Prevalence of auditory verbal hallucinations in a general population: A group comparison study

The present study was specifically designed to investigate the prevalence of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) in the general population, and sought to compare similarities and differences regarding socio‐demographics, mental health and severe life events between individuals who have never experienced AVH with those who had. The study also aimed to compare those who sought professional help for their experience of AVH with those who had not sought help. Through a postal questionnaire, 2,533 participants ages 18 and over from a national survey completed the Launay‐Slade Hallucinations Scale and other measures examining AVH characteristics and other areas related to AVH. In total, 7.3% of the sample reported a life‐time prevalence of AVH. Those with AVH were more likely to be single and unemployed, reported higher levels of depression and anxiety, and experienced a higher number of severe life events compared with those without AVH. Only 16% of those who experienced AVH in the general population sought professional help for these experiences. Compared to those who did not seek professional help, participants that had were more likely to experience AVH with a negative content, experience them on a daily basis, undergo negative reactions when experiencing AVH, and resist AVH. In conclusion, the prevalence of AVH was found to be relatively high. The results also revealed higher levels of reduced mental health for individuals who sought professional help, followed by those who did not, compared with those who had never experienced AVH.     

Normativity in Comparative Religious Ethics

This essay seeks to clarify the meaning and nature of normativity in metaethics and offers reasons why comparative religious ethics (CRE) must properly address questions about normativity. Though many comparative religious ethicists take CRE to be a normative discipline, what they say about normativity is often unclear and confusing. I argue that the third‐wave scholars face serious questions with respect to not only the justification of moral belief but also the rationality of moral belief and action. These scholars tend to view the justification of moral belief to be a matter of process (that is, discursive social practice) rather than evidence‐possession, thus overlooking crucial differences between the two. They also run the risk of confusing motivating and explanatory reasons with normative reasons for moral belief and action. Consequently, their account of normativity would be insufficient for determining the rationality of moral beliefs and actions as well as for justifying moral beliefs.     

The Cultural Definition of Art

Most modern definitions of art fail to successfully address the issue of the ever‐changing nature of art, and rarely even attempt to provide an account that would be valid in more than just the modern Western context. This article develops a new theory that preserves the advantages of its predecessors, solves or avoids their problems, and has a scope wide enough to account for art of different times and cultures. It argues that an object is art in a given context iff some person(s) culturally competent in this context have afforded it the status of a candidate for appreciation for reasons considered good in this context. This weakly institutional view is supplemented by auxiliary definitions explaining the notions of cultural contexts, competence, and good reasons for affording the status. The relativisation to contexts brings increased explanatory power and scope, and the ability to account for the diversity of art.     

The development of emotion recognition from facial expressions and non‐linguistic vocalizations during childhood

Sensitivity to facial and vocal emotion is fundamental to children's social competence. Previous research has focused on children's facial emotion recognition, and few studies have investigated non‐linguistic vocal emotion processing in childhood. We compared facial and vocal emotion recognition and processing biases in 4‐ to 11‐year‐olds and adults. Eighty‐eight 4‐ to 11‐year‐olds and 21 adults participated. Participants viewed/listened to faces and voices (angry, happy, and sad) at three intensity levels (50%, 75%, and 100%). Non‐linguistic tones were used. For each modality, participants completed an emotion identification task. Accuracy and bias for each emotion and modality were compared across 4‐ to 5‐, 6‐ to 9‐ and 10‐ to 11‐year‐olds and adults. The results showed that children's emotion recognition improved with age; preschoolers were less accurate than other groups. Facial emotion recognition reached adult levels by 11 years, whereas vocal emotion recognition continued to develop in late childhood. Response bias decreased with age. For both modalities, sadness recognition was delayed across development relative to anger and happiness. The results demonstrate that developmental trajectories of emotion processing differ as a function of emotion type and stimulus modality. In addition, vocal emotion processing showed a more protracted developmental trajectory, compared to facial emotion processing. The results have important implications for programmes aiming to improve children's socio‐emotional competence.     

Model and interactive algorithm of bi‐level multi‐objective decision‐making with multiple interconnected decision makers

Furthering a prior research on two‐person bi‐level multi‐objective decision‐making problems of the leader‐follower Stackelberg game, we present an extended model of bi‐level multi‐objective decision‐making with multiple interconnected decision makers at the lower level. In the model, the upper level decision maker acts as a leader and the lower level decision makers behave as the followers, and inter‐connections and interactions exist among these followers in decision‐making scenarios. Following the rules of leader‐follower Stackelberg game, we develop an interactive algorithm of the model for solving multi‐objective decision‐making problems and reflecting the interactive natures among the decision makers. Finally, the authors exemplify the model and algorithm, and draw a conclusion on points of contributions and the significance of this study in decision‐making and support. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Verbal and practical intelligence in general anxiety,obsessive compulsive and major depression disorders

IntroductionPrevious researches have shown that anxiety symptoms are negatively associated with measures of intelligence. However, recent findings indicate possible positive relationships between Generalized Anxiety Disorders (GAD) and intelligence. Also, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is associated with a moderate degree of underperformance on cognitive tests, including deficient processing. There are inconsistent results to present the relationship between Major Depression Disorder (MDD) and IQ. The present study has three main aims. The first aim of this study is to investigate the difference between IQ in individuals with GAD, OCD and major depressive disorder, and normal group. The second purpose is to perform a comparative study between the GAD, OCD and MDD groups on verbal and non-verbal intelligence. The third aim of this study is to examine the relationships between GAD, OCD and MDD as well as their underlying cognitive processes, including worry, rumination, and post-event processing, with verbal and non-verbal intelligence.ObjectiveThe present study is performed on four groups of participants including those with GAD, OCD, MDD and Healthy Volunteer (HV) group consisting of individuals without psychiatric disorders.MethodThe number of 50 healthy volunteers as the control group, 45 patients with GAD, 20 patients with OCD and 25 patients with MDD (n = 140) were selected as the case-referent groups. The present study was a cross-sectional type and the research was performed based on the causal-comparative method. Verbal and non-verbal intelligence was measured with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-3rd edition (WAIS-III). Rumination and post-event processing were measured by PSWQ, RRS-BR, and PEPQ, respectively.ResultsThe results indicate that Verbal Intelligence and Verbal Comprehension Index in GAD patients have significant differences in comparison to the OCD, MDD and control groups. While, the value of the Working Memory Index (WMI) in the normal group is higher than the value of the same index in the GAD, OCD and MDD groups. Also, the values of the Processing Speed Index (PSI) in normal and GAD groups are higher than the OCD and MDD groups. The worry, rumination, and post-event processing in patients with GAD are positively correlated with general and verbal intelligence. But, verbal and non-verbal intelligence had a negative correlation with worry, rumination and post-event processing in healthy volunteers.ConclusionInvestigation of the possible connections between intelligence and the cognitive processes underlying emotional disorders can provide therapeutic strategies for smart individuals who are at risk for GAD.