How strong is the comparison‐to‐the‐strongest heuristic?: An empirical test of the comparison‐ to‐the‐strongest heuristic in probability judgment1,2

Abstract: Windschitl and Wells (1998 ) proposed that the pairwise comparison between the focal and strongest alternative outcomes plays an important role in probability judgment. However, their studies did not control the effects of alternative outcomes other than the strongest one. This article tested whether only the strongest alternative outcome would affect probability judgment, using a variable selection method in a multiple regression analysis. Study 1 reanalyzed the results of Windschitl and Young (2001 ) and showed that only the strongest alternative outcome affects probability judgment. In Study 2, a new experiment was conducted to modify the methodological problems in Study 1. The results of Study 2 were identical to those of Study 1. All these results consistently supported the comparison hypothesis.     

突发公共卫生事件中舆论性信息弱势群体的伦理问题

突发公共卫生事件发生后,为了避免疾病扩散,通过流行病学调查得到的患者信息需进行公布,其中与私行私德有关之处在公众围观中可能被放大评判,话语权不足的患者成为舆论中信息弱势群体。这一状况会导致公私边界不明晰,患者私行入公域;道德评价成为情绪宣泄,负面后果无人负责;以道德为名造成撕裂,消解舆论的监督作用等负面后果。要解决这些伦理问题,需要把握适宜的伦理距离,树立距离伦理意识;依照分布式道德行为措施追责,发挥网络平台道德促进者作用;同时增强公共卫生沟通机制中的伦理因素,推进规范化管理。

     

社会距离知觉对道德判断的影响研究

理论上,人们对不同个体行为是否违背道德的判断是完全一致的。本研究提出,人们对社会距离线索的知觉会影响对道德行为的判断。研究设计了两个实验,分别从社会距离直接启动和社会距离线索启动的角度对这一假设进行了检验。结果发现,较近的社会距离启动及社会距离线索都能促使个体采取更温和的道德判断,功利主义的色彩比较浓厚,而较远的社会距离启动促使个体采用更加严格的道德判断,表现出道义论倾向。文章最后讨论了这一结果对未来研究的意义。     

Certainty and Uncertainty: The Two Faces of the Hindsight Bias

“Hindsight Bias” is a person's tendency, after learning about the actual outcome of a situation or the correct answer to a question, to distort a previous judgment in the direction of this new information. In the literature, hindsight bias has been mostly discussed as an inevitable result of a “judgment under uncertainty.” We think that the hindsight bias is due to memorial as well as inferential processes: Whereas certainty about the recollection is memorial and concerns the recollective experience, certainty at the time of the judgment is inferential and concerns the individual's metaknowledge (“I know that I knew that”). In two experiments participants' feelings of certainty were measured indirectly (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) by giving participants the option of leaving those questions unanswered about which they felt uncertain. This free-report option was offered to half of the participants in the first estimate phase (concerning time of judgment) and to the second half in the memory phase (concerning the recollective experience). At the end of the session, participants were presented again with the questions they had skipped and were now required to answer them. This procedure allowed us to compare the amount of hindsight bias for the skipped, uncertain items to the spontaneously answered, certain ones. Both experiments demonstrated that the hindsight bias is a result of the interaction of both uncertainty and certainty.