Elaboration et validation de tests de jugement situationnel comme outil de sélection professionnelle : guide méthodologique

Current views in personnel selection recognize the necessity for situational judgements tests (SJT) which are closed to the real work context of companies. The SJTs have also become a popular selection tool across Europe. SJTs are attractive because they show good validity, positive applicants reactions and can be cost effective to test large group of applicants at once. The aim of this paper is to describe a structured methodology for the elaboration of such test. Each stage is illustrated by examples and psychometrics validation issues are discussed.     

Validity evidence for the situational judgment test paradigm in emotional intelligence measurement

To date, various measurement approaches have been proposed to assess emotional intelligence (EI). Recently, two new EI tests have been developed based on the situational judgment test (SJT) paradigm: the Situational Test of Emotional Understanding (STEU) and the Situational Test of Emotion Management (STEM). Initial attempts have been made to examine the construct‐related validity of these new tests; we extend these findings by placing the tests in a broad nomological network. To this end, 850 undergraduate students completed a personality inventory, a cognitive ability test, a self‐report EI test, a performance‐based EI measure, the STEU, and the STEM. The SJT‐based EI tests were not strongly correlated with personality and fluid cognitive ability. Regarding their relation with existing EI measures, the tests did not capture the same construct as self‐report EI measures, but corresponded rather to performance‐based EI measures. Overall, these results lend support for the SJT paradigm for measuring EI as an ability.     

From the clarity of ideas to the validity of judgments: Kant's farewell to epistemic perfectionism

Against the standard interpretation of Kant's ‘Copernican revolution’ as the prioritization of epistemology over ontology, I argue in this paper that his critique of traditional metaphysics must be seen as a farewell to the perfectionism on which early modern rationalist ontology and epistemology are built. However, Kant does not simply replace ‘perfection’ with another fundamental concept of normativity. More radically, Kant realizes that it is not simply ideas but only the relation of ideas that can be subject to norms, and thus he shifts the focus from the reality of ideas to the validity of judgments. Section 1 of this paper clarifies the pre-Kantian role of the concept of perfection and examines Kant's critical response to that concept. Section 2 identifies Kant's point of departure from the Cartesian ‘way of ideas.’ Section 3 explains the key problem of his novel account of epistemic normativity. I conclude that Kant's anti-perfectionism must be seen as the driving force behind his ‘Copernican revolution’ in order to fully appreciate his mature account of epistemic normativity.     

A group construal account of drop-in-the-bucket thinking in policy preference and moral judgment

Decisions, both moral and mundane, about saving individuals or resources at risk are often influenced not only by numbers saved and lost, but also by proportions of groups saved and lost. Consider choosing between a program that saves 60 of 240 lives at risk and one that saves 50 of 100. The first option maximizes absolute number saved; the second, proportion saved. In two studies, we show that the influence of proportions on such decisions depends on how items at risk are mentally represented. In particular, we show that proportions have greater influence on people's decisions to the extent that the items at risk are construed as forming groups, as opposed to distinct individuals. Construal was manipulated by means of animated displays in which resources at risk moved either independently (promoting individual construal) or jointly (promoting group construal). Results support the hypothesis that (a) decision makers form mental representations which vary in the degree to which resources at risk are construed as groups versus individuals and (b) construal of resources as groups promotes the influence of proportions on decisions and moral judgments.     

Moral signals, public outrage, and immaterial harms

Public outrage is often triggered by “immaterially” harmful acts (i.e., acts with relatively negligible consequences). A well-known example involves corporate salaries and perks: they generate public outrage yet their financial cost is relatively minor. The present research explains this paradox by appealing to a person-centered approach to moral judgment. Strong moral reactions can occur when relatively harmless acts provide highly diagnostic information about moral character. Studies 1a and 1b first demonstrate dissociation between moral evaluations of persons and their actions—although violence toward a human was viewed as a more blameworthy act than violence toward an animal, the latter was viewed as more revealing of bad moral character. Study 2 then shows that person-centered cues directly influence moral judgments—participants preferred to hire a more expensive CEO when the alternative candidate requested a frivolous perk as part of his compensation package, an effect mediated by the informativeness of his request.     

Resources versus respect: Social judgments based on targets' power and status positions

In two experiments, we investigate how individuals' levels of power and status interact to determine how they are perceived by others. We find that power and status have similar, positive, effects on judged dominance. We also find that power has a negative effect on perceived warmth, but status moderates this “power penalty”: high power without status is associated with low warmth, but power with status is judged warm. Consequently, we find high status individuals, regardless of power level, are perceived positively - dominant and warm - whereas high power-low status individuals are judged most negatively — dominant and cold (Experiments 1 and 2). As a result, perceivers expect positive interactions with high status individuals, but negative interactions with high power, low status individuals (Experiment 2). These findings provide insight into power and status social judgments, and further our understanding of similarities and differences between these distinct, yet related, constructs.     

Cost-Benefit Analysis Mediation of the Relationship Between Sensation Seeking and Risk Behavior

Risk behavior during adolescence results in substantial morbidity and mortality. Sensation seeking consistently relates to engagement in risk behavior, but the psychological mediators of this relationship remain unclear. The current study demonstrates that adolescents’ judgments of the costs versus benefits of risk behavior were a significant mediator of this relationship. Participants were 406 racially and ethnically diverse adolescents ages 12-17 (M = 14.5, SD = 1.7; 48.3% female) who participated in a larger multi-site investigation of personality and neurocognitive predictors of risk behavior. Data were collected via self-report in a single laboratory session. Mediation of the relationship of sensation seeking to risk behavior was tested using structural equation modeling. Results indicated that higher levels of sensation seeking predicted weighing the benefits of risk behavior higher than its costs, which in turn predicted higher levels of risk behavior. Implications of these findings for understanding mechanisms underlying adolescents’ risk behavior and directions for future research are discussed.     

For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment

People often judge it unacceptable to directly harm a person, even when this is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome, such as saving five other lives. We demonstrate that similar judgments arise when people consider damage to owned objects. In two experiments, participants considered dilemmas where saving five inanimate objects required destroying one. Participants judged this unacceptable when it required violating another’s ownership rights, but not otherwise. They also judged that sacrificing another’s object was less acceptable as a means than as a side-effect; judgments did not depend on whether property damage involved personal force. These findings inform theories of moral decision-making. They show that utilitarian judgment can be decreased without physical harm to persons, and without personal force. The findings also show that the distinction between means and side-effects influences the acceptability of damaging objects, and that ownership impacts utilitarian moral judgment.     

Transfer effects between moral dilemmas: A causal model theory

Evaluations of analogous situations are an important source for our moral intuitions. A puzzling recent set of findings in experiments exploring transfer effects between intuitions about moral dilemmas has demonstrated a striking asymmetry. Transfer often occurred with a specific ordering of moral dilemmas, but not when the sequence was reversed. In this article we present a new theory of transfer between moral intuitions that focuses on two components of moral dilemmas, namely their causal structure and their default evaluations. According to this theory, transfer effects are expected when the causal models underlying the considered dilemmas allow for a mapping of the highlighted aspect of the first scenario onto the causal structure of the second dilemma, and when the default evaluations of the two dilemmas substantially differ. The theory’s key predictions for the occurrence and the direction of transfer effects between two moral dilemmas are tested in five experiments with various variants of moral dilemmas from different domains. A sixth experiment tests the predictions of the theory for how the target action in the moral dilemmas is represented.