集体自恋：群际冲突的催化剂

集体自恋是将自恋延伸到群体水平的一个经典构念, 目前被界定为对于“自身所属群体是卓越的并值得优待, 却未充分被他者承认”的信念。现有研究发现它对群际敌对性有较强解释力, 因为集体自恋者对内群体形象、地位或身份所受威胁高度敏感, 容易高估威胁和怀疑外群体, 而缺乏自我价值感及控制感是集体自恋的重要根源。鉴于现有研究一般都预设了集体自恋的脆弱性和消极性, 而集体自恋的属性不必然如此, 未来研究应在充分厘清集体自恋内涵及结构的基础上探索其消极与积极后效, 揭示其多元成因及干预方法, 并推进跨文化研究。     

Thinking,Acting, Considering

According to a familiar (alleged) requirement on practical reason, one must believe a proposition if one is to take it for granted in reasoning about what to do. This paper explores a related requirement, not on thinking but on acting—that one must accept a goal if one is to count as acting for its sake. This is the acceptance requirement. Although it is endorsed by writers as diverse as Christine Korsgaard, Donald Davidson, and Talbot Brewer, I argue that it is vulnerable to counterexamples, in which agents act in light of ends that they do not accept but are still merely considering. For instance, a young professional may keep a job option open not because she definitely wants or intends to take it, but just because she is considering taking it. I try to show (1) that such examples are not easily resisted; (2) that they present challenges specifically for Brewer, Davidson, and especially Korsgaard; and (3) that the examples also raise fresh, non-partisan questions in action theory. What is considering, exactly? How could it fall short of acceptance while still guiding behaviour? How can we act for an end before thinking it through?     

Do We Decide Intentionally?

In a recent article in this journal, Joshua Shepherd presents and rejects a new argument for the sceptical conclusion that everyday decisions aren't intentional actions. After relating his focal argument to a different argument for the same conclusion that is presented and rejected by Alfred Mele, I defend these arguments from extant criticisms, and develop new objections that shed light on the intentionality of typical decisions.