论元结构的焦点和重音关系对话语理解的影响

本研究采用韵律合适度判断和理解任务,通过两个实验探讨论元结构的焦点和重音之间的关系对话语理解的影响。实验通过操纵答句中的论元是否出现在问句中,变化问句的信息状态;通过操纵答句不同句子成份重读,变化答句的重读位置。实验结果发现:新论元负载焦点必须重读;重读论元将焦点投射到句子的高一级单元上,但动词必须重读;旧论元不负载焦点不必重读,但负载焦点的动词必须重读。     

Michael J. Dodds,O.P. Unlocking Divine Action: Contemporary Science & Thomas Aquinas

Abstract

Philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig has argued for the past-finitude of the world, employing contemporary cosmology in support of the Kalam cosmological argument for the existence of a First Cause. However, his argument has gained little traction in the world of interdisciplinary theology. In what follows, we present Craig's argument and entertain potential objections from the perspective of interdisciplinarians. Finally, we argue that, in spite of the potential objections raised by contemporary theologians, Craig's argument remains theologically pertinent—provided his conclusion is framed within the more modest methodology of a best explanation.     

German Idealism and the Concept of Punishment

This paper examines the Leibnizian background to Kant's critique of the ontological argument. I present Kant's claim that existence is not a real predicate, already formulated in his pre-critical essay of 1673, as a generalization of Leibniz's reasoning regarding the existence of created things. The first section studies Leibniz's equivocations on the notion of existence and shows that he employs two distinct notions of existence – one for God and another for created substances. The second section examines Kant's position in his early paper of 1763. My claim is that Kant's view of existence in 1763, namely that it is not a predicate, is strongly related to the logical notion of possibility, formulated by Leibniz and accepted by Kant.     

HOW SHOULD WE BEHAVE? A REVIEW OF REASONS AND PERSONS BY DEREK PARFIT

In this book Parfit attempts to develop a rational, non-religious ethics. Instead of asking, “What does God tell us to do?” he asks, “What does reason tell us to do?” Given a set of simple assumptions, he considers whether it is possible to be consistently selfish or consistently good. Analyses of personal dilemmas (problems of self-control) and moral dilemmas (problems of social cooperation) show that neither consistent selfishness nor consistent goodness is logically possible. Instead, a fine balance must be maintained between, on the one hand, our immediate versus long-term good and, on the other, our own good versus that of other people. Ultimately Parfit fails to develop a formula by which such a balance may be struck. Parfit''s analysis is consistent with behavioral analysis in its reductionistic view of the self and the parallel it draws between relations with other people and relations with oneself at other times. Parfit''s analysis is inconsistent with behaviorism in its view of the mind as internal, available to introspection, and able to cause behavior. His nonfunctional mentalism leads Parfit to inconsistencies and blocks the path to a consistent ethics. Teleological behaviorism''s view of the mind in terms of patterns of overt behavior is not hampered by these inconsistencies and may lead to a functional rather than purely rational ethics.     

A critique of Vihvelin's Three-fold Classification

In this essay, I argue for the rejection of Vihvelin's ‘Three-fold Classification’ (3-FC), a nonstandard taxonomy of free-will compatibilism, incompatibilism, and impossibilism. Vihvelin is right that the standard taxonomy of these views is inadequate, and that a new taxonomy is needed to clarify the free-will debate. Significantly, Vihvelin notes that the standard formal definition of ‘incompatibilism’ does not capture the historically popular view that deterministic laws pose a threat to free will. Vihvelin's proposed solution is to redefine ‘incompatibilism.’ However, Vihvelin's formal definition of ‘incompatibilism’ is flawed according to her own arguments. In addition, Vihvelin's characterization of ‘compatibilism’ is (at best) incomplete, and at least two important free-will views are missing from her proposed taxonomy. Given the problems with Vihvelin's arguments for 3-FC, her novel view of the dialectic between the major free-will views lacks support.     

Aiming at the good

This paper shows how we can plausibly extend the guise of the good thesis in a way that avoids intellectualist challenge, allows animals to be included, and is consistent with the possibility of performing action under the cognition of their badness. The paper also presents some independent arguments for the plausibility of this interpretation of the thesis. To this aim, a teleological conception of practical attitudes as well as a cognitivist account of arational desires is offered.     

Epistemological Open Questions

While there has been a great deal of recent interest in parallels between metaethics and metaepistemology, there has been little discussion of epistemological analogues of the open question argument (hereafter: OQA). This is somewhat surprising—the general trend in recent work is in the direction of emphasizing the continuity between metaethics and metaepistemology, and to treat metanormative questions as arising in parallel in these two normative domains. And while the OQA has been subjected to a wide variety of objections, it is still influential in metaethics. In this paper, I aim to show that an epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin. That's not to say that I'll unqualifiedly endorse either argument. Rather, my aim is to show that there is just as strong a prima facie (really, secunda facie) case for an OQA in metaepistemology as there is in metaethics—I leave open whether the ultima facie case collapses.     

Sinnott-Armstrong,Walter, ed., Moral Psychology,Volume 3. The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion,Brain Disorders,and Development,Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008, pp. xix + 569, US $30 (paperback)

Many take the claim that you cannot ‘get’ an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ to imply that non-moral beliefs are by themselves incapable of justifying moral beliefs. I argue that this is a mistake and that the position that moral beliefs are justified exclusively by non-moral beliefs—a view that I call moral inferentialism—presents an attractive non-sceptical moral epistemology.     

动词论元结构复杂性加工的认知神经机制

动词论元结构复杂性表现在论元数量、论元范畴选择模式、题元角色指派模式和映射方式四个方面。大部分实证研究表明, 更多的论元数量、选择性论元范畴、选择性题元角色指派以及非典型映射, 使动词论元结构加工的认知神经机制更复杂。多论元加工功能脑区主要涉及左侧额下回和外侧裂周后部; 选择性论元范畴加工功能脑区主要涉及左侧额下回、额叶中后部、颞上回和颞叶中后部; 选择性题元角色指派加工功能脑区主要涉及外侧裂周后部、左侧额叶中后部和额下回; 非典型映射加工功能脑区主要涉及左侧额下回、颞上回、颞中回和颞叶后部。左侧额下回可能涉及初始句法加工、动词次范畴确定、句法移位和非宾格动词语义加工, 左侧额叶中后部可能涉及初始句法加工和动词次范畴确定, 左侧颞上回和颞叶中后部可能涉及表层句法加工和表层论元句法-语义整合, 外侧裂周后部可能涉及论元语义表征。动词论元结构加工过程和动词词汇特征表明, 复杂性某些方面存在交互作用。动词论元结构复杂性与加工难易的对应关系、复杂性加工难度层级和交互作用的认知神经机制以及汉语动词论元结构复杂性加工认知神经机制等议题, 有待进一步探讨。     

Acquiring and processing verb argument structure: distributional learning in a miniature language

Adult knowledge of a language involves correctly balancing lexically-based and more language-general patterns. For example, verb argument structures may sometimes readily generalize to new verbs, yet with particular verbs may resist generalization. From the perspective of acquisition, this creates significant learnability problems, with some researchers claiming a crucial role for verb semantics in the determination of when generalization may and may not occur. Similarly, there has been debate regarding how verb-specific and more generalized constraints interact in sentence processing and on the role of semantics in this process. The current work explores these issues using artificial language learning. In three experiments using languages without semantic cues to verb distribution, we demonstrate that learners can acquire both verb-specific and verb-general patterns, based on distributional information in the linguistic input regarding each of the verbs as well as across the language as a whole. As with natural languages, these factors are shown to affect production, judgments and real-time processing. We demonstrate that learners apply a rational procedure in determining their usage of these different input statistics and conclude by suggesting that a Bayesian perspective on statistical learning may be an appropriate framework for capturing our findings.