Typical delay determines waiting time on periodic-food schedules: Static and dynamic tests

Pigeons and other animals soon learn to wait (pause) after food delivery on periodic-food schedules before resuming the food-rewarded response. Under most conditions the steady-state duration of the average waiting time, t, is a linear function of the typical interfood interval. We describe three experiments designed to explore the limits of this process. In all experiments, t was associated with one key color and the subsequent food delay, T, with another. In the first experiment, we compared the relation between t (waiting time) and T (food delay) under two conditions: when T was held constant, and when T was an inverse function of t. The pigeons could maximize the rate of food delivery under the first condition by setting t to a consistently short value; optimal behavior under the second condition required a linear relation with unit slope between t and T. Despite this difference in optimal policy, the pigeons in both cases showed the same linear relation, with slope less than one, between t and T. This result was confirmed in a second parametric experiment that added a third condition, in which T + t was held constant. Linear waiting appears to be an obligatory rule for pigeons. In a third experiment we arranged for a multiplicative relation between t and T (positive feedback), and produced either very short or very long waiting times as predicted by a quasi-dynamic model in which waiting time is strongly determined by the just-preceding food delay.     

A general model for the analysis of multilevel data

A general model is developed for the analysis of multivariate multilevel data structures. Special cases of the model include repeated measures designs, multiple matrix samples, multilevel latent variable models, multiple time series, and variance and covariance component models.We would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Ruth Silver. We also wish to thank the referees for helping to clarify the paper. This work was partly carried out with research funds provided by the Economic and Social Research Council (U.K.).     

Test theory without an answer key

A general model is presented for homogeneous, dichotomous items when the answer key is not known a priori. The model is structurally related to the two-class latent structure model with the roles of respondents and items interchanged. For very small sets of respondents, iterative maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters can be obtained by existing methods. For other situations, new estimation methods are developed and assessed with Monte Carlo data. The answer key can be accurately reconstructed with relatively small sets of respondents. The model is useful when a researcher wants to study objectively the knowledge possessed by members of a culturally coherent group that the researcher is not a member of.This research was supported by NSF Grant No. SES-8320173 to the authors. We gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions from John Boyd, Tarow Indow, and Kathy Maher as well as the editor and several anonymous referees.     

Canonical analysis of two convex polyhedral cones and applications

Canonical analysis of two convex polyhedral cones consists in looking for two vectors (one in each cone) whose square cosine is a maximum. This paper presents new results about the properties of the optimal solution to this problem, and also discusses in detail the convergence of an alternating least squares algorithm. The set of scalings of an ordinal variable is a convex polyhedral cone, which thus plays an important role in optimal scaling methods for the analysis of ordinal data. Monotone analysis of variance, and correspondence analysis subject to an ordinal constraint on one of the factors are both canonical analyses of a convex polyhedral cone and a subspace. Optimal multiple regression of a dependent ordinal variable on a set of independent ordinal variables is a canonical analysis of two convex polyhedral cones as long as the signs of the regression coefficients are given. We discuss these three situations and illustrate them by examples.     

Hierarchical classes: Model and data analysis

A discrete, categorical model and a corresponding data-analysis method are presented for two-way two-mode (objects × attributes) data arrays with 0, 1 entries. The model contains the following two basic components: a set-theoretical formulation of the relations among objects and attributes; a Boolean decomposition of the matrix. The set-theoretical formulation defines a subset of the possible decompositions as consistent with it. A general method for graphically representing the set-theoretical decomposition is described. The data-analysis algorithm, dubbed HICLAS, aims at recovering the underlying structure in a data matrix by minimizing the discrepancies between the data and the recovered structure. HICLAS is evaluated with a simulation study and two empirical applications.This research was supported in part by a grant from the Belgian NSF (NFWO) to Paul De Boeck and in part by NSF Grant BNS-83-01027 to Seymour Rosenberg. We thank Iven Van Mechelen for clarifying several aspects of the Boolean algebraic formulation of the model and Phipps Arabie for his comments on an earlier draft.     

Factor invariance of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory

Several factor analyses of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI) have resulted in very similar solutions. Interpretation of this consistency is hampered by the fact that the 20 scales of the inventory share items. Overlapping items cause the scales to be linearly dependent and may create structure in the interscale correlation matrix which is separate from the subject response patterns. A factor analysis was performed on the matrix of item-overlap coefficients which describes the underlying artifactual structure of the instrument. Data from two new subject samples were factor analyzed and compared to previously published studies. Similarity coefficients among factors across studies were calculated.     

Daily stress and anxiety and their relation to daily fluctuations of symptoms in asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) patients

Although stress and anxiety have long been assumed to play an exacerbatory role in asthma, no study has systematically documented that daily exacerbations of asthma symptoms are related to stress and/or anxiety. In this study, 24 airways obstruction patients (12 asthmatics and 12 chronic obstructive pulmonary disease patients) were instructed to monitor the severity of daily respiratory symptoms. In addition, subjects recorded their daily anxiety level and the number and perceived impact of daily stressors. The results showed that although there were differences between high- and low-stress days for both groups, there were no differences between groups on symptom severity or between high- and low-anxiety days, as measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). Thus, although the number and impact of daily stressors were found to be directly associated with the severity of asthma symptoms, anxiety does not appear to have a direct role in the exacerbation of asthma. The findings failed to support the anxiety theory of asthma but provided an explanation for the poor results obtained in previous treatment studies which employed anxiety management with asthmatics.     

ON MARTIN EGER'S "A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES"

Abstract. Criticisms are presented against Eger's challenge to the demarcation between the natural sciences and ethics. Arguments are given both against his endorsement of the "new" philosophy of science and against his rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, his educational recommendations are reinforced rather than weakened by these criticisms     

The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation

The rejection of rhetoric has been a constant theme in Western thought since Plato. The presupposition of such a debasement lies at the foundation of a certain view of Reason that I have called propositionalism, and which is analyzed in this article. The basic tenets of propositionalism are that truth is exclusive, i.e. it does not allow for any alternative, and that there is always only one proposition which must be true, the opposite one being false. Necessity and uniqueness are the ideals of propositionalism. But the question of the necessity of such a necessity is bound to arise. Foundationalism and propositionalism are intrinsically related. Since necessity excludes alternatives, rhetoric, which is based on the possibility of opposite standpoints, is unavoidably devalued as the crippled child of Reason, identical to sophistry or eristic. But propositionalism cannot justify itself and provide a justification for its own foundation without circle or contraditction. Since it responds to the problem of eradicating problems and alternatives through propositional entities, propositionalism is ultimately based on questioning to which it replies in the mode of denial. The unavowed foundation of Reason is therefore the question of questioning, even though this very question is suppressed as propositionalism. The trace of such a question is not only historical, but can also be seen, for instance, in the role played by the principle of contradiction in the constitution of propositional Reason (Artitotle): opposite propositions are not the expression of a problematic situation, they are either possible or successively unique propositions.We want to replace propositionalism by problematology which allows for the conceptualization of alternatives, thereby rendering a true rhetoric possible. Argumentation cannot then be equated with eristic any more, as propositionalism maintained.Rationality must be seen as having questioning as its true starting-point. Reason must be rhetorical if it is to survive the death of propositionalism which took place after the radical criticisms of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Even if it is still hard ffor philosophers and rhetoricians to think within another framework and even though they prefer endlessly to deconstauct the old one instead of changing it, problematology is bound to impose itself as the new voice for rationality, because Reason has always endeavored to solve problems. Propositionalism has been only one way of conceiving problems, based on the view that solutions could be but the suppression of questioning.     

Rhetoric and “doing philosophy”

By drawing new distinctions labelled appeal and response to replace traditional rhetorical modes of written discourse, the essay sketches a new perspective about what philosophers are doing rhetorically in doing philosophy. To think of philosophers as simply engaged in argument is an oversimplification and a distortion of what philosophers do. Crucial to doing philosophy are four activities: (1) definition and redefinition of problems and issues that form both the focus of the canonical historical literature of philosophy and what goes on in contemporary philosophy as a discipline, (2) the development and use of formal languages and technical vocabularies to abbreviate and label complexity and to disambiguate and precise distinctions necessary to deal with problems and issues, (3) the development and exploration of argumentative appeals for acceptance or refutation of answers to questions raised by the philosophical problematic, and (4) the development and exploration of explanatory responses to questions raised by the problematic. In so far as these four activities are driven and sanctioned by the current, self-defining philosophical problematic, contemporary philosophy as a body of knowledge is historical, cumulative, and marked by progress, and the doing of philosophy is fundamentally the making of written appeals and responses about its problematic.