全文获取类型
收费全文 | 246篇 |
免费 | 13篇 |
国内免费 | 3篇 |
专业分类
262篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 3篇 |
2022年 | 1篇 |
2021年 | 2篇 |
2020年 | 7篇 |
2019年 | 9篇 |
2018年 | 11篇 |
2017年 | 7篇 |
2016年 | 8篇 |
2015年 | 7篇 |
2014年 | 3篇 |
2013年 | 23篇 |
2012年 | 10篇 |
2011年 | 4篇 |
2010年 | 4篇 |
2009年 | 15篇 |
2008年 | 13篇 |
2007年 | 20篇 |
2006年 | 10篇 |
2005年 | 11篇 |
2004年 | 13篇 |
2003年 | 5篇 |
2002年 | 14篇 |
2001年 | 8篇 |
2000年 | 5篇 |
1999年 | 9篇 |
1998年 | 3篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1996年 | 5篇 |
1995年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 3篇 |
1993年 | 7篇 |
1992年 | 2篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 6篇 |
1989年 | 3篇 |
1988年 | 4篇 |
1987年 | 3篇 |
排序方式: 共有262条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
171.
Lieven Decock 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2002,33(2):231-250
Quine's views on indispensability arguments in mathematics are scrutinised. A weak indispensability argument is distinguished
from a strong indispensability thesis. The weak argument is the combination of the criterion of ontological commitment, holism
and a mild naturalism. It is used to refute nominalism. Quine's strong indispensability thesis claims that one should consider
all and only the mathematical entities that are really indispensable. Quine has little support for this thesis. This is even
clearer if one takes into account Maddy's critique of Quine's strong indispensability thesis. Maddy's critique does not refute
Quine's weak indispensability argument. We are left with a weak and almost unassailable indispensability argument.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
172.
Robert K. Fleck 《Zygon》2011,46(3):561-587
Abstract. Since Darwin, scholars have contemplated what our growing understanding of natural selection, combined with the fact that great suffering occurs, allows us to infer about the possibility that a benevolent God created the universe. Building on this long line of thought, I develop a model that illustrates how undesirable characteristics of the world (stylized “evils”) can influence long‐run outcomes. More specifically, the model considers an evolutionary process in which each generation faces a risk from a “natural evil” (e.g., predation, disease, or a natural disaster) subsequent to a basic resource allocation game. This allows both resource allocation and the natural evil to influence the number of surviving offspring. As the model shows, when the risk from the natural evil can be mitigated through the benevolent behavior of neighbors, the population may have increasing benevolence as a result of (1) greater risk from the natural evil and (2) a greater degree to which selfish individuals transfer resources to themselves in the resource allocation game. The main implication is that a world with evolutionary processes (in contrast to a world of static design) can allow two factors that have traditionally been considered “evils”—namely, the indiscriminate cruelty of the natural world and the capacity for humans to harm each other—to promote desirable long‐run outcomes. 相似文献
173.
Nicolas Espinoza 《Synthese》2008,165(1):127-139
It is commonly assumed that moral deliberation requires that the alternatives available in a choice situation are evaluatively
comparable. This comparability assumption is threatened by claims of incomparability, which is often established by means
of the small improvement argument (SIA). In this paper I argue that SIA does not establish incomparability in a stricter sense.
The reason is that it fails to distinguish incomparability from a kind of evaluative indeterminacy which may arise due to
the vagueness of the evaluative comparatives ‘better than,’ ‘worse than,’ and ‘equally as good as.’ 相似文献
174.
Mylan Engel Jr. 《Metaphilosophy》2014,45(2):146-160
As we trace a chain of reasoning backward, it must ultimately do one of four things: (i) end in an unjustified belief, (ii) continue infinitely, (iii) form a circle, or (iv) end in an immediately justified basic belief. This article defends positism—the view that, in certain circumstances, type‐(i) chains can justify us in holding their target beliefs. One of the assumptions that generates the epistemic regress problem is: (A) Person S is mediately justified in believing p iff (1) S has a doxastic reason q for p and (2) S is justified in believing q. Assumption (A) presupposes that reasoning is only justification transmitting, not justification generating. The article rejects (A) and argues that, in certain circumstances, reasoning itself is justification generating, even if that from which one is reasoning is not itself justified. It concludes by comparing positism with its infinitist, coherentist, and foundationalist rivals, acknowledging what is right about these other views. 相似文献
175.
《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(3-4):67-81
Most philosophers agree that an argument's presentation is relevant to its philosophical merit. This paper explains why David Hume considered presentation philosophically important. On Hume's epistemology, presentation is closely connected with two principal aims of philosophical arguments: persuasion and epistemic justification. Hume's views imply that presentation is a factor determining an argument's persuasiveness and that, by philosophical standards of justification, presentation is also a factor determining the extent to which an argument's conclusion is justified. 相似文献
176.
J. Angelo Corlett 《Sport, Ethics and Philosophy》2014,8(2):116-136
Recently, there have been discussions about whether or not inter-collegiate football should be eliminated in the US. This article philosophically assesses the arguments for its elimination as well as the arguments proffered against its elimination. While a variety of arguments are discussed, a new one is brought into the foray of philosophical investigation, one that combines the unfairness and economic arguments: the health care and medical costs to others argument. It is believed that this argument is sufficient to justify the elimination of inter-collegiate football. 相似文献
177.
Howard Rachlin 《The Behavior analyst / MABA》2013,36(2):209-222
Misconceptions abound about teleological behaviorism (TB). Because very few people other than the author publicly call themselves teleological behaviorists, the fault must be mine. The present article is an attempt to clear up those misconceptions. First I will try to indicate what teleological behaviorism is not. Then, in the form of six fables (loosely connected stories, allegories, analogies, fairy tales, and arguments), I will try to give the reader an understanding of what teleological behaviorism actually is. 相似文献
178.
Patrick J. Leman 《The Journal of genetic psychology》2013,174(1):40-57
In this experimental study, the author examined whether children's conversations play a role in the processes of influence between peers. Children, aged 8 to 10 years, who were at different levels of moral development participated. The conversations of 120 children were coded and analyzed in terms of argument structure and content. Results indicated that the differences in structure between boys' and girls' arguments are stylistic and do not influence conversation outcomes. The children's use of the structural features of conversations suggested that when a more advanced position is adopted, the arguments themselves appear to inspire cognitive change. However, when a less advanced position is adopted, the children who influence their peers invoke a particular and insistent conversational style. Results are discussed in terms of transmission and constructivist accounts of the role of social interaction in cognitive development. 相似文献
179.
Kevin Scharp 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(1):25-63
This paper examines the nature of ‘reasonable’ (eulogos) argumentation in Generation of Animals III.10. Its aim is to develop an alternative to the dialectical construal of reasonable argumentation in Aristotle recently favoured by Robert Bolton. On the basis of a close textual analysis I show that the reasonable arguments deployed in Generation of Animals III.10 do not appeal to endoxa or reputable beliefs per se. Instead, they rely upon general facts (sumbainonta) about animals established by empirical induction. This implies that, contra Bolton, not all reasonable arguments in Aristotle are dialectical; some, in fact, are thoroughly empirical and scientific. I conclude by suggesting that such empirical reasonable arguments even have a place in the De Caelo, the treatise that Bolton primarily focused upon when developing his interpretation. 相似文献
180.
Russell Marcus 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(2):163-183
Abstract Hartry Field defended the importance of his nominalist reformulation of Newtonian Gravitational Theory, as a response to the indispensability argument, on the basis of a general principle of intrinsic explanation. In this paper, I argue that this principle is not sufficiently defensible, and can not do the work for which Field uses it. I argue first that the model for Field’s reformulation, Hilbert’s axiomatization of Euclidean geometry, can be understood without appealing to the principle. Second, I argue that our desires to unify our theories and explanations undermines Field’s principle. Third, the claim that extrinsic theories seem like magic is, in this case, really just a demand for an account of the applications of mathematics in science. Finally, even if we were to accept the principle, it would not favor the fictionalism that motivates Field’s argument, since the indispensabilist’s mathematical objects are actually intrinsic to scientific theory. 相似文献