语言理解中的动作知觉：基于具身认知的视角

具身认知理论是目前认知科学领域中最新的研究范式和取向, 它认为人的认知过程依赖于感知和动作系统, 强调身体在认知中发挥重要作用。具身语言理解则认为, 身体、动作和知觉系统在语言认知中也起着不可或缺的作用。文章在简要回顾具身语言理解的相关理论如索引假设、浸入式经历者框架、语言神经理论的基础上, 重点从语言理解的四个层面的实证研究, 即音位、单词、句子、语篇, 证实具身语言理解的观点。未来的研究应该着眼于用具身认知观点来解释更高级的抽象语言表征, 具身单词、句子、语篇的具体表征形式, 并利用具身语言认知的观点进行认知的本土化研究。     

失歌症者对音乐和言语音高的加工

音高是音乐和言语领域中一个重要维度。失歌症是一种对音乐音高加工的障碍。探讨失歌症者对音乐和言语音高的加工有助于揭示音乐和言语音高加工是否共享特定的认知和神经机制。已有研究结果表明, 失歌症者对音乐音高加工存在障碍, 这种音高障碍在一定程度上影响到言语音高加工。同时, 声调语言背景无法弥补失歌症者的音高障碍。这些研究结果支持了资源－共享框架(resource-sharing framework), 即音乐和语言共享特定的认知和神经机制(Patel, 2003, 2008, in press), 并可能在一定程度上为失语症临床治疗提供借鉴。     

汉语口语韵律的作用及其神经机制

汉语是一种声调语言, 在口语韵律表达中存在独特的特点。本项目利用汉语不同于非声调语言的特点, 探讨已有研究中尚未澄清的问题, 即汉语声调在早期自动加工中对语义激活的作用, 以及在不同认知阶段中, 汉语声调和语调加工的神经机制。这些问题是当前的研究热点, 但仍存在着各种分歧和激烈的争论。本项目拟采用ERP方法, 结合LORETA源定位技术, 通过不同的实验范式考察以下内容：(1)在早期自动加工过程中, 汉语声调对词汇语义激活的作用; (2)在早期阶段, 汉语声调和语调加工的大脑激活模式; (3)在晚期阶段, 汉语声调和语调加工的大脑激活模式。对这些问题的考察将有助于澄清当前的激烈争论, 拓展以往基于非声调语言研究建立的口语加工理论的适用范围, 为完善言语认知加工的理论模型提供新的实验证据。     

Second-Order Positive Comprehension and Frege’s Basic Law V

Richard Heck and John Burgess have shown that Frege’s Basic Law V is consistent with predicative comprehension and that the resulting theory interprets Robinson Arithmetic. There are also many other ways to keep Frege from being contradictory. This paper shows that Basic Law V is also consistent with positive comprehension and that the resulting theory also interprets Robinson Arithmetic. In addition, the theory of positive Frege provides a new understanding of Dummett’s “indefinitely extensible concepts.”     

语篇理解中语义整合的神经机制及其影响因素

语义整合是把当前阅读中新出现的词语与之前的语境进行语义联结以形成连贯表征的过程。在语篇理解中, 很多理论都确定了整合这一过程的重要性, 语义整合是达成语篇连贯的一个关键步骤, 探究其神经机制及影响因素对理解语篇有重要意义。已有的ERP研究表明语篇理解中的语义整合是即时发生的; 已有的fMRI研究和神经震荡的分析提供了参与这一过程的具体脑区和神经网络的证据。其影响因素主要包括语篇内因素、非言语因素和个体差异。     

口语句子产生中词汇选择的计划单元：来自大中小学生的比较研究

采用图-词干扰范式,要求被试口语产生包含三个名词的句子,通过检验句中不同位置的名词上的语义干扰效应, 探讨大中小学生言语产生中词汇选择的计划单元。结果发现,大学生和初中生都只在第一个名词上发现了言语产生潜伏期的语义干扰效应,表明其词汇选择的计划单元只限于第一个名词,支持了严格递进假设;小学生在三个名词上都没有发现潜伏期的语义干扰效应,表明小学生没有稳定地选择好第一个名词即开始发音。由此可见,词汇选择的计划单元大小是可变的,存在年龄上的个体差异,主要表现在小学生和初中生之间。     

Getting Vygotskian about theory of mind: Mediation,dialogue, and the development of social understanding

The ideas of Vygotsky [Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). Thinking and speech. In The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky, (Vol. 1). New York: Plenum. (Original work published 1934.)] have been increasingly influential in accounting for social–environmental influences on the development of social understanding (SU). In the first part of this article, I examine how Vygotskian ideas have to date been recruited to explanations of the development of SU. Next, I present a model of SU development which draws on two implications of Vygotsky’s ideas: the importance of semiotic mediation for mental functioning, and the dialogic nature of the higher mental functions. I then consider the value of the proposed model in accounting for evidence from three areas of enquiry: the typical development of SU in infancy and early childhood, relations between individual differences in SU and social–environmental variables, and atypical development. The model is suggested to be particularly helpful in understanding the transition from intentional-agent to mental-agent understanding, and the role of language in SU. Remaining challenges include a need to specify further the cognitive processes underlying internalization, and to gather more extensive evidence on the roles of typical and atypical social experience in SU development.     

Motor programming in apraxia of speech

Apraxia of Speech (AOS) is an impairment of motor programming. However, the exact nature of this deficit remains unclear. The present study examined motor programming in AOS in the context of a recent two-stage model [Klapp, S. T. (1995). Motor response programming during simple and choice reaction time: The role of practice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21, 1015–1027; Klapp, S. T. (2003). Reaction time analysis of two types of motor preparation for speech articulation: Action as a sequence of chunks. Journal of Motor Behavior, 35, 135–150] that proposes a preprogramming stage (INT) and a process that assigns serial order to multiple programs in a sequence (SEQ). The main hypothesis was that AOS involves a process-specific deficit in the INT (preprogramming) stage of processing, rather than in the on-line serial ordering (SEQ) and initiation of movement. In addition, we tested the hypothesis that AOS involves a central (i.e., modality-general) motor programming deficit. We used a reaction time paradigm that provides two dependent measures: study time (the amount of time for participants to ready a motor response; INT), and reaction time (time to initiate movement; SEQ). Two experiments were conducted to examine INT and SEQ in AOS: Experiment 1 involved finger movements, Experiment 2 involved speech movements analogous to the finger movements. Results showed longer preprogramming time for patients with AOS but normal sequencing and initiation times, relative to controls. Together, the findings are consistent with the hypothesis of a process-specific, but central (modality-independent) deficit in AOS; alternative explanations are also discussed.     

Can the irrelevant speech effect turn into a stimulus suffix effect?

The irrelevant sound effect (ISE) and the stimulus suffix effect (SSE) are two qualitatively different phenomena, although in both paradigms irrelevant auditory material is played while a verbal serial recall task is being performed. Jones, Macken, and Nicholls (2004) have proposed the effect of irrelevant speech on auditory serial recall to switch from an ISE to an SSE mechanism, if the auditory-perceptive similarity of relevant and irrelevant material is maximized. The experiment reported here (n = 36) tested this hypothesis by exploring auditory serial recall performance both under irrelevant speech and under speech suffix conditions. These speech materials were spoken either by the same voice as the auditory items to be recalled or by a different voice. The experimental conditions were such that the likelihood of obtaining an SSE was maximized. The results, however, show that irrelevant speech—in contrast to speech suffixes—affects auditory serial recall independently of its perceptive similarity to the items to be recalled and thus in terms of an ISE mechanism that crucially extends to recency. The ISE thus cannot turn into an SSE.     

Can an agent's false belief be corrected by an appropriate communication? Psychological reasoning in 18-month-old infants

Do 18-month-olds understand that an agent's false belief can be corrected by an appropriate, though not an inappropriate, communication? In Experiment 1, infants watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers: a box and a cup. To start, agent1 played with the ball and then hid it in the box, while agent2 looked on. Next, in agent1's absence, agent2 moved the ball from the box to the cup. When agent1 returned, agent2 told her "The ball is in the cup!" (informative-intervention condition) or "I like the cup!" (uninformative-intervention condition). During test, agent1 reached for either the box (box event) or the cup (cup event). In the informative-intervention condition, infants who saw the box event looked reliably longer than those who saw the cup event; in the uninformative-intervention condition, the reverse pattern was found. These results suggest that infants expected agent1's false belief about the ball's location to be corrected when she was told "The ball is in the cup!", but not "I like the cup!". In Experiment 2, agent2 simply pointed to the ball's new location, and infants again expected agent1's false belief to be corrected. These and control results provide additional evidence that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to agents. In addition, the results suggest that by 18 months of age infants expect agents' false beliefs to be corrected by relevant communications involving words or gestures.