How we have fallen: implicit trajectories in collective temporal thought

ABSTRACT

Memory may play a critical role in the ability to imagine events in the future. While most work on this relation has concerned episodic memory and simulated episodic events in the future, the current study examines how collective memories relate to imagination for the collective future. Two thousand American participants provided events for (1) America’s origins, (2) normative events that all Americans should remember, and (3) events in America’s future. Each event was rated for emotional valence. Whereas collective memories – particularly origin events – showed pronounced positivity biases, there was a negativity bias in collective future thought, indicating an implicit trajectory of decline in Americans’ representations of their nation across time. Imagination for the social future may not be simulated based on the template of collective memories, but may rather relate to the past in a way that is mediated by cultural narrative schemata.     

Communicative action,the lifeworlds of learning and the dialogue that we aren't 1

Abstract

The first section of the paper reviews the kind of action which unfolds in Plato's Republic, and argues that, from Book II onwards, its character shifts from a genuine dialogue (communicative action) to a more manipulative kind of intercourse (strategic action). While the former kind of action was characteristic of the educational activities of the historical Socrates, the case is made that this kind of action became largely eclipsed in Western education and superseded by the strategic concerns to which Platonist conceptions of learning gave prominence. The Platonist legacy, it is pointed out, had a decisive impact on Western conceptions of learning, even beyond the Enlightenment. These conceptions were largely custodial rather than emancipatory in character. An argument is presented in thirteen steps in the second section of the paper, to establish the case that the kind of action which properly describes the experience of teaching and learning is that of a cultural courtship. A distinction is drawn between honourable and dishonourable forms of courtship, the honourable being a candidate for defence in universalist terms. The practical import of the distinction is considered. Under the title ‘The Dialogue that we Aren't’, the third section reviews postmodern objections ‐ particularly those of Lyotard ‐ to the kind of argument made in the thirteen steps, and the concluding section considers Habermas’ later theories in relation to my own ‘universalist’ argument.     

Temporal perception is enhanced for goal-directed biological actions

ABSTRACT

Research into the visual perception of goal-directed human action indicates that human action perception makes use of specialized processing systems, similar to those that operate in visual expertise. Against this background, the current research investigated whether perception of temporal information in goal-directed human action is enhanced relative to similar motion stimuli. Experiment 1 compared observers’ sensitivity to speed changes in upright human action to a kinematic control (an animation yoked to the motion of the human hand), and also to inverted human action. Experiment 2 compared human action to a non-human motion control (a tool moved the object). In both experiments observers’ sensitivity to detecting the speed changes was higher for the human stimuli relative to the control stimuli, and inversion in Experiment 1 did not alter observers’ sensitivity. Experiment 3 compared observers’ sensitivity to speed changes in goal-directed human and dog actions, in order to determine if enhanced temporal perception is unique to human actions. Results revealed no difference between human and dog stimuli, indicating that enhanced speed perception may exist for any biological motion. Results are discussed with reference to theories of biological motion perception and perception in visual expertise.     

The Limits of Attention for Visual Perception and Action in Aging

ABSTRACT

This study aimed to investigate whether aging results in an increased attentional blink effect in older adults as compared to young adults. A rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm was employed in which participants were asked to identify two targets (dual-task condition) presented in rapid succession. These targets were separated by various intervals in a stream of stimuli. The performance for identifying the second target was normally diminished as compared to identification of a single-task target. Various combinations of tasks, such as two perceptual tasks or one perceptual and one action task, as well as different types of pointing action, such as pointing to a displaced target, pointing to a stationary target or pointing to a disappeared target, were manipulated in this study to see if aging may further impact these variables. The results of this study showed that in young adults, successful identification of the first target interfered with identifying the second target, as well as the initiation time (action planning) of pointing to the second target. However, identification of the first target did not interfere with pointing movement time and pointing accuracy, even when the target was displaced, which required online control of action. Conversely, for older adults, successful central identification not only interfered with identifying the second target and with the pointing initiation time, but also interfered with pointing movement time for a displaced target. This suggests that older adults seem to be unable to concurrently identify the first target and correct their already-initiated pointing movement compared to young adults.     

Motivation-encompassing attitudes

Alfred R. Mele defends a broadly ‘Humean’ theory of motivation. One common dispute between Humeans and anti-Humeans has to do with whether or not a desire is required to motivate action. For the most part Mele avoids this dispute. He claims that there are reasons to think that beliefs cannot motivate action, but finally allows that it might be that it is a contingent fact that beliefs can motivate action in human beings. Instead Mele argues for the claim that certain kinds of desires – namely action-desires – are ‘paradigmatic motivational attitudes’, similar in an essential way to intentions, and that beliefs are not. Hence it is a necessary truth that action-desires encompass motivation to act; if beliefs encompass motivation to act, it is not a necessary truth that they do. In this way Mele preserves some of what is intuitively right about the Humean account, while admitting that the arguments normally offered in support of the standard Humean claims are open to objections. I argue that Mele's account is implausible. His argument against the claim that state-desires are essentially motivation-encompassing attitudes is convincing, but the same argument proves that action-desires are not essentially motivation-encompassing either. If this difference between desires and beliefs cannot be maintained, however, then Mele fails to defend any motivationally relevant difference between beliefs and desires.     

Validation of a Community Collective Efficacy Scale in an African Context

The aim of this study was to validate a community collective efficacy scale in an African context. An abridged version of the Community Collective Efficacy Scale was validated in a cross-sectional survey design. Participants (N = 1050) from urban (n = 451) and rural (n = 599) areas completed the CCES and other measures of self-efficacy and psychological well-being. Results indicated a Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient of 0.72 and satisfactory inter-item correlations ranging between 0.17 and 0.25. Significant correlations between the CCES and other measures of self-efficacy and psychological well-being indicated good criterion-related validity. Construct validity was supported by confirmatory and exploratory factor analysis. Exploratory factor analysis yielded one factor that relates to a sense of “we-ness”. The CCES thus has good reliability and validity in an African context.     

Ecosystem Dynamics: a Natural Middle

Conflicts between science and religion revolve about fundamental assumptions more often than they do facts or theories. The key postulates that have guided science since the Enlightenment appear to be wholly inadequate to describe properly the development of ecosystems. An emended set of tenets adequate to the ecological narrative also significantly ameliorates the adversarial nature of the dialogue between scientists and theists.     

Reply to Commentaries

In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the distinction between cognition and metacognition and show how to draw it within our framework. Next, we explain how metacognition differs from social cognition. The underlying mechanisms of metacognitive development are then elucidated in terms of interaction patterns. Finally, we consider measures of metacognition and suitable methods for investigating it. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Unpredictable yet Guided: Arendt on Principled Action

Political action is unpredictable because it unfolds among a plurality of independent actors. This unpredictability generates a fundamental puzzle: If an actor cannot know where her initiative will lead, what motivates and guides her in her doings? The aim of this paper is to develop and defend the solution to the puzzle that we can find in the thought of Hannah Arendt, namely the idea that political action is – or should be – motivated and guided by principles, principles like justice, equality, or honour. Such principles must be distinguished from goals because they do not designate a specific state of affairs, but are general ideas that allow for diverse implementations. I show that this distinction is of great practical importance for the actors involved, since their outlook and their attitude towards others will differ depending on whether they see their activity as aimed at a goal or as guided by a principle.     

Structural and functional information—an evolutionary approach to pragmatic information

The paper starts with a critics of the potential information which is related to the statistical entropy. In order to include the syntactic and semantic aspects of information, we propose a distinction between structural and functional information, instead. Structural information represents the structural determination of a system state, it measures the content of information, as given by the material structure. Functional information, on the other hand, represents the operational closure of the system, it could be e.g. an algorithm which activates and interprets the existing structural information.

From an evolutionary point of view, pragmatic information is generated by an interplay of structural and functional information. This leads to a new insight into the concept of pragmatic information, which is not an invariant of evolution, but must be steadily re‐generated.

The active role of information in a self‐organization process is demonstrated in a model of artificial agents. It is shown by means of computer simulations that the feedback of already existing information on the generation of new information performs analogies to the creation of a collective memory.