Imaging,empathy, and causal attribution

Three studies were conducted to test whether imagery accounts for the effects of empathy on attributions, that is, whether attributers construct and scan a mental image of social scenarios the same way that actual participants scan a real environment. According to this interpretation, attributers “see” the world as the participant does and make vicarious attributions. An alternative interpretation holds that subjects base vicarious attributions on recreating the motivations and affect of the actor, so that imaging is irrelevant to empathy and attributions. In the first study, subjects who imagined a story from the perspective of a particular character later showed differential recall of story details as a function of role, but not differential attributions. In Experiment 2, role-taking subjects showed clear effects of imaged perspective on recall for story details, but no effects on attributions of causality for an accident. Further, recall and attribution were uncorrelated. In the last study, empathy and imagery role-taking instructions produced independent effects: imagers showed pronounced perspective-relevant recall and empathizers did not. Neither showed unambiguous vicarious attributions. Recall and attribution were again uncorrelated. These studies suggest that the imagery explanation of empathy effects is untenable, and imply that the recall of perspective-relevant details is unlikely to mediate attributions of causality in imaginary scenarios.     

Retention of conditioned inhibition in a bar-press suppression paradigm

In three experiments, the retention of conditioned inhibition in rats was examined over long intervals. Retention deficits of conditioned inhibition were found at 21 days, although conditioned excitation was relatively stable over time. This loss of conditioned inhibition was demonstrated using both the summation and the retardation of learning techniques in a bar-press suppression paradigm. Furthermore, retention differences were found between within-groups and between-groups generalization tests of conditioned inhibition, using the summation procedure. These differences were interpreted within a retrieval-oriented model of memory.     

A general scheme for the analytic decomposition of objective test scores: Illustrative demonstrations using the Rod-and-Frame test and the Müller-Lyer illusion

Objective tests of personality typically include a number of items or trials; the total score on the test is the sum of the subject's “correct” responses across all such trials. Normally, the trials are varied systematically across various facets of the test design, so that the total score represents a composite measure of accuracy averaged across these test facets. However, since only one score is computed for each subject, some potentially important kinds of individual differences—namely all those associated with each particular variation in the test design—are treated solely as measurement unreliability. Such a psychometric stance may serve to obscure more differentiated types of individual differences, with the result that composite scores from trials based on one type of experimental design may not be highly related to such scores from trials using a somewhat different design. The present paper presents a general procedure for scoring objective tests more analytically. To illustrate this general rationale, and to demonstrate its potential utility, data have been reanalyzed from two previous studies, one using the Rod-and-Frame test, the other the Müller-Lyer illusion. In both cases, the traditional global accuracy score did not correlate significantly with other theoretically related variables, while a number of component scores were quite highly related.     

The form of analog size information in memory

The information used to choose the larger of two objects from memory was investigated in two experiments that compared the effects of a number of variables on the performance of subjects who either were instructed to use imagery in the comparison task or were not so instructed. Subjects instructed to use imagery could perform the task more quickly if they prepared themselves with an image of one of the objects at its normal size, rather than with an image that was abnormally big or small, or no image at all. Such subjects were also subject to substantial selective interference when asked to simultaneously maintain irrelevant images of digits. In contrast, when subjects were not specifically instructed to use imagery to reach their decisions, an initial image at normal size did not produce significantly faster decisions than no image, or a large or small image congruent with the correct decision. The selective interference created by simultaneously imaging digits was reduced for subjects not told to base their size comparisons on imagery. The difficulty of the size discrimination did not interact significantly with any other variable. The results suggest that subjects, unless specifically instructed to use imagery, can compare the size of objects in memory using information more abstract than visual imagery.     

Behavioral inference in young children

Three experiments are reported on behavioral inference in children of 3 to 5 years of age. In each experiment the children learned two separate sequences of behavior which they were required to put together in the final test stage in order to obtain a reward. In the first experiment moderate levels of behavioral inference were obtained, although a relatively high proportion of children failed to respond in the test phase. In the second experiment different instructions were used in the test phase, the number of nonresponders was greatly reduced and a much higher proportion of children showed behavioral inference. The third experiment obtained similar results under conditions which excluded the possibility of mediation during a memory test, which was included in the previous experiments. It was concluded that behavioral inference is found, under suitable conditions, in children as young as 3-years-old, and that reports by other investigators of failure to find such inference up to the age of about 8 were due to problems with apparatus and instructions.