How strong is the comparison‐to‐the‐strongest heuristic?: An empirical test of the comparison‐ to‐the‐strongest heuristic in probability judgment1,2

Abstract: Windschitl and Wells (1998 ) proposed that the pairwise comparison between the focal and strongest alternative outcomes plays an important role in probability judgment. However, their studies did not control the effects of alternative outcomes other than the strongest one. This article tested whether only the strongest alternative outcome would affect probability judgment, using a variable selection method in a multiple regression analysis. Study 1 reanalyzed the results of Windschitl and Young (2001 ) and showed that only the strongest alternative outcome affects probability judgment. In Study 2, a new experiment was conducted to modify the methodological problems in Study 1. The results of Study 2 were identical to those of Study 1. All these results consistently supported the comparison hypothesis.     

Identifying Variables Responsible for Data not Missing at Random

When data are not missing at random (NMAR), maximum likelihood (ML) procedure will not generate consistent parameter estimates unless the missing data mechanism is correctly modeled. Understanding NMAR mechanism in a data set would allow one to better use the ML methodology. A survey or questionnaire may contain many items; certain items may be responsible for NMAR values in other items. The paper develops statistical procedures to identify the responsible items. By comparing ML estimates (MLE), statistics are developed to test whether the MLEs are changed when excluding items. The items that cause a significant change of the MLEs are responsible for the NMAR mechanism. Normal distribution is used for obtaining the MLEs; a sandwich-type covariance matrix is used to account for distribution violations. The class of nonnormal distributions within which the procedure is valid is provided. Both saturated and structural models are considered. Effect sizes are also defined and studied. The results indicate that more missing data in a sample does not necessarily imply more significant test statistics due to smaller effect sizes. Knowing the true population means and covariances or the parameter values in structural equation models may not make things easier either. The research was supported by NSF grant DMS04-37167, the James McKeen Cattell Fund.     

A connectionist model of a continuous developmental transition in the balance scale task

A connectionist model of the balance scale task is presented which exhibits developmental transitions between ‘Rule I’ and ‘Rule II’ behavior [Siegler, R. S. (1976). Three aspects of cognitive development. Cognitive Psychology,8, 481–520.] as well as the ‘catastrophe flags’ seen in data from Jansen and van der Maas [Jansen, B. R. J., & van der Maas, H. L. J. (2001). Evidence for the phase transition from Rule I to Rule II on the balance scale task. Developmental Review, 21, 450–494]. The model extends a connectionist model of this task [McClelland, J. L. (1989). Parallel distributed processing: Implications for cognition and development. In R. G. M. Morris (Ed.), Parallel distributed processing: Implications for psychology and neurobiology (pp. 8–45). Oxford: Clarendon Press] by introducing intrinsic variability into processing and by allowing the network to adapt during testing in response to its own outputs. The simulations direct attention to several aspects of the experimental data indicating that children generally show gradual change in sensitivity to the distance dimension on the balance scale. While a few children show larger changes than are characteristic of the model, its ability to account for nearly all of the data using continuous processes is consistent with the view that the transition from Rule I to Rule II behavior is typically continuous rather than discrete in nature.     

The reality of the other: Dreaming of the analyst1

The author discusses the obstacles to symbolization encountered when the analyst appears in the first dream of an analysis: the reality of the other is represented through the seeming recognition of the person of the analyst, who is portrayed in undisguised form. The interpretation of this first dream gives rise to reflections on the meaning of the other’s reality in analysis: precisely this realistic representation indicates that the function of the other in the construction of the psychic world has been abolished. An analogous phenomenon is observed in the countertransference, as the analyst’s mental processes are occluded by an exclusively self‐generated interpretation of the patient’s psychic world. For the analyst too, the reality of the other proves not to play a significant part in the construction of her interpretation. A ‘turning‐point’ dream after five years bears witness to the power of the transforming function performed by the other throughout the analysis, by way of the representation of characters who stand for the necessary presence of a third party in the construction of a personal psychic reality. The author examines the mutual denial of the other’s otherness, as expressed by the vicissitudes of the transference and countertransference between analyst and patient, otherness being experienced as a disturbance of self‐sufficient narcissistic functioning. The paper ends with an analysis of the transformations that took place in the analytic relationship.     

On the language specificity of basic number processing: transcoding in a language with inversion and its relation to working memory capacity

Transcoding Arabic numbers from and into verbal number words is one of the most basic number processing tasks commonly used to index the verbal representation of numbers. The inversion property, which is an important feature of some number word systems (e.g., German einundzwanzig [one and twenty]), might represent a major difficulty in transcoding and a challenge to current transcoding models. The mastery of inversion, and of transcoding in general, might be related to nonnumerical factors such as working memory resources given that different elements and their sequence need to be memorized and manipulated. In this study, transcoding skills and different working memory components in Austrian (German-speaking) 7-year-olds were assessed. We observed that inversion poses a major problem in transcoding for German-speaking children. In addition, different components of working memory skills were differentially correlated with particular transcoding error types. We discuss how current transcoding models could account for these results and how they might need to be adapted to accommodate inversion properties and their relation to different working memory components.     

Changing explicit and implicit attitudes: The case of self-esteem

Three experiments investigated predictions concerning asymmetrical patterns of implicit and explicit self-esteem change. Specifically, we investigated the influence of knowledge about the own self that is momentarily salient as well as the influence of affective valence associated with the self in memory on implicit and explicit self-esteem. The latter was induced by evaluative conditioning, the former by directed thinking about oneself. We found that while evaluative conditioning changed implicit but not explicit self-esteem (Experiment 1), thinking about the own self altered explicit but not implicit self-esteem (Experiment 2). Moreover, in a third experiment, it could be shown that the effect of evaluative conditioning can spill over to the explicit level when participants are asked to focus on their feelings prior to making their self-report judgements (Experiment 3). Implications of our results are discussed in terms of recent controversies regarding dual-process models of attitudes and associative versus propositional modes of information processing.     

When head is tempered by heart: Heart rate variability modulates perception of other-blame reducing anger

This study examined the relationship between heart rate variability (HRV), as an index of individual differences in emotion regulation, and perception of other-blame, as a mechanism of anger induction. The physiological responses were recorded while subjects read a story from a computer screen. The story narrated a negative event in self-referred way -dismissal from a job as the result of a colleague’s action- under conditions of intentionality versus non-intentionality. Cognitive and emotional variables were assessed by questionnaire immediately after the physiological test. The resulting structural model supports the conclusion that HRV exerts its regulatory influence directly on perception of other-blame rather than on emotion. In situations of intentionality, individuals with higher HRV make less extreme evaluation of the offender’s blame, versus those with lower HRV, thus leading to a reduction in anger reaction. These results suggest that HRV is a direct index of cognitive rather than emotional regulation.     

The Mental Model Theory of Conditionals: A Reply to Guy Politzer

This paper replies to Politzer’s (2007) criticisms of the mental model theory of conditionals. It argues that the theory provides a correct account of negation of conditionals, that it does not provide a truth-functional account of their meaning, though it predicts that certain interpretations of conditionals yield acceptable versions of the ‘paradoxes’ of material implication, and that it postulates three main strategies for estimating the probabilities of conditionals.     

Heuristic and analytic processes in mental models for conditionals: An integrative developmental theory

This article presents a developmental dual-process theory of the understanding of conditionals that integrates Evans’ heuristic–analytic theory within the revised mental model theory of conditional proposed by Barrouillet, Gauffroy, and Lecas (2008). According to this theory, the interpretation of a conditional sentence is driven by unconscious and implicit heuristic processes that provide individuals with an initial representation that captures its meaning by representing the cases that make it true. This initial model can be enriched with additional models (a process named fleshing out within the mental model theory) through the intervention of conscious and demanding analytic processes. Being optional, these processes construct representations of cases that are only compatible with the conditional, leaving its truth-value indeterminate when they occur. Because heuristic processes are relatively immune to developmental changes, while analytic processes strongly develop with age, the initial model remains stable through development whereas the number of additional models that can be constructed increases steadily. Thus, the dual-process mental model theory predicts in which cases conditionals will be deemed true, indeterminate, or false and how these cases evolve with age. These predictions were verified in children, adolescents and adults who were asked to evaluate the truth value and the probability of several types of conditionals. The results reveal a variety of developmental trajectories in the way different conditionals are interpreted, which can all be accounted for by our revised mental model theory.