内隐理论与群体关系

内隐理论是外行人对社会世界中人与事的朴素解释。人们对社会分类(种族、宗教、性别、职业等)属性的理解, 影响着个体对群体信息的加工、判断和反应, 能显著地预测群体过程(如刻板印象、偏见、歧视等), 并调节着社会认同的心理效应, 这弥补了社会认同过程中对个体差异的考虑, 对社会认同理论的发展具有重要贡献。实证研究表明：在改善和促进群体关系的实践中, 可以将外行人的内隐理论作为一个中介, 以此减少刻板印象和偏见, 培育良好的群体关系。未来研究中, 需要进一步整合内隐理论的概念, 采取一些纵向的研究为实践提供科学的指导。     

印象形成中交叉刻板印象的加工机制

以大学生作为被试,旨在探究：在交叉刻板印象加工过程中,是否存在某一单维刻板印象的加工优势效应？如果存在,靶子熟悉度的差异是否会影响单维刻板印象的加工优势效应？该单维刻板印象加工优势效应是否还会受到其他单维刻板印象加工的调节。研究结果表明：（1）在对具有性别-年龄组合而成的交叉刻板印象的人群进行判断时,通过面孔进行启动,发现在不同的条件下分别存在性别单维刻板印象和年龄单维刻板印象的加工优势效应,即年轻男性或女性面孔的性别特征较年龄特征更容易得到加工和提取,老年男性或女性面孔的年龄特征较性别特征更具有加工优势。而在范畴词汇启动下,老年男性或女性词汇启动下的年龄特征较性别特征更具有加工优势。（2）熟悉性会影响单维刻板印象的加工优势,即在年轻被试感知面孔或范畴词汇时,其对老年男性或女性靶子间击中率的差异要显著大于对年轻男性或女性的靶子间击中率的差异。换言之,年轻被试感知老年人靶子的性别与年龄间的差异要显著大于年轻人靶子,出现自我参照现象。（3）在交叉刻板印象加工中,同时存在的各类单维刻板印象加工是彼此削弱的,具有优势加工效应的刻板印象的加工会受到非优势刻板印象加工的抑制。（4）在交叉刻板印象加工中,优势刻板印象加工会受到其相对刻板印象加工的削弱。     

刻板印象激活的无意图性及其大脑神经活动特征

采用启动Stroop范式, 对刻板印象激活的无意图性及其大脑神经活动特征进行了探讨。操纵了启动和“无启动”条件以及与启动所激活的刻板印象一致、冲突和无关的3类靶子词, 记录了36名大学生被试对靶子词进行颜色判别的行为反应和脑电图(EEG, electroencephalogram)。结果发现：(1)“无启动”条件下对3类靶子的反应时基本一致; 启动条件下对一致靶子做出颜色判别的反应时显著快于对冲突靶子的, 对无关靶子的反应时介于两者之间。(2)“无启动”条件下无关靶子诱发的N400波幅最大--显著大于一致和冲突靶子诱发的, 后两者诱发的N400无差异; 启动条件下一致靶子诱发的N400波幅显著小于冲突和无关靶子诱发的N400波幅, 无关靶子诱发的N400波幅也小于冲突靶子诱发的N400波幅。这表明刻板印象激活是一个发生在知觉后加工阶段的具有无意图性的自动化加工过程, 刻板印象激活效应具有抑制冲突信息加工同时促进一致信息加工的“双刃剑”模式, N400可以作为考察这一认知过程特征的电生理学指标。     

老年刻板印象威胁及其研究操纵

随着人口老龄化的不断加剧, 老年刻板印象威胁受到越来越多的关注。不同于种族或民族、性别等刻板印象威胁, 老年刻板印象威胁表现出累积性、共通性与连续性等特征。目前关于老年刻板印象威胁的研究多集中于认知老化尤其是记忆老化上, 关注老年刻板印象威胁对老年司机和老年员工的消极影响。消除与降低老年刻板印象威胁的消极效应可以从认知改变、群体认同、代际接触、老龄自我实现和个性化以及媒体宣传等五个方面来进行。在实验室研究中, 老年刻板印象威胁有外显与内隐两种不同的操纵形式。未来可以从扩展研究领域、细化“年龄”差异、比较整体效应大小和性别差异、侧重积极效应以及加强本土化检验和跨文化比较研究等方面来深化。     

Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra

Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense of Standard Russellianism is to hold that spectrum inversion without illusion is conceivable but not in fact possible. I argue that this response fails. As a consequence, either phenomenal content is not Russellian, or experiences do not represent mind-independent physical properties.     

Intentionalism and Change Blindness

According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can vary despite sameness of phenomenal character.

Threat in dreams: an adaptation?

Revonsuo's influential Threat Simulation Theory (TST) predicts that people exposed to survival threats will have more threat dreams, and evince enhanced responses to dream threats, compared to those living in relatively safe conditions. Participants in a high crime area (South Africa: n=208) differed significantly from participants in a low crime area (Wales, UK: n=116) in having greater recent exposure to a life-threatening event (chi([1,N=186])(2)=14.84, p<.00012). Contrary to TST's predictions, the SA participants reported significantly fewer threat dreams (chi([1,N=287])(2)=6.11, p<.0134), and did not differ from the Welsh participants in responses to dream threats (Fisher's Exact test, p=.2478). Overall, the incidence of threat in dreams was extremely low-less than 20% of dreams featured realistic survival threats. Escape from dream threats occurred in less than 2% of dreams. We conclude that this evidence contradicts key aspects of TST.     

Shooting the messenger won’t change the news

Malcolm-Smith, Solms, Turnbull and Tredoux [Malcolm-Smith, S., Solms, M., Turnbull, O., & Tredoux, C. (2008). Threat in dreams: An adaptation? Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1281–1291.] conducted a rigorous study that sampled two populations differentially exposed to threat in real life, and found that critical predictions from the Threat Simulation Theory of dreams [Revonsuo, A. (2000a). The reinterpretation of dreams: An evolutionary hypothesis of the function of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 877-901.; Revonsuo, A. (2000b). Did ancestral humans dream for their lives? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 1063–1082.] were not supported. Specifically, we found no evidence of increased realistic threats to physical survival or enhanced threat avoidance in the dreams of those from the exposed population. Revonsuo and Valli’s [Revonsuo, A., & Valli, K. (2008). How to test the threat simulation theory. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1292-1296.] commentary on our study argues that the methods we used are so flawed as to render the results meaningless. In this response article, we address the criticisms raised in their commentary.     

In Defence of Non-conceptual Content

In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same fine grainess of non-conceptual contents while having conceptual structure. In what follows I will argue that, first, that the notion of demonstrative concept is not viable and, second, that there is an epistemological role for non-conceptual content.

War-Related Dream Themes in Germany from 1956 to 2000

Based on the continuity hypothesis of dreaming, the effects of World War II on the dreams of German persons have been studied. The present study included four representative samples from 1956 to 2000 (repeated cross-sectional surveys). Although a decline of war-related dream themes over time was found, the heightened rate of these themes in the oldest age group (60 years and older) in the year 2000 indicate the long-lasting effect of emotionally salient life experiences on dreams. The present findings indicate that the method of dream content analysis is a very informative approach to study the effects of political events on the inner life of people and, thus, of value for the field of political science.