Are there True Contradictions? A Critical Discussion of Graham Priest's, Beyond the limits of thought

The present article critically examines three aspects of Graham Priest's dialetheic analysis of very important kinds of limitations (the limit of what can be expressed, described, conceived, known, or the limit of some operation or other). First, it is shown that Priest's considerations focusing on Hegel's account of the infinite cannot be sustained, mainly because Priest seems to rely on a too restrictive notion of object. Second, we discuss Priest's treatment of the paradoxes in Cantorian set-theory. It is shown that Priest does not address the issue in full generality; rather, he relies on a reading of Cantor which implicitly attributes a very strong principle concerning quantification over arbitrary domains to Cantor. Third, the main piece of Priest's work, the so-called “inclosure schema”, is investigated. This schema is supposed to formalize the core of many well-known paradoxes. We claim, however, that formally the schema is not sound. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A dialogue on Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise

The five participants in this dialogue critically discuss Zeno of Elea's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. They consider a number of solutions to and restatements of the paradox, together with their philosophical implications. Among the issues investigated include the appearance-reality distinction, Aristotle's distinction between actual and potential infinity, the concept of a continuum, Cantor's continuum hypothesis and theory of transfinite ordinals, and, as a solution to Zeno's puzzle, the distinction between infinite and indeterminate or inexhaustible divisibility.     

Framing of decisions under ambiguity

This paper reports three experiments that illustrate framing of decision problems due to Ellsberg (1961) in which probabilities are ambiguous. Although the standard Ellsberg problems often induce violations of Savage's sure-thing principle, framing of the equivalent problems in a sequential format reduces these violations. Nevertheless, this has an ironic consequence of introducing another inconsistency in the decision makers' choices: An inconsistency between the standard and sequential formulations of the Ellsberg problems.     

Distinguishing indeterminate belief from “risk-averse” preferences

I focus my discussion on the well-known Ellsberg paradox. I find good normative reasons for incorporating non-precise belief, as represented by sets of probabilities, in an Ellsberg decision model. This amounts to forgoing the completeness axiom of expected utility theory. Provided that probability sets are interpreted as genuinely indeterminate belief (as opposed to “imprecise” belief), such a model can moreover make the “Ellsberg choices” rationally permissible. Without some further element to the story, however, the model does not explain how an agent may come to have unique preferences for each of the Ellsberg options. Levi (1986, Hard choices: Decision making under unresolved conflict. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press) holds that the extra element amounts to innocuous secondary “risk” or security considerations that are used to break ties when more than one option is rationally permissible. While I think a lexical choice rule of this kind is very plausible, I argue that it involves a greater break with xpected utility theory than mere violation of the ordering axiom.     

Deductivism and the Informal Fallacies

This essay proposes and defends a general thesis concerning the nature of fallacies of reasoning. These in distinctive ways are all said to be deductively invalid. More importantly, the most accurate, complete and charitable reconstructions of these species and specimens of the informal fallacies are instructive with respect to the individual character of each distinct informal fallacy. Reconstructions of the fallacies as deductive invalidities are possible in every case, if deductivism is true, which means that in every case they should be formalizable in an expressively comprehensive formal symbolic deductive logic. The general thesis is illustrated by a detailed examination of Walter Burleigh's paradox in his c. 1323 work, De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior (Longer Treatise on the Purity of Logic), as a challenge to the deductive validity of hypothetical syllogism. The paradox has the form, ‹If I call you a swine, then I call you an animal; if I call you an animal, then I speak truly; therefore, if I call you a swine, then I speak truly'. Several solutions to the problem are considered, and the inference is exposed as an instance of the common deductive fallacy of equivocation.     

The Unbearable Uncertainty Paradox

People can be risk seeking and risk averse, but people can also be uncertainty averse: in other words, if risk is at least the possibility of an unwanted affect, then it is not only the unwanted effect that they want to avoid, it can also be the uncertainty inherent in the possibility that they wish to avoid. This uncertainty aversion can even lead to a state where someone prefers a certain outcome at all costs, even when it is the worst case. This gives rise to the following paradox: the worst case seems to be more acceptable than the state where there is still a chance that it will not materialize. We can call this the Unbearable Uncertainty Paradox. This essay provides a first conceptual sketch of this phenomenon that seems to be widespread but nevertheless does not appear to have been identified before, either by philosophers or by psychologists.     

When to think like an epistemicist

Epistemicism is the view that seemingly vague predicates are not in fact vague. Consequently, there must be a sharp boundary between a man who is bald and one who is not bald. Although such a view is often met with incredulity, my aim is to provide a defense of epistemicism in this essay. My defense, however, is backhanded: I argue that the formal commitments of epistemicism are the result of good practical reasoning, not metaphysical necessity. To get to that conclusion, I spend most of the essay arguing that using a formal system like classical logic to manage seemingly vague situations requires practical principles to mediate between the formalism and what it aims to represent.     

Do Employees Leave Just Because They Can? Examining the Perceived Employability–Turnover Intentions Relationship

The relationship between perceived employability and turnover intentions seems much more complicated than what the common sense would suggest. Based on the reviewed literature, it was expected that job satisfaction, affective commitment, and perceived job security would moderate this relationship. Using a sample of working individuals from different occupations and sectors (N = 721), it was found that employees who perceived themselves as highly employable were more likely to have turnover intentions when their affective commitment was low and perceived job security was high; and the relationship was negative for employees with shorter tenures. Understanding the conditions under which perceived employability is associated with turnover intentions may help organizations design human resource policies that allow them to retain an educated and competent workforce.     

如何解决团队创新悖论?基于成员认知风格“组型”与“构型”视角的探究

如何提升团队创新绩效?这是近年来管理实践界与学术界共同关注的热门话题。鉴于创新是一项兼具“探索”与“利用”双元特征的活动, 懂得如何平衡二者之间的悖论关系就成为提升团队创新绩效的关键。基于成员认知风格的微观视角, 从“组型”与“构型”两方面探索了解决这一悖论关系的方法。具体而言：(1)成员认知风格组型与团队领导行为之间的互补效应有助于解决团队创新悖论; (2)在合理的“成员认知风格-工作角色要求”构型基础上, 营造良好的团队协作氛围, 有助于解决团队创新悖论。进一步地, 还基于阴阳哲学思想研究了解决团队创新悖论的内在机制。为论证相关理论命题, 将开展三个研究模块, 采用定量与定性相结合的研究方法对提出的研究模型进行检验。相关发现不仅有助于丰富从微观视角研究团队创新前因、悖论管理方法的理论成果, 还将为企业的创新管理实践提供建议。