Extreme Outcomes Sway Risky Decisions from Experience

Whether buying stocks or playing the slots, people making real‐world risky decisions often rely on their experiences with the risks and rewards. These decisions, however, do not occur in isolation but are embedded in a rich context of other decisions, outcomes, and experiences. In this paper, we systematically evaluate how the local context of other rewarding outcomes alters risk preferences. Through a series of four experiments on decisions from experience, we provide evidence for an extreme‐outcome rule, whereby people overweight the most extreme outcomes (highest and lowest) in a given context. As a result, people should be more risk seeking for gains than losses, even with equally likely outcomes. Across the experiments, the decision context was varied so that the same outcomes served as the high extreme, low extreme, or neither. As predicted, people were more risk seeking for relative gains, but only when the risky option potentially led to the high‐extreme outcome. Similarly, people were more risk averse for relative losses, but only when the risky option potentially led to the low‐extreme outcome. We conclude that in risky decisions from experience, the biggest wins and the biggest losses seem to matter more than they should. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

汉语声调水平映射规则的内隐学习及其长度迁移效应

内隐学习领域关注的重要问题是被试能够习得何种结构及其相应的学习机制。远距离规则的研究为澄清这一问题提供了新的视角。现有研究已证实被试能够内隐地习得并迁移固定长度的远距离规则。按照内隐学习抽象性的观点,如果被试习得的是远距离的抽象规则本身,那么迁移也同时会发生在不同长度的材料上。因此,研究以独特的汉语声调水平映射规则为材料,通过对表面特征与底层规则之间的分离操作,探讨声调水平映射规则的内隐习得和长度迁移,结果表明被试不仅能够习得这一规则,还能够将该规则灵活迁移到不同长度的材料上,进一步为内隐学习的抽象性特点和无限性的学习机制提供强有力的新证据。     

Inference and the taking condition

It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rule‐following, or by finding an innocuous role for the taking‐belief. Finally, I propose an alternative account of taking, according to which it is not a separate belief, but rather an aspect of the attitude of believing: Believing that p implies not only taking p to be true and taking oneself to believe that p, but also taking one's reasons q to support p, when the belief in question is held on account of an inference.     

Estimation and visualization of confusability matrices from adaptive measurement data

We present a simple but effective method based on Luce’s choice axiom [Luce, R.D. (1959). Individual choice behavior: A theoretical analysis. New York: John Wiley & Sons] for consistent estimation of the pairwise confusabilities of items in a multiple-choice recognition task with arbitrarily chosen choice-sets. The method combines the exact (non-asymptotic) Bayesian way of assessing uncertainty with the unbiasedness emphasized in the classical frequentist approach.We apply the method to data collected using an adaptive computer game designed for prevention of reading disability. A player’s estimated confusability of phonemes (or more accurately, phoneme-grapheme connections) and larger units of language is visualized in an easily understood way with color cues and explicit indication of the accuracy of the estimates. Visualization of learning-related changes in the player’s performance is considered.The empirical validity of the choice axiom is evaluated using the game data itself. The axiom appears to hold reasonably well although a small systematic violation is observable for the smallest choice-set sizes.     

Puzzles of Discourse in Being and Time: Minding Gaps in Understanding

Abstract

This paper takes issue with Heidegger’s claim that discourse and understanding are equally basic in the constitution of our making sense of the world. I argue that Heidegger cannot consistently establish this claim, and that discourse can be thought of as being more basic than understanding. The proposed line of thinking has the advantage of shedding light on both the finitude and the normativity of our making sense of the world. Thus, by setting up an exchange with the later Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule‐following makes it possible to develop an approach to the normativity of meaning which was not readily available on Heidegger’s account. Further, the paper offers an inquiry into a certain aspect of our finite sense of the world which, in spite of Heidegger’s marked attention to finitude, was obscured by his approach to discourse. The implications of the argument might be far‐reaching. The view of a basic role of discourse can put into question Heidegger’s guiding vision according to which time alone is ultimately the fundamental constituent of our sense of what there is. The engagement with Wittgenstein indicates, in conjunction with other themes of the paper, that there are certain perspectives and issues in phenomenology which are much closer to aspects of the analytic tradition than is usually granted.     

The Theory Of Social–Cultural Genetic Gene (S- c Dna)

It took a long time for humanity to know about biogenetics. And yet its role as a determinant in the living system was not proven until the twentieth century when DNA was discovered. Similarly, it took a long time for humanity to know about culture and civilization. And yet until now there is neither definite standards for differentiating them nor a definition that is commonly acceptable. By taking an evolutionary pluralism as ontology framework and the transdisciplinary research method of the systems science, we have in the new social system model discovered the central rules that govern the social–cultural heredity: Culture–Production–Civilization. The relationship between culture and civilization is exactly that of genotype and phenotype. Culture is the S-cDNA within the social system while civilization is the social phenotype. Culture is a determinant that ultimately determines the existence, stagnation, change, and evolution of the social system.     

Updating beliefs in light of uncertain evidence: Descriptive assessment of Jeffrey's rule

Jeffrey (1983) proposed a generalisation of conditioning as a means of updating probability distributions when new evidence drives no event to certainty. His rule requires the stability of certain conditional probabilities through time. We tested this assumption (“invariance”) from the psychological point of view. In Experiment 1 participants offered probability estimates for events in Jeffrey's candlelight example. Two further scenarios were investigated in Experiment 2, one in which invariance seems justified, the other in which it does not. Results were in rough conformity to Jeffrey's (1983) principle.     

Multiple schedules of conjugate reinforcement and extinction: A translational model for assessing automatically reinforced behavior

This study evaluated the extent to which a conjugate reinforcement schedule (CONJ) involving a contingency between pedaling a stationary bike and viewing a preferred movie could serve as a translational preparation for the analysis of automatically reinforced behavior. In part, researchers examined whether providing participants with either an accurate or an inaccurate rule about the extinction (EXT) component of a multiple schedule (MULT) contributed to the development of control by the MULT (CONJ EXT) schedule. Results show schedule control emerged for four of five participants who received the accurate rule and none of the five participants who received the inaccurate rule. In addition, participants who received accurate rules typically increased pedaling during CONJ components that followed two consecutive EXT components, suggesting that they experienced deprivation for audio and visual stimulation generated by pedaling. These preliminary findings suggest that researchers could use this translational preparation to identify matched interventions for some automatically reinforced behavior.