A critique of Tversky and Kahneman's distinction between fallacy and misunderstanding

Tversky and Kahneman explain cognitive errors in terms of either misunderstanding or fallacy , but have failed to define these concepts. Therefore, they are unable to derive strict diagnostic criteria for distinguishing between them. The lack of conceptual clarification also has prevented them from recognizing the circular relationship between understanding and logicality. Diagnosis of understanding presupposes logicality, and diagnosis of logicality presupposes understanding. This circularity follows when understanding is defined as grasping what is and is not logically implied by a given expression as intended, and when fallacy is defined as logical error. Alternative definitions are discussed and rejected. Tversky and Kahneman fail to realize that one cannot explain and understand what is genuinely illogical, and that, therefore, errors must always be regarded as failure to understand, that is, as logical inference from erroneous premises.     

May the force be with you

This paper is a critical assessment of argumentum ad baculum, or appeal to force. Its principal contention is that, contrary to common opinion, there is no general fallacy of ad baculum. Most real-life ad baculums are, in fact, fairly strong. A basic logical form for reconstructed ad baculums is proposed, and a number of heterodoxical conclusions are also advanced and argued for. They include that ad baculum is not necessarily a prudential argument, that ad baculum need not involve force, violence, or threats, and that one can argue ad baculum to oneself. The starting point of the paper, however, is a critical evaluation of three ad baculums from the exercise sets of Irving Copi's well-known Introduction to Logic.     

The fallacy of fallacies

Several of the so-called fallacies in Aristotle are not in fact mistaken inference-types, but mistakes or breaches of rules in the questioning games which were practiced in the Academy and in the Lyceum. Hence the entire Aristotelian theory of fallacies ought to be studied by reference to the author's interrogative model of inquiry, based on his theory of questions and answers, rather than as a part of the theory of inference. Most of the fallacies mentioned by Aristotle can in fact be diagnosed by means of the interrogative model, including petitio principii, multiple questions, babbling, etc., and so can Aristotle's alleged anticipation of the fallacy of argumentum ad hominem. The entire Aristotelian conception of inquiry is an interrogative one. Deductive conclusions caught Aristotle's attention in the form of answers that every rational interlocutor must give, assuming only his own earlier answers. Several features of Aristotle's methodology can be understood by means of the interrogative model, including the role of endoxa in it. Theoretically, there is also considerable leeway as to whether fallacies are conceived of as mistakes in questioning or as breaches of the rules that govern questioning games.     

交道性世界中的生命沉沦及反向运动之可能——海德格尔“那托普报告”的构境论解读

青年海德格尔在"那托普报告"中突显出一种全新的功用性交道世界观。在这里,本体论被建构为生命活动的存在论,对于每一个生命个体来说,你的存在方式就是我照料故我在。并且,我们交道故世界在。可是,这个交道性的周围世界就是沉沦。由于生命此在的个体已经将自己交付于交道性的非本真的关照性在世,所以他必然失去本己性的独立性,只是作为常人沉沦于世界。     

Naming our concerns about neuroscience: a review of Bennett and Hacker's philosophical foundations of neuroscience

Bennett and Hacker use conceptual analysis to appraise the theoretical language of modern cognitive neuroscientists, and conclude that neuroscientific theory is largely dualistic despite the fact that neuroscientists equate mind with the operations of the brain. The central error of cognitive neuroscientists is to commit the mereological fallacy, the tendency to ascribe to the brain psychological concepts that only make sense when ascribed to whole animals. The authors review how the mereological fallacy is committed in theories of memory, perception, thinking, imagery, belief, consciousness, and other psychological processes studied by neuroscientists, and the consequences that fallacious reasoning have for our understanding of how the brain participates in cognition and behavior. Several behavior-analytic concepts may themselves be nonsense based on thorough conceptual analyses in which the criteria for sense and nonsense are found in the ways the concepts are used in ordinary language. Nevertheless, the authors' nondualistic approach and their consistent focus on behavioral criteria for the application of psychological concepts make Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience an important contribution to cognitive neuroscience.     

董仲舒"元"概念新解

关于董仲舒哲学体系中“元”的概念,先贤及时贤有不同的理解.元有本原之义,但不能理解为宇宙本原或者元气,也不能简单地理解为时间概念的开始.元具有开始、开端的意思,但如果仅仅停留在开始、开端这一点上,就丧失了董仲舒元哲学的本来含义,而这一点恰恰被学者所忽略.元是存在于天地之前的一种本原性的秩序,它强调“始”、“微”、“正”,强调君主在天人体系中的地位和作用,重视道德动机.元囊括了整个天人体系,天人体系的本原是元,元同时又涵盖了一切秩序.     

Evolutionary Ethics: Its Origin and Contemporary Face

The development of modern evolutionary ethics began shortly after the publication of Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species by Natural Selection . Early discussions were plagued by several problems. First, evolutionary ethical explanations were dependent on group-selection accounts of social behavior (especially the explanation of altruism). Second, they seem to violate the philosophical principle that "ought" statements cannot be derived from "is" statements alone (values cannot be derivedfrom facts alone). Third, evolutionary ethics appeared to be biologically deterministic, deemed incompatible with the free will required for ethics to be possible. Fourth, social policies based on evolutionary theory (for example, eugenics in the early part of this century) seemed patently unethical. Sociobiology (which coalesced as a field of study with Edward O. Wilson's Sociobiology: The New Synthesis , 1975) addressed several of these problems and provided a rich framework and a new impetus for evolutionary ethics. The lingering problems were the philosophical is-ought barrier and biological determinism. After tracing the early and more recent development of evolutionary ethics, I argue that the remaining problems can be surmounted and an incipient evolutionary ethics can be defended. Thoroughgoing evolutionaryethics must await theoretical developments in neurobiology and cognitive science.     

Once (but not twice) upon a time: Narrative inoculation against conjunction errors indirectly reduces conspiracy beliefs and improves truth discernment

Psychological inoculation has proven effective at reducing susceptibility to misinformation. We present a novel storytelling approach to inoculation against susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy (d_{meta-analysis} = 0.82), a known cognitive predictor of conspiracy beliefs. In Study 1 (Pilot; N = 161), a narrative inoculation (vs. control) reduced susceptibility to conjunction errors, and in turn, conspiracy beliefs regarding government malfeasance. In Study 2 (main experiment; N = 141; pre-registered), two separate narrative inoculations (vs. control) directly reduced susceptibility to conjunction errors, and indirectly reduced conspiracy beliefs regarding extra-terrestrial cover-ups. In addition, the inoculation messages improved detection of both real and fake news (‘truth discernment’). We discuss theoretical and practical implications, including the use of inoculation to induce critical thinking styles, and tailoring inoculations that may suit storytelling mediums.     

The construct of the ‘mana personality’ in Jung’s works: a historic-hermeneutic perspective. Part I

According to Jung, the ‘mana personality’ represents an archetypal phase of the individuation process of remarkable interest in psychological, hermeneutic and theoretical terms. This figure is characterized by a high initiatic potential that fosters the approximation of the consciousness of the Self. At the same time, it entails a risk of psychic inflation or of ‘similarity to God’. In this article, divided in two parts, I deal with those aspects through a reconstruction of the development of this notion within Jung’s published works, adopting a primarily chronological and, secondarily, thematic approach moving from a textual analysis of relevant passages. In this first part, I consider some passages which deal mainly with the risks of the assimilation of the unconscious in ‘La structure de l’inconscient’ (1916) that preceded the successive proper treatment of the mana personality’s notion presented, and here examined, in ‘The relations between the ego and the unconscious’ (1928). Successively, I take into consideration some further issues related to it discussed by Jung in ‘The structure of the psyche’ (1928/1931), ‘Archaic man’ (1931), and ‘Nietzsche’s Zarathustra’.     

The construct of the ‘mana personality’ in Jung’s works: a historic-hermeneutic perspective. Part II

This is the second part of an article that tries to provide a framework of understanding of, and a seminal reflection on, a highly interesting yet little explored psychological construct of Jung’s analytical psychology, namely the ‘mana personality’. Here I take into consideration some issues around the ‘saviour complex’, discussed in Jung’s seminar on Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, concerning both the psychological analysis of the individual and the socio-political level related to the collective horizon of the 1930s. Moreover, I consider the continuity of Jung’s analysis of such issues in other works such as ‘Psychology and national problems’ (1936), Symbols of Transformation (1952), and Aion (1950). I finally make some suggestions concerning Jung’s apparent hermeneutic tendency to apply the construct of the mana personality to collective historical phenomena.