Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Neural processing of intentional biological motion in unaffected siblings of children with autism spectrum disorder: An fMRI study

Despite often showing behaviorally typical levels of social cognitive ability, unaffected siblings of children with autism spectrum disorder have been found to show similar functional and morphological deficits within brain regions associated with social processing. They have also been reported to show increased activation to biological motion in these same regions, such as the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), relative to both children with autism and control children. It has been suggested that this increased activation may represent a compensatory reorganization of these regions as a result of the highly heritable genetic influence of autism. However, the response patterns of unaffected siblings in the domain of action perception are unstudied, and the phenomenon of compensatory activation has not yet been replicated. The present study used functional magnetic resonance imaging to determine the neural responses to intentional biological actions in 22 siblings of children with autism and 22 matched controls. The presented actions were either congruent or incongruent with the actor’s emotional cue. Prior studies reported that typically developing children and adults, but not children with autism, show increased activation to incongruent actions (relative to congruent), within the pSTS and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. We report that unaffected siblings did not show a compensatory response, or a preference for incongruent over congruent trials, in any brain region. Moreover, interaction analyses revealed a sub-region of the pSTS in which control children showed an incongruency preference to a significantly greater degree than siblings, which suggests a localized deficit in siblings. A sample of children with autism also did not show differential activation in the pSTS, providing further evidence that it is an area of selective disruption in children with autism and siblings. While reduced activation to both conditions was unique to the autism sample, lack of differentiation to incongruent and congruent intentional actions was common to both children with ASD and unaffected siblings.     

Hornsby and Baker on the physicalist orthodoxy

I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived of as a feature of mind-independent reality. I suggest that in fact there is no such phenomenology of passage in the first place. There is, however, a specific structural aspect of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of movement and change that can explain how one might mistakenly come to the belief that such experiences do involve a phenomenology of passage.     

Subjective temporal trajectories for subjective well-being

Based on Diener's (Diener, E. (1984). Subjective well-being. Psychological Bulletin, 95, 542–575.) tripartite model of subjective well-being (SWB), subjective evaluations of past, present, and anticipated future life satisfaction (LS), positive affect (PA), and negative affect (NA) were evaluated in a cross-sectional undergraduate sample. Upward mean trends in subjective trajectories (past?<?present?<?future) were typical, on average, for each SWB component. As predicted, higher levels of present SWB were aligned with greater positive psychological, physical, and interpersonal functioning. In contrast, steeper upward subjective SWB trajectories were associated with greater distress and dysfunction. Of the three SWB components, unique links with indicators of functioning were most consistent for LS trajectories. We conclude that a temporally expanded conceptualization of SWB spanning subjective assessments of past, present, and anticipated future LS, PA, and NA provides a rich framework for studying the structure of SWB and the significance of how people perceive their well-being to be unfolding over time.     

Loving the One You Hurt: Positive Effects of Recounting a Transgression against an Intimate Partner

Intimate partners described a past transgression in which one of them had been a victim and the other a perpetrator and then evaluated each other and their relationship. Participants had been randomly assigned to the perpetrator or victim role. Perpetrators described their actions as more justifiable, perceived greater improvement since the transgression, and were more optimistic about the future of their relationship than were their victims or control participants. The results support the authors' contention that temporal appraisals are an important mechanism enabling people to maintain positive images of themselves and their relationships.     

Memory of Past Beliefs and Actions

Two notions of memory are studied both syntactically and semantically: memory of past beliefs and memory of past actions. The analysis is carried out in a basic temporal logic framework enriched with beliefs and actions.     

Temporal control in rats: analysis of nonlocalized effects from short interfood intervals.

The present experiment analyzed temporal control of postreinforcement pause duration during within-session changes in the criterion for reinforcement (interfood interval, IFI). Analysis of interval-by-interval changes in the pause revealed localized and nonlocalized effects from short intervals that caused specific changes in performance. In Phase 1, rats were presented with five consecutive 15-s IFIs intercalated into a series of 60-s IFIs. The 15-s set decreased the pause in adjacent and more remote 60-s intervals. In Phase 2, two sets of 15-s intervals were intercalated. The spacing between the two sets varied so that 0, 5, 10, or 15 60-s IFIs separated the sets. The postreinforcement pause tracked all changes in the IFI duration, and the localized effect from a short set extended beyond the next interval to the next few 60-s IFIs. Effects from one set, however, did not combine with a second set: Changes in the pause after two sets were the same regardless of the spacing between sets.     

Effects of signaling on temporal control of behavior in response‐initiated fixed intervals

Behavior and events distributed in time can serve as markers that signal delays to future events. The majority of timing research has focused on how behavior changes as the time to some event, usually food availability, decreases. The primary objective of the two experiments presented here was to assess how behavior changes as time passes between two time markers when the first time marker was manipulated but the second, food delivery, was held constant. Pigeons were exposed to fixed‐interval, response‐initiated fixed‐interval, and signaled response‐initiated fixed‐interval 15‐ and 30‐s schedules of reinforcement. In Experiment 1, first‐response latencies were systematically shorter in the signaled response‐initiated schedules than response‐initiated schedules, suggesting that the first response was a more effective time marker when it was signaled. In Experiment 2, responding in no‐food (i.e. “peak”) trials indicated that timing accuracy was equivalent in the three schedule types. Compared to fixed interval schedules, timing precision was reduced in the signaled response‐initiated schedules and was lowest in response‐initiated schedules. Results from Experiments 1 and 2 coupled with previous research suggest that the overall “informativeness” of a time marker relative to other events and behaviors in the environment may determine its efficacy.     

Reevaluating the link between dispositional optimism and positive functioning using a temporally expanded perspective

Dispositional optimism is typically defined in terms of generalized positive expectancies for personal future life outcomes. Yet, multiple lines of inquiry have demonstrated fundamental interconnections among all three temporal perspectives (past, present, and future). Hence, in the present work, we examine the commonality underlying dispositional optimism and individuals’ evaluations of their past, present, and anticipated future lives. Results (n = 459; 80% female; M age = 19.68) suggest that dispositional optimism loads strongly on an underlying (latent) tendency to evaluate one’s life positively across temporal perspectives. This latent tendency was significantly associated with each Big Five personality dimension; independent of this latent tendency dispositional optimism was associated only with neuroticism. Controlling for personality dimensions, the latent tendency was predictive of positive functioning (mental health, coping, physical health, and social resources); in contrast, independent of this latent tendency dispositional optimism had no significant residual associations with any of the various functioning indicators.