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51.
Philip S. Gorski 《Zygon》1990,25(3):279-307
Abstract. What is the relationship between natural science, social science, and religion? The dominant paradigm in contemporary social science is scientism, the attempt to apply the methods of natural science to the study of society. However, scientism is problematic: it rests on a conception of natural science that cannot be sustained. Natural scientific understanding emerges from an instrumental and objectifying relation to the world; it is oriented toward control and manipulation of the physical world. Social-scientific understanding, by contrast, must begin with a practical and meaningful relation to the world: it is oriented toward the mediation of values and objective possibilities in the social world. Social science is therefore a form of practical reason based on objective claims. But while social-scientific understanding starts with interpretation, its possibilities by no means end there. In particular, by developing abstract and objectified models of society as a system, social science opens existing social organization to critical reflection. Religion, by contrast, is a form of speculative reason about ultimate values, based on subjective claims of religious experience. Social science nevertheless shares with religion an orientation toward values and concern with the “good life.” 相似文献
52.
Michael Slote 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2018,26(3):419-436
ABSTRACTFor obvious reasons sentimentalists have been hesitant to offer accounts of moral reasons for action: the whole idea at least initially smacks of rationalist notions of morality. But the sentimentalist can seek to reduce practical to sentimentalist considerations and that is what the present paper attempts to do. Prudential reasons can be identified with the normal emotional/motivational responses people feel in situations that threaten them or offer them opportunities to attain what they need. And in the most basic cases altruistic/moral reasons involve the empathic transfer of one person’s prudential reasons and emotions to another person or persons who can help them. Practical/moral reasons for self-sacrifice also depend on empathic transfer and can vary in strength with the strength of the transfer. 相似文献
53.
On a standard interpretation, Hume argued that reason is not practical, because its operations are limited to “demonstration” and “probability.” But recent critics claim that by limiting reason’s operations to only these two, his argument begs the question. Despite this, a better argument for motivational skepticism can be found in Hume’s text, one that emphasizes reason’s inability to generate motive force against contrary desires or passions. Nothing can oppose an impulse but a contrary impulse, Hume believed, and reason cannot generate an impulse. This better argument is here developed and defended. Two lines of objection to it can be anticipated: (1) that reason actually can generate impulsive force, based on contents of its normative judgments and (2) that reason neither can nor needs to generate an impulse, since the actions of rational agents are not determined by forceful impulses of desire, as Hume supposed. These objections are answered by pointing out their unsatisfying consequences. 相似文献
54.
The paper introduces a new model of argumentation, the Mixed Game Model, that no longer separates rule-governed competence from actual performance but starts from human beings and their ability of competence-in-performance. Human beings are able to orientate themselves in ever-changing surroundings and to negotiate diverging views in argumentative action games. Argumentation is thus described as a mixed game played by human beings according to principles of probability. These principles include constitutive, regulative and executive principles. Constitutive Principles focus on the basic components of the game, that is, action, dialogue, and coherence as the interplay of different communicative means. Regulative Principles mediate between correlated human abilities and interests. Executive Principles guide the sequencing of action according to cognitive strategies. The mixed game no longer rests on pre-established harmony but describes performance as a non-equilibrial process of negotiation that mediates between order and disorder and is based on the integration of various parameters such as rationality, reason, persuasion and emotion. How the model works is exemplified by an analysis of part of a debate in the European Parliament. 相似文献
55.
Veit Bader 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2003,6(1):3-22
Discussions of the relations between religions, society, politics, and the state in recent political philosophy are characterized, firstly, by a strong US American bias focusing on limitations of religious arguments in public debate. Even if the restriction or radical exclusion of religious reasons from public debate has recently been extensively criticized, secularist interpretations of liberal-democratic constitutions still prevail. Here it is argued that both strong secularism and weak or second order secularism are counterproductive for many reasons. Secondly, separationist interpretations of state-church relations are predominant, even if the severe wall of separation is criticized more often nowadays. Here it is argued that there are more and more interesting options than either separationism or accommodationism, that we should not exclusively focus at the constitutional relations between state and churches but address the full reciprocal relationship between society, culture, politics, nation, state and (organized) religions, and that we need more historical and comparative perspectives for the required institutionalist turn in political theory in order to overcome the obstacles inherent in predominant American political philosophy. The articles included in this volume are first, modest steps in this new direction. 相似文献
56.
《Metaphilosophy》2000,31(3):323-345
Books reviewed:
Michele M. Moody-Adams, Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt's Concept of the Social
Susan Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate 相似文献
Michele M. Moody-Adams, Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt's Concept of the Social
Susan Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate 相似文献
57.
58.
H. Lillehammer 《The Journal of Ethics》2000,4(3):173-190
This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms. 相似文献
59.
John Lemos 《Philosophia》2006,34(1):85-93
In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that (1) there is a difference between moral practical reasoning (MPR) and prudential practical reasoning (PPR) and (2) what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued that since it is more reasonable to assess prudential practical rationality in terms of the absolute standard than the relative standard, there is no conflict between the demands of MPR (morality) and PPR (self-interest).
相似文献
John LemosEmail: |