Understanding subgroup differences with general mental ability tests in employment selection: Exploring socio-cultural factors across inter-generational groups

In employment selection, general mental ability (GMA) tests predict training and job performance but also lead to subgroup differences which in turn can produce adverse impact against minority groups. Although researchers have explored genetic, developmental, and environmental explanations for ethnic group differences, few studies have explored socio-cultural factors comparing immigrant and non-immigrant job applicants. Given that many ethnic job applicants may also be immigrants, understanding these factors can provide insight into GMA test score differences. The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of individual and socio-cultural factors on GMA test scores with immigrant and non-immigrant bus driver applicants. This is the first study of its kind to our knowledge that has attempted to disentangle the effects of socio-cultural factors from race/ethnicity in the study of subgroup differences. Incorporating these variables between non-visible minority and minority groups accounted for considerable variance in GMA test scores across groups. The implications of focusing on socio-cultural variables to enhance our understanding of subgroup differences are discussed. Our results specifically suggest that practitioners attend to the issue of the intersecting grounds of potential discrimination when using GMA tests in personnel selection.     

Moral psychology of the fading affect bias

We argue that many of the benefits theorists have attributed to the ability to forget should instead be attributed to what psychologists call the “fading affect bias,” namely the tendency for the negative emotions associated with past events to fade more substantially than the positive emotions associated with those events. Our principal contention is that the disposition to display the fading affect bias is normatively good. Those who possess it tend to lead better lives and more effectively improve their societies. Secondarily, we note that if Julia Driver’s moral theory is correct, then the disposition to display the fading affect bias is a moral virtue.     

Rethinking the explanatory power of dynamical models in cognitive science

In this paper I offer an interventionist perspective on the explanatory structure and explanatory power of (some) dynamical models in cognitive science: I argue that some “pure” dynamical models – ones that do not refer to mechanisms at all – in cognitive science are “contextualized causal models” and that this explanatory structure gives such models genuine explanatory power. I contrast this view with several other perspectives on the explanatory power of “pure” dynamical models. One of the main results is that dynamical models need not refer to underlying mechanisms in order to be explanatory. I defend and illustrate this position in terms of dynamical models of the A-not-B error in developmental psychology as elaborated by Thelen and colleagues, and dynamical models of unintentional interpersonal coordination developed by Richardson and colleagues.     

Are the states underlying implicit biases unconscious? – A Neo-Freudian answer

Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic of implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack based on its inconsistency with empirical data. Instead, Gawronski, Hoffman, and Wilbur (2006) analyze implicit biases based on the so-called Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, according to which implicit attitudes are phenomenally conscious and accessible. The mismatch between the explicit and the implicit attitude is explained by the Cognitive Inconsistency Approach (CIA) (as I will call it): implicit attitudes are conscious but rejected as basis for explicit judgments because the latter lead to cognitive inconsistency with respect to other beliefs held by the subject. In this paper, I will argue that the CIA is problematic since it cannot account for the fact that implicit attitudes underlying implicit biases typically are unconscious. I will argue that a better explanation of the attitude-mismatch can be given in terms of a Neo-Freudian account of repression. I will develop such an account, and I will show how it can accommodate the merits of the APE model while avoiding the problems of the CIA.     

Cross-task and cross-manipulation stability in shifting the decision criterion

In recognition memory experiments participants must discriminate between old and new items, a judgment influenced by response bias. Research has shown substantial individual differences in the extent to which people will strategically adjust their response bias to diagnostic cues such as the prior probability of an old item. Despite this significant between subject variability, shifts in bias have been found to be relatively predictive within individuals across memory tests. Experiment 1 sought to determine whether this predictability extends beyond memory. Results revealed that the amount a subject shifted response bias in a recognition memory task was significantly predictive of shifting in a visual perception task, suggesting that shifting can generalise outside of a specific testing domain. Experiment 2 sought to determine how predictive shifting would be across two manipulations well known to induce shifts in bias: a probability manipulation and a response payoff manipulation. A modest positive relationship between these two methods was observed, suggesting that shifting behaviour is relatively predictive across different manipulations of shifting. Overall, results from both experiments suggest that response bias shifting, like response bias setting, is a relatively stable behaviour within individuals despite changes in test domain and test manipulation.     

Monkey see,monkey do: The effect of social influence on selective‐exposure bias

Selective‐exposure bias refers to the tendency to predominantly seek out attitude‐consistent information and avoid attitude‐inconsistent information. Although researchers have proposed and tested several underlying psychological factors that might contribute to this tendency, the potential role of social influence has not been addressed. In the present research, we address this issue. In four experiments (total N = 645), participants’ selective‐exposure bias was significantly reduced when the bias was portrayed as non‐normative (vs. normative). In Experiment 4, we obtained evidence for the possibility that this social‐norm manipulation could result in effects on attitudes through information selection. Overall, this research contributes novel evidence for the effect of social influence on selective‐exposure bias.     

Attentional biases for threat after fear-related autobiographical recall

Background : Previous studies suggested that affective state could enhance stimulus salience and modulate attention allocation for mood-congruent information, but contrasting data have been reported on the effects of mood induction on attentional biases for threat (ABTs) in non-clinical individuals.

Objective : We aimed to assess whether laboratory-induced negative mood can increase individuals’ tendency to allocate attention on threatening stimuli, thus determining a difficulty in attentional disengagement from threat. We also aimed at assessing whether level of trait anxiety could modulate the effect of mood induction on attentional biases.

Methods : We used an autobiographical episode recall procedure for mood induction (fear, happiness and neutral episode recall), and an exogenous cueing task with threatening and non-threatening images to assess attentional biases in 120 undergraduate students.

Results: Participants showed a significant difficulty in disengaging attention from threat after recalling fear-related episodes, independently from their trait anxiety level.

Conclusions: These findings clarify that the ABTs are not exclusive to anxiety disorders or high trait anxiety individuals, and could also arise in non-clinical individuals in a fearful context.     

The effects of type of instruction,animacy cues,and dimensionality of objects on the shape bias in 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children

Robust evidence exists for the shape bias, or children's tendency to extend novel names and categorize objects more readily on the basis of shape than on other object features. However, issues remain about the conditions that affect the shape bias and its importance as a linguistic device. In this research, we examined how type of instruction (common noun naming, proper noun naming, same kind, and goes with), animacy of objects (animate, inanimate), and dimensionality of objects (two‐dimensional, three‐dimensional) affect the shape bias in 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children. Overall, all children showed strong use of the shape bias with categorization (same kind, goes with) instructions, the former in line with the shape‐as‐cue theory. Additionally, the shape bias was quite robust in the inanimate condition, regardless of type of instruction or dimensionality of objects. However, in the animate condition, a proper noun naming instruction coupled with an animate object cue reduced the shape bias across both two‐ and three‐dimensional objects. Implications of these findings are presented.

Highlights

• This study assessed the “shape bias,” a linguistic strategy young children routinely use when confronted with the task of extending a novel name from one object to another.
• Novel name extension and categorization tasks were used in this study.
• Shape bias was affected by the type of instructions, animacy of objects, and dimensionality of objects.

     

Decision mechanisms underlying mood-congruent emotional classification

There is great interest in understanding whether and how mood influences affective processing. Results in the literature have been mixed: some studies show mood-congruent processing but others do not. One limitation of previous work is that decision components for affective processing and responses biases are not dissociated. The present study explored the roles of affective processing and response biases using a drift-diffusion model (DDM) of simple choice. In two experiments, participants decided if words were emotionally positive or negative while listening to music that induced positive or negative mood. The behavioural results showed weak, inconsistent mood-congruency effects. In contrast, the DDM showed consistent effects that were selectively driven by an a-priori bias in response expectation, suggesting that music-induced mood influences expectations about the emotionality of upcoming stimuli, but not the emotionality of the stimuli themselves. Implications for future studies of emotional classification and mood are subsequently discussed.