The Impossibility of Local Skepticism

According to global skepticism, we know nothing. According to local skepticism, we know nothing in some particular area or domain of discourse. Unlike their global counterparts, local skeptics think they can contain our invincible ignorance within limited bounds. I argue that they are mistaken. Local skepticism, particularly the kinds that most often get defended, cannot stay local: if there are domains whose truths we cannot know, then there must be claims outside those domains that we cannot know even if they are true. My argument focuses on one popular form of local skepticism, ethical skepticism, but I believe that the argument generalizes to cover other forms as well.

An algorithm for generating artificial test clusters

An algorithm for generating artificial data sets which contain distinct nonoverlapping clusters is presented. The algorithm is useful for generating test data sets for Monte Carlo validation research conducted on clustering methods or statistics. The algorithm generates data sets which contain either 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 clusters. By default, the data are embedded in either a 4, 6, or 8 dimensional space. Three different patterns for assigning the points to the clusters are provided. One pattern assigns the points equally to the clusters while the remaining two schemes produce clusters of unequal sizes. Finally, a number of methods for introducing error in the data have been incorporated in the algorithm.     

A critique of Vihvelin's Three-fold Classification

In this essay, I argue for the rejection of Vihvelin's ‘Three-fold Classification’ (3-FC), a nonstandard taxonomy of free-will compatibilism, incompatibilism, and impossibilism. Vihvelin is right that the standard taxonomy of these views is inadequate, and that a new taxonomy is needed to clarify the free-will debate. Significantly, Vihvelin notes that the standard formal definition of ‘incompatibilism’ does not capture the historically popular view that deterministic laws pose a threat to free will. Vihvelin's proposed solution is to redefine ‘incompatibilism.’ However, Vihvelin's formal definition of ‘incompatibilism’ is flawed according to her own arguments. In addition, Vihvelin's characterization of ‘compatibilism’ is (at best) incomplete, and at least two important free-will views are missing from her proposed taxonomy. Given the problems with Vihvelin's arguments for 3-FC, her novel view of the dialectic between the major free-will views lacks support.     

Turning up the volume on the property view of sound

In the present article, I show that sounds are properties that are not physical in a narrow sense. First, I argue that sounds are properties using Moorean-style arguments and defend this property view from various arguments against it that make use of salient disanalogies between sounds and colors. The first disanalogy is that we talk of objects making sounds but not of objects making colors. The second is that we count and quantify over sounds but not colors. The third is that sounds can survive qualitative change in their auditory properties, but colors cannot survive change in their chromatic properties. Next, I provide a taxonomy of property views of sound. As the property view of sound has been so rarely discussed, many of the views available have never been articulated. My taxonomy will articulate these views and how they are related to one another. I taxonomize sounds according to three characteristics: dispositional/non-dispositional, relational/non-relational and reductive/non-reductive. Finally, mirroring a popular argument in the color literature, I argue that physical views in the narrow sense are unable to accommodate the similarity and difference relations in which sounds essentially stand. I end replying to three objections.     

A Taxonomy of Anger-Related Behaviors in Young Adults

In 2 studies, we investigated the occurrence of anger-related behaviors and their relationship to emotional, performance-related, and situational variables. In the first study, we constructed a comprehensive taxonomy of behaviors associated with anger, and we examined the occurrence of the resulting behavior categories as a function of several independent variables. A total of 8 distinct behavior categories were identified, 3 aggressive and 5 nonaggressive. Our results also demonstrated that fight (including both verbal and physical aggression) and flight behaviors occurred most frequently. Physical aggression, however, occurred most frequently in an inhibited form, in response to the emotion of anger (as compared to the emotion of irritation), and when the anger was intense. A second study was conducted to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1. The results suggest that the taxonomy, as derived in Study 1, is comprehensive and allows for a reliable categorization. Moreover, it appeared that fight and flight behaviors occurred most frequently if the target at whom one is angry was present. The following reduction rules were used: (a) responses that differed only in the order of the words were put together; (b) singular and plural items were joined; (c) responses that differed only in verbs such as “to be,” “to become” or “to do” were grouped together; (d) responses that differed only syntactically (verb, noun or adjective) were grouped together; (e) responses that differed only with respect to an article, a preposition, or a possessive word were grouped together; (f) and a few specific rules were used (e.g., yourself = myself; self = auto). The complete coding manual is available upon request from the first author. This number differed across proportions because it depended on the number of participants assigned to each of the experimental questionnaires. Our initial analyses contained a participant-specific random intercept, so as to take into account individual differences in the propensity to use each of the behavior categories. Inclusion of a random intercept appeared to yield a significant improvement in model fit for two of the eight behavior categories. However, because analyses with a random and with a fixed intercept yielded similar conclusions, we decided to select the most parsimonious model, namely the one without a random intercept. The total number of participant–performance–instrumentality combinations equals 504 (i.e., 84×6) because all 84 participants had to answer six questions.     

The multiple realization book

In this review of Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book I look at the positive account, Modest Identity Theory, that Polger and Shapiro advance. In §2 of this review, I outline P&S’s arguments against multiple realization and summarize the view they defend, Modest Identity Theory. In §3, I consider what consequences the adoption of Modest Identity Theory might have on the ontology of psychological or mental kinds. In particular, I highlight the ontological pluralism and anti-reductionism that Polger and Shapiro endorse. Modest Identity Theory tolerates multiple taxonomies of psychological kinds, which represents an important departure from earlier versions of Identity Theory. I conclude in §4 by arguing that the way Modest Identity Theory individuates psychological kinds very closely resembles the way that those kinds are individuated by functionalism. I argue that the causal properties individuative of psychological kinds can be used to group together distinct neuroanatomical characteristics. I illustrate this by describing research into the functional connectivity of the reading network. I conclude by emphasizing the value of using empirical evidence from neuroscience and cognitive science to inform the new pluralistic ontology of psychological and mental kinds with which Modest Identity Theory is compatible.