互惠教学:情境教学与认知教学结合的典范

互惠教学是一种教授阅读理解策略的教学模式,结合了专家示范教学与小组对话的特征。本文回顾了互惠教学这一教学模式的提出,以及在以往二十多年里这一领域所经历的策略研究、对话研究与教学情境研究的三个阶段;进而评价了以往研究中的不足。展望了今后研究的方向,为阅读策略的教学与研究提供了参考,并支持了专长研究的新视角。     

认知负荷理论在教学设计中的应用及其启示

在教学设计中,认知负荷理论有助于激励学习者的学习活动、使之表现出良好的学习绩效。认知负荷理论主要依赖于以容量有限的工作记忆为核心的认知结构的支持。工作记忆包括相对独立的视觉、听觉信息加工单元,同时又与容量较大的长时记忆共同承担着对信息的贮存与理解。根据该理论,可以通过把多个信息单元编码成一个完整的认知图式,或通过自动化加工规则,或使用多媒介（多感觉通路）呈现形式等多种方法来设法规避工作记忆的有限性。此文总结了可通过样例学习增加适当的认知负荷的教育技巧,样例一精细化训练对于降低认知干扰及超负荷的影响,样例对学习者的认知负荷的影响,以认知负荷理论为基础的教学设计原则,以及基于认知负荷理论研发的教学设计在各方面业已取得的进展及其存在的问题与可能的发展趋势。     

Non-Adjunctive Inference and Classical Modalities

The article focuses on representing different forms of non-adjunctive inference as sub-Kripkean systems of classical modal logic, where the inference from □A and □B to □A∧B fails. In particular we prove a completeness result showing that the modal system that Schotch and Jennings derive from a form of non-adjunctive inference in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980) is a classical system strictly stronger than EMN and weaker than K (following the notation for classical modalities presented in Chellas, 1980). The unified semantical characterization in terms of neighborhoods permits comparisons between different forms of non-adjunctive inference. For example, we show that the non-adjunctive logic proposed in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980) is not adequate in general for representing the logic of high probability operators. An alternative interpretation of the forcing relation of Schotch and Jennings is derived from the proposed unified semantics and utilized in order to propose a more fine-grained measure of epistemic coherence than the one presented in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980). Finally we propose a syntactic translation of the purely implicative part of Jaśkowski's system D₂ into a classical system preserving all the theorems (and non-theorems) explicilty mentioned in (Jaśkowski, 1969). The translation method can be used in order to develop epistemic semantics for a larger class of non-adjunctive (discursive) logics than the ones historically investigated by Jaśkowski.     

The Logic and Meaning of Plurals. Part I

Contemporary accounts of logic and language cannot give proper treatments of plural constructions of natural languages. They assume that plural constructions are redundant devices used to abbreviate singular constructions. This paper and its sequel, “The logic and meaning of plurals, II”, aim to develop an account of logic and language that acknowledges limitations of singular constructions and recognizes plural constructions as their peers. To do so, the papers present natural accounts of the logic and meaning of plural constructions that result from the view that plural constructions are, by and large, devices for talking about many things (as such). The account of logic presented in the papers surpasses contemporary Fregean accounts in its scope. This extension of the scope of logic results from extending the range of languages that logic can directly relate to. Underlying the view of language that makes room for this is a perspective on reality that locates in the world what plural constructions can relate to. The papers suggest that reflections on plural constructions point to a broader framework for understanding logic, language, and reality that can replace the contemporary Fregean framework as this has replaced its Aristotelian ancestor.     

On Retaining Classical Truths and Classical Deducibility in Many-Valued and Fuzzy Logics

In this paper, I identify the source of the differences between classical logic and many-valued logics (including fuzzy logics) with respect to the set of valid formulas and the set of inferences sanctioned. In the course of doing so, we find the conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for any many-valued semantics (again including fuzzy logics) to validate exactly the classically valid formulas, while sanctioning exactly the same set of inferences as classical logic. This in turn shows, contrary to what has sometimes been claimed, that at least one class of infinite-valued semantics is axiomatizable.     

Dual Intuitionistic Logic and a Variety of Negations: The Logic of Scientific Research

We consider a logic which is semantically dual (in some precise sense of the term) to intuitionistic. This logic can be labeled as “falsification logic”: it embodies the Popperian methodology of scientific discovery. Whereas intuitionistic logic deals with constructive truth and non-constructive falsity, and Nelson's logic takes both truth and falsity as constructive notions, in the falsification logic truth is essentially non-constructive as opposed to falsity that is conceived constructively. We also briefly clarify the relationships of our falsification logic to some other logical systems.     

The Logical Structure of Linguistic Commitment III Brandomian Scorekeeping and Incompatibility

Curiously, though he provides in Making It Explicit (MIE) elaborate accounts of various representational idioms, of anaphora and deixis, and of quantification, Robert Brandom nowhere attempts to lay out how his understanding of content and his view of the role of logical idioms combine in even the simplest cases of what he calls paradigmatic logical vocabulary. That is, Brandom has a philosophical account of content as updating potential – as inferential potential understood in the sense of commitment or entitlement preservation – and says that the point of logical vocabulary is to make available the expressive resources to make explicit such semantic structures as arise from discursive scorekeeping practice. Thus, one would expect an account of the updating or inferential potential of sentences involving logical vocabulary, an account which is such as to assign to those sentences the inferential significance necessary for this expressive job. In short, one would expect a semantics of logical vocabulary – &, , – in terms of the difference an assertion of a sentence involving it makes to the atomic score of a linguistic agent, and a completeness proof for the logic generated by this semantics. Despite this, no such semantics is given in MIE. It is in the current paper.     

Some Thoughts about the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever

The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever was first described by the late George Boolos in the Spring 1996 issue of the Harvard Review of Philosophy. Although not dissimilar in appearance from many other simpler puzzles involving gods (or tribesmen) who always tell the truth or always lie, this puzzle has several features that make the solution far from trivial. This paper examines the puzzle and describes a simpler solution than that originally proposed by Boolos.     

Effects of the contingency for homework submission on homework submission and quiz performance in a college course

Effects of the contingency for submission of homework assignments on the probability of assignment submission and on quiz grades were assessed in an undergraduate psychology course. Under an alternating treatments design, each student was assigned to a points condition for 5 of 10 quiz-related homework assignments corresponding to textbook chapters. Points were available for homework submission under this condition; points were not available under the no-points condition. The group-mean percentage of homework assignments submitted and quiz grades were higher for all chapters under the points condition than in the no-points condition. These findings, which were replicated in Experiment 2, demonstrate that homework submission was not maintained when the only consequences were instructor-provided feedback and expectation of improved quiz performance.