Testing boundary conditions for the conjunction fallacy: effects of response mode, conceptual focus, and problem type

Two experiments used within-subject designs to examine how conjunction errors depend on the use of (1) choice versus estimation tasks, (2) probability versus frequency language, and (3) conjunctions of two likely events versus conjunctions of likely and unlikely events. All problems included a three-option format verified to minimize misinterpretation of the base event. In both experiments, conjunction errors were reduced when likely events were conjoined. Conjunction errors were also reduced for estimations compared with choices, with this reduction greater for likely conjuncts, an interaction effect. Shifting conceptual focus from probabilities to frequencies did not affect conjunction error rates. Analyses of numerical estimates for a subset of the problems provided support for the use of three general models by participants for generating estimates. Strikingly, the order in which the two tasks were carried out did not affect the pattern of results, supporting the idea that the mode of responding strongly determines the mode of thinking about conjunctions and hence the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy. These findings were evaluated in terms of implications for rationality of human judgment and reasoning.     

Knowledge activation after information encoding: Implications of trait priming on person judgment

It is widely assumed that traits primed after the encoding of person information do not lead to assimilation effects on the judgment of that person. The authors challenge this view by providing evidence that post-encoding trait primes can result in assimilative person judgments under certain conditions. In Experiments 1 and 2, we identify the conditions under which these assimilation effects occur. Experiment 1 shows the importance of participants’ goals during person information encoding: assimilation is observed when person information is encoded as part of a memorization goal (as opposed to an impression formation goal). The findings of Experiment 2 further reveal that the encoded person information should imply trait concepts rather than being merely vague with respect to the primed trait category. Finally, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that the obtained assimilation effect is driven by differential accessibility for prime-congruent person information.     

Verbal and nonverbal behaviour as a basis for credibility attribution: The impact of task involvement and cognitive capacity

Three experiments were able to demonstrate the usefulness of dual-process models for the understanding of the process of credibility attribution. According to the assumptions of dual-process models, only high task involvement and high cognitive capacity leads to intensive processing of verbal and nonverbal information when making credibility judgments. Under low task involvement and/or low cognitive capacity, people predominantly use nonverbal information for their credibility attribution. In Experiment 1, participants under low or high task involvement saw a film in which the nonverbal behaviour (fidgety vs. calm) and the verbal information (low versus high credibility) of a source were manipulated. As predicted, when task involvement was low, only the nonverbal behaviour influenced participants’ credibility attribution. Participants with high task involvement also used the verbal information. In Experiment 2 and 3, the cognitive capacity of the participants was manipulated. Participants with high cognitive capacity, in contrast to those of low cognitive capacity, used the verbal information for their credibility attribution.     

多参照系条件下信息获取方式对绝对方位判断的影响

把参照系整合基础上的绝对方位判断分解成路径获取过程（目标位置信息）、自身定向过程（前行方向信息）和物体定位过程（目标物体相对于参照物体的方位信息）,系统地考察了多参照系条件下信息获取方式对该任务的影响。研究以视觉形式呈现空间信息,实验1a和1b的任务中均包括上述三个过程,前者以地图的形式呈现前行方向信息、后者以语词的形式直接呈现前行方向信息;实验2有两个任务,分别独立于路径描述（定位后判断）和自身定位（定向后判断）。所有任务均为目标位置（R0o－前、R45o－左前/右前、R90o－左/右、R135o－左后/右后, R180o－后）×前行方向（北、东南西、斜方向）的组内设计、因变量为正确率和判断时间为主,共有64名大学生被试（男女各半）参与实验。发现：0o和180o位置优势效应、朝北优势效应在所有任务中都很明显;实验1和定向后判断任务中存在正方向R90o位置优势效实;定位后判断时间短于定向后判断时间,但总体所用时间上没有差异。结合信息获取的方式和可能使用到的判断策略,从绝对方位判断的认知结构上展开了讨论。     

大学生对网瘾和作弊的责任推断与应对策略

运用情景模拟和角色扮演的方法,研究大学生对网瘾和作弊的责任归因结构及其应对策略。对416名被试的研究结果显示：（1）责任归因的心理结构是一个“责任推断→责任情感→责任行为”的一元结构模式。（2）我国大学生的责任推断过程与维纳的经典理论基本一致,但在行为应对策略上存在一定的文化差异。（3）大学生对网瘾和作弊的责任推断倾向明显并与情感体验基本保持一致,但与行为应对策略存在一定的冲突。（4）大学生在网瘾和作弊的责任推断、情感体验以及应对策略上存在一定差异。     

BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS: THRIVING,BUT HOW ABOUT ITS FUTURE?

Behavior analysis has been thriving by continuing to make important theoretical and empirical contributions to a wide array of problems, as well as by contributing to interdisciplinary research. Applied research in behavior analysis is flourishing. Despite these positive signs there may be an erosion of support for basic research in animal learning and behavior, including behavior analysis. Increased attention by behavior analysts to fundamental problems in areas of cognition, including decision-making and language, may help behavior analysis to evolve more successfully. An experimental analysis of gambling may prove particularly fruitful.     

Prolegomena to a future phenomenology of morals

Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness. In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye on some of the main philosophical issues in ethics and how moral phenomenology might be brought to bear on them. In discussing such matters, we consider some of the doubts about moral phenomenology and its value to ethics that are brought up by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Michael Gill in their contributions to this issue.

Overconfidence and underconfidence: When and why people underestimate (and overestimate) the competition

It is commonly held that people believe themselves to be better than others, especially for outcomes under their control. However, such overconfidence is not universal. This paper presents evidence showing that people believe that they are below average on skill-based tasks that are difficult. A simple Bayesian explanation can account for these effects and for their robustness: On skill-based tasks, people generally have better information about themselves than about others, so their beliefs about others’ performances tend to be more regressive (thus less extreme) than their beliefs about their own performances. This explanation is tested in two experiments that examine these effects’ robustness to experience, feedback, and market forces. The discussion explores the implications for strategic planning in general and entrepreneurial entry in particular.     

Not so above average after all: When people believe they are worse than average and its implications for theories of bias in social comparison

Recent research calls into question the generally accepted conclusion that people believe themselves to be better than average. This paper reviews the new theories that have been proposed to explain the fact that better-than-average effects are isolated to common behaviors and abilities, and that people believe themselves to be below average with respect to rare behaviors and uncommon abilities. These new theories are then used to revisit prior findings of better-than-average effects. When viewed in light of recent work, the evidence suggests that prior findings overstated the degree to which people engage in self-enhancement by believing that they are better than others when in fact they are not. Prior studies have often confounded desirability with commonness and have used subjective measures of comparative judgment that capitalize on people’s tendency to conflate relative with absolute self-evaluation.     

Calibration accuracy of a judgmental process that predicts the commercial success of new product ideas

We examine the accuracy of forecasts of the commercial potential of new product ideas by experts at an Inventor's Assistance Program (IAP). Each idea is evaluated in terms of 37 attributes or cues, which are subjectively rated and intuitively combined by an IAP expert to arrive at a forecast of the idea's commercialization prospects. Data regarding actual commercialization outcomes for 559 new product ideas were collected to examine the accuracy of the IAP forecasts. The intensive evaluation of each idea conducted by the IAP produces forecasts that accurately rank order the ideas in terms of their probability of commercialization. The focus of the evaluation process on case‐specific evidence that distinguishes one idea from another, however, and the corresponding neglect of aggregate considerations such as the base rate (BR) and predictability of commercialization for new product ideas in general, yields forecasts that are systematically miscalibrated in terms of their correspondence to the actual probability of commercialization. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.