Hearing your voice through bone and air: Implications for explanations of stuttering behavior from studies of normal speakers

Cherry and Sayers (1956) reported that stutterers have problems dealing with sound fed back to the ears through bone. Their experimental support for this claim is reexamined. It is shown that their technique does not produce the same bone-conducted feedback as produced by the speaker while speaking. Their results are reinterpreted as showing that stutterers have problems when speaking in the presence of low frequency sound because of its masking properties, rather than because the sound originates in bone-conducted feedback.     

Proofreading errors in good and poor readers

Seven-year-old children classified as good and poor readers carried out a proofreading task on two passages varying in level of difficulty. Misspellings were introduced by transposing two adjacent letters in the work "the," other three-letter words, and longer words. While both groups of readers were able to identify the correct spelling of the misspelled words on a spelling test, poor readers made significantly more proofreading errors. Word length had a significant effect on performance, indicating that sensitivity to word configuration is important for successful proofreading. The pattern of proofreading errors did not reflect underlying differences which might relate to strategies used by the two groups in normal reading. The results are compared with those from other proofreading and letter detection experiments in order to highlight methodological implications when such tasks are used to verify hypotheses concerned with normal reading strategies.     

Causal ambiguity and heterosexual affiliation

A male's decision to approach a physically attractive female stranger may be fraught with ambivalence. He is drawn by her beauty but he may fear rejection. The conflict lessens, however, if approach can occur under the guise of a motive other than desire to be with the attractive woman. This is because keeping one's true approach motive ambiguous may make direct personal rejection less likely. The effect of ambiguity on males' tendencies to approach females was explored in two experiments. In the first study, presented to subjects as a movie rating exercise, an excuse to sit with an attractive female confederate (a movie preference) was available to some subjects but not to others. As predicted, males only sat with the confederate when a reason for their affiliative behavior, other than her attractiveness, was available. In the second study, male-female dyads were run through the film rating paradigm with the female subjects in the role played by the confederate in Study I. The results of Study I were replicated for the dyads which included attractive females, as expected. The relationships between fear of failure and attributional ambiguity in social and achievement settings are examined. The tendency to discount a person's physical appearance as a cause of social behavior is discussed.     

When what is said is important: A comparison of expert and attractive sources

Ninety-eight female subjects were presented with a statement made by an attractive or an expert source suggesting that people should sleep less than the usual eight hours. For approximately half of the subjects the source gave a simple statement of opinion, for the other half six separate supporting arguments were also presented. As predicted the manipulation of number of arguments provided had more influence on the effectiveness of the expert than the attractive source. Results were interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that quite different dynamics underly the persuasive power of attractive and expert individuals.     

The effect of frustrative nonreward on the attractiveness of the omitted reward

Two experiments were performed to test the hypothesis that omission of a previously received reward is followed by greater motivation to obtain that specific reward, as compared with the case where the reward had been present. In Experiment 1, experimental rats regularly received food rewards (R_a) at one goal, followed by a choice between food and milk (R_b). Control animals received the same choice without food preceding it. Reward magnitudes were manipulated so as to produce a preference for R_b, and additional forced trials were given each day to equalise experience of the two rewards. In the test phase both groups received trials with R_a present (R) or absent (N) at the first goal. The experimental Ss shifted their choice towards R_a on N trials; the controls did not behave differently after R and N. Experiment 2 was similar, except that R_a was milk and R_b food. The same effect of N on experimental animals was obtained. It is argued that the results are relevant to the double-runway ‘frustration effect’, and cannot be explained by existing theories of frustration.     

Attribution and reconstructive memory

Two experiments were conducted to test the effects of making an attribution on later memory for the event that gave rise to the attribution. Subjects in Experiment 1 observed a scenario in which an actor's behavior was associated with high or low variance (distinctiveness) across situations, and high or low congruence (consensus) to the actions of others. Subjects either made attributions for the actor's behavior immediately following the scenario or not. One week later, subjects were asked to recall consensus and distinctiveness for the actor's original behavior. Subjects who made attributions were significantly better at estimating the high-high and low-low combinations of consensus and distinctiveness than were their no-attribution counterparts. It was suggested that making an attribution may allow for a reconstructed memory for the original event, but not enhance direct access to the original event information. A second experiment tested this concept further by having subjects view an edited version of the scenario in which either the distinctiveness or the consensus information was deleted and having subjects make attributions or not. One week later, subjects were asked to indicate their certainty that consensus and distinctiveness information was a part of the original scenario and to estimate the levels of consensus and distinctiveness. Subjects who made attributions were more confident and accurate in estimating the level of consensus or distinctiveness that was given in the original scenario than were no-attribution subjects. However, attribution subjects were also more confident that consensus information or distinctiveness information was contained in the scenario (when it was not) than were the noattributio subjects. Results of the two experiments suggest that eliciting attributions can distort subsequent memory for the event on which the attributions were based.     

Self-focused attention and belief perseverance

The perseverance of an erroneous belief was investigated in the debriefing paradigm as a function of self-focused attention. Subjects were given either success or failure experiences via bogus performance feedback and received this feedback under high or low mirror self-focusing. All subjects were subsequently debriefed about the false nature of the feedback, and then, before answering questions about their estimated actual performance and ability, mirror self-focus was again manipulated. The results showed that self-focus prior to debriefing increased belief perseverance while self-focus after debriefing reduced the perseverance effects. Discussion of these findings emphasized the role of self-focus in information processing before and adherence to veridical standards after debriefing.     

On the study of statistical intuitions

The study of intuitions and errors in judgment under uncertainty is complicated by several factors: discrepancies between acceptance and application of normative rules; effects of content on the application of rules; Socratic hints that create intuitions while testing them; demand characteristics of within-subject experiments; subjects' interpretations of experimental messages according to standard conversational rules. The positive analysis of a judgmental error in terms of heuristics may be supplemented by a negative analysis, which seeks to explain why the correct rule is not intuitively compelling. A negative analysis of non-regressive prediction is outlined.     

Illusory conjunctions in the perception of objects

In perceiving objects we may synthesize conjunctions of separable features by directing attention serially to each item in turn (A. Treisman and G. Gelade, Cognitive Psychology, 1980, 12, 97–136). This feature-integration theory predicts that when attention is diverted or overloaded, features may be wrongly recombined, giving rise to “illusory conjunctions.” The present paper confirms that illusory conjunctions are frequently experienced among unattended stimuli varying in color and shape, and that they occur also with size and solidity (outlined versus filled-in shapes). They are shown both in verbal recall and in simultaneous and successive matching tasks, making it unlikely that they depend on verbal labeling or on memory failure. They occur as often between stimuli differing on many features as between more similar stimuli, and spatial separation has little effect on their frequency. Each feature seems to be coded as an independent entity and to migrate, when attention is diverted, with few constraints from the other features of its source or destination.     

The development of alertness

Two experiments explored variation in the alerting process across age and warning interval as well as the effects of alertness on subsequent processing. Experiment 1 obtained alertness functions for a group of 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults. Results revealed strong age differences in speed of alerting and in maintenance of alertness over a 1-sec interval. Five-year-olds alerted more slowly than older groups and sustained optimal alertness less well. Both groups of children showed more variability in alerting functions compared with adults. Experiment 2 examined the degree to which age differences in processing speed were attributable to differential speed and maintenance of alerting. Masking functions obtained across variations in the alerting interval revealed that when level of alertness was optimal in both 5-year-olds and adults, minimal age differences in processing speed were observed. During short, nonoptimal alerting intervals, speed of processing in adults was faster than in 5-year-old children. The pattern of results across studies suggested that alertness can fluctuate over time in young children, that level of alertness affects subsequent perceptual processing speed, and that developmental variation in speed and maintenance of alertness can partly explain observed age differences in processing speed. The potential role of alertness in more complex cognitive tasks is discussed.