample of information they acquire may limit their retrospective reinterpretation of the event.     

The dispositional shift in attribution over time

Two experiments examined the effect of time on causal attributions. In Experiment I, subjects who described themselves into a tape recorder assumed more personal responsibility for their behavior after 3 weeks' time than others who explained their behavior immediately after its occurrence. In Experiment II, actor-subjects took part in a getting acquainted conversation and explained their behavior more dispositionally and less situationally after 3 weeks' time than they had initially, while observer-subjects experienced no change over time. Results were interpreted in terms of an altered self-perspective in memory and the diminished salience of situational details over time.