Effects of facial expressions on visual short-term memory in relation to alexithymia traits

We examined dysfunctional memory processing of facial expressions in relation to alexithymia. Individuals with high and low alexithymia, as measured by the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20), participated in a visual search task (Experiment 1A) and a change-detection task (Experiments 1B and 2), to assess differences in their visual short-term memory (VSTM). In the visual search task, the participants were asked to judge whether all facial expressions (angry and happy faces) in the search display were the same or different. In the change-detection task, they had to decide whether all facial expressions changed between successive two displays. We found individual differences only in the change-detection task. Individuals with high alexithymia showed lower sensitivity for the happy faces compared to the angry faces, while individuals with low alexithymia showed sufficient recognition for both facial expressions. Experiment 2 examined whether individual differences were observed during early storage or later retrieval stage of the VSTM process using a single-probe paradigm. We found no effect of single-probe, indicating that individual differences occurred at the storage stage. The present results provide new evidence that individuals with high alexithymia show specific impairment in VSTM processes (especially the storage stage) related to happy but not to angry faces.     

Dissociation between the behavioural and electrophysiological effects of the face and body composite illusions

Several studies have reported similarities between perceptual processes underlying face and body perception, particularly emphasizing the importance of configural processes. Differences between the perception of faces and the perception of bodies were observed by means of a manipulation targeting a specific subtype of configural processing: the composite illusion. The composite face illusion describes the fact that two identical top halves of a face are perceived as being different if they are presented with different bottom parts. This effect disappears, if both halves are laterally shifted. Crucially, the effect of misalignment is not observed for bodies. This study aimed to further explore differences in the time course of face and body perception by using the composite effect. The present results replicated behavioural effects illustrating that misalignment affects the perception of faces but not bodies. Thus, face but not body perception relies on holistic processing. However, differences in the time course of the processing of both stimulus categories emerged at the N170 and P200. The pattern of the behavioural data seemed to be related to the P200. Thus, the present data indicate that holistic processes associated with the effect of misalignment might occur 200 ms after stimulus onset.     

One ring to rule them all: Master discourses of enlightenment—and racism—from colonial to contemporary New Zealand

We interrogated historical continuity and change in discourses of enlightenment and racism through the analysis of 160 years of New Zealand Speeches from the Throne (1854–2014, 163 speeches). Enlightenment discourses of benevolence and perfectibility were prevalent in all periods, much more so than racism. ‘Old‐fashioned’ racism took the form of an assumed civilizational superiority (including accusations of ‘barbarism’) during colonization, with ‘modern’ racism taking forms like blaming Māori for not ‘productively’ using the land. Both declined to almost zero by the 20th century, undermining the idea of ‘old‐fashioned’ versus ‘modern’ racism. Utilitarian discourses peaked in the late 19th to early 20th centuries as justification for Māori land alienation. ‘Master discourses of enlightenment’ consisted of a central core of social representations that changed at the periphery, with a gradual expansion of symbolic inclusion of Māori in discourses of national identity to the point where biculturalism is the dominant discourse for elites today.     

Echoes of the Danish Cartoon Crisis 10 Years Later: Identity,Injury and Intelligibility from Copenhagen to Paris and Texas

ABSTRACT

The tenth anniversary of the Danish cartoon crisis of 2005–06 invites reflection on its historical significance and contemporary relevance. In the Danish context 10 years ago, the events generated substantial debate about issues such as terrorism, immigration, blasphemy and the place of Islam in Denmark and in the Danish folk. Furthermore, they raised complex questions about Danish identity in a society that had become significantly more religiously and culturally diverse in the preceding decades. Most of these questions, however, were eclipsed by the polarized public debate about free speech and religious respect. The year 2015 brought many of these questions back to the fore after the murders that January of 12 journalists at the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo and attacks at a kosher market in Paris, followed in February by shootings at a free speech event in Copenhagen and at a synagogue, and later attacks in May at a Muhammad cartoon contest exhibit in Garland, Texas. Despite their disparate contexts, these violent events have echoes of the original Danish cartoon crisis. This article suggests that the three concepts of identity, injury and intelligibility can together help to add complexity to popular interpretations of the original Danish cartoon crisis and recent related events, and prompt us to think beyond the dualistic categories of free speech and blasphemy.     

The role of holistic face processing in acquired prosopagnosia: evidence from the composite face effect

Faces are processed more holistically than other objects, and it has been suggested that the loss of holistic face processing causes acquired prosopagnosia. Support for this hypothesis comes from several cases who failed to show holistic face effects as well as the absence of reports of prosopagnosics with unequivocally normal holistic face perception. The current study examines the relationship between holistic face processing and prosopagnosia by testing seven acquired prosopagnosics with the face composite task, a classic measure of holistic face processing. To enhance the robustness of the findings, each prosopagnosic was tested with two versions of the composite task showing upright faces. We also tested an inverted condition to exclude the possibility that more general factors account for composite effects for upright faces. Four of the seven acquired prosopagnosic participants showed consistent upright face composite effects with minimal inverted face composite effects. We conclude that severe face processing deficits can co-occur with intact holistic face processing and that factors other than a loss of holistic processing contribute to the perceptual and recognition deficits in acquired prosopagnosia.     

The “parts and wholes” of face recognition: A review of the literature

It has been claimed that faces are recognized as a “whole” rather than by the recognition of individual parts. In a paper published in the Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology in 1993, Martha Farah and I attempted to operationalize the holistic claim using the part/whole task. In this task, participants studied a face and then their memory presented in isolation and in the whole face. Consistent with the holistic view, recognition of the part was superior when tested in the whole-face condition compared to when it was tested in isolation. The “whole face” or holistic advantage was not found for faces that were inverted, or scrambled, nor for non-face objects, suggesting that holistic encoding was specific to normal, intact faces. In this paper, we reflect on the part/whole paradigm and how it has contributed to our understanding of what it means to recognize a face as a “whole” stimulus. We describe the value of part/whole task for developing theories of holistic and non-holistic recognition of faces and objects. We discuss the research that has probed the neural substrates of holistic processing in healthy adults and people with prosopagnosia and autism. Finally, we examine how experience shapes holistic face recognition in children and recognition of own- and other-race faces in adults. The goal of this article is to summarize the research on the part/whole task and speculate on how it has informed our understanding of holistic face processing.     

Judging trustworthiness from faces: Emotion cues modulate trustworthiness judgments in young children

By adulthood, people judge trustworthiness from appearances rapidly and reliably. However, we know little about these judgments in children. This novel study investigates the developmental trajectory of explicit trust judgments from faces, and the contribution made by emotion cues across age groups. Five‐, 7‐, 10‐year‐olds, and adults rated the trustworthiness of trustworthy and untrustworthy faces with neutral expressions. The same participants also rated faces displaying overt happy and angry expressions, allowing us to investigate whether emotion cues modulate trustworthiness judgments similarly in children and adults. Results revealed that the ability to evaluate the trustworthiness of faces emerges in childhood, but may not be adult like until 10 years of age. Moreover, we show that emotion cues modulate trust judgments in young children, as well as adults. Anger cues diminished the appearance of trustworthiness for participants from 5 years of age and happy cues increased it, although this effect did not consistently emerge until later in childhood, that is, 10 years of age. These associations also extended to more subtle emotion cues present in neutral faces. Our results indicate that young children are sensitive to facial trustworthiness, and suggest that similar expression cues modulate these judgments in children and adults.     

Dissecting the time course of person recognition in natural viewing environments

Person recognition often unfolds over time and distance as a person approaches, with the quality of identity information from faces, bodies, and motion in constant flux. Participants were familiarized with identities using close‐up and distant videos. Recognition was tested with videos of people approaching from a distance. We varied the timing of prompted responses in the test videos, the amount of video seen, and whether the face, body, or whole person was visible. A free response condition was also included to allow participants to respond when they felt ‘confident’. The pattern of accuracy across conditions indicated that recognition judgments were based on the most recently available information, with no contribution from qualitatively diverse and statistically useful person cues available earlier in the video. Body recognition was stable across viewing distance, whereas face recognition improved with proximity. The body made an independent contribution to recognition only at the farthest distance tested. Free response latencies indicated meta‐knowledge of the optimal proximity for recognition from faces versus bodies. Notably, response bias varied strongly as a function of participants’ expectation about whether closer proximity video was forthcoming. These findings lay the groundwork for developing person recognition theories that generalize to natural viewing environments.     

Commentary on ‘The arms of the chimeras’ by Béatrice Ithier

In this Commentary I will first of all summarise my understanding of the proposal set out by Béatrice Ithier concerning her concept of the ‘chimera’. The main part of my essay will focus on Ithier's claim that her concept of the chimera could be described as a ‘mental squiggle’ because it corresponds to Winnicott's work illustrated in his book ‘Therapeutic Consultations’ (1971). At the core of Ithier's chimera is the notion of a traumatic link between analyst and patient, which is the reason she enlists the work of Winnicott. I will argue, however, that Ithier's claim is based on a misperception of the theory that underpins Winnicott's therapeutic consultations because, different from Ithier's clinical examples of work with traumatised patients, Winnicott is careful to select cases who are from an ‘average expectable environment’ i.e. a good enough family. Moreover, Winnicott does not refer to any traumatic affinity with his patients, or to experiencing a quasi‐hallucinatory state of mind during the course of the consultations. These aspects are not incorporated into his theory. In contrast (to the concept Ithier attempts to advance), Winnicott's squiggle game constitutes an application of psychoanalysis intended as a diagnostic consultation. In that sense Winnicott's therapeutic consultations are comparable with the ordinary everyday work between analyst and analysand in a psychoanalytic treatment. My Commentary concludes with a question concerning the distinction between the ordinary countertransference in working with patients who are thinking symbolically in contrast to an extraordinary countertransference that I suggest is more likely to arise with patients who are traumatised and thus functioning at a borderline or psychotic level.