A WORLD OF CONTINGENCIES

Abstract Physicalism holds that the laws of physics are inviolable and ubiquitous and thereby account for all of reality. Laws leave no “wiggle room” or “gaps” for action by numinous agents. They cannot be invoked, however, without boundary stipulations that perforce are contingent and which “drive” the laws. Driving contingencies are not limited to instances of “blind chance,” but rather span a continuum of amalgamations with regularities, up to and including nearly determinate propensities. Most examples manifest directionality, and their very definition encompasses intentionality. Contingencies, via their interactions with laws, can reinforce and maintain one another, thereby giving rise to enduring, ordered configurations of constraints. All of ordered nature thus results from ongoing transactions between mutualistic contingencies that constrain possibilities and entropic chance events that degrade order but diversify opportunities. Laws do not of themselves determine reality; interactions among contingencies do. For believers, the robust abundance of indeterminacies provides ample latitude for divine intervention, free will, and prayer. The priority of contingency also affords some insight into the meaning of suffering and evil.     

Perceptuomotor rules as prediction tools in (joint) action: The case of orientation perception

The human action system has a layered structure supporting a cascade of partially overlapping information processes in multiple, interlinked representational spaces. Apart from the mirror neuron system which through motor resonance mediates one's understanding of the action goals of one's partner, perceptuomotor rules like Fitts' law, the Isogony Principle, and sequencing heuristics provide further sources of prediction in (joint) action. The present study focuses on a perceptuomotor rule that describes how the orientation of framed, tilted objects is perceived and acted upon by individuals. In two experiments involving the Rod-and-Frame Illusion (RFI) participants were asked to perform delayed responses that consisted either of (1) making a perceptual judgment in a forced-choice paradigm, or (2) rotating and propelling a hand-held cylinder. Irrespective of response type, the effects of the RFI proved robust and constant. The relevance of the findings for prediction in joint-action tasks is discussed.     

Representation and learning in motor action – Bridges between experimental research and cognitive robotics

To gain a better understanding of the functionality of representation and categorization in action and interaction, it is fundamental that researchers understand how movements are represented in long-term memory. It is our position that human motor control requires that our actions be planned and represented in terms of intended perceptual effects and future task demands, and that the individual has a well-structured mental representation of the task so that the movement can be carried out successfully. Basic Action Concepts (BACs) are identified as major building blocks of cognitive representation in long-term memory, which are cognitive tools used to master the functional demands of movement tasks. In this paper, we consider relevant issues in research methodology and present an experimental method that can be used to assess action-relevant representational structures. This method permits us to observe the strong relationship between cognitive representation and performance in manual action. For example, the specific differences in the mental representations of participants are strongly related to skill level, as well as biomechanical and task constraints. We then discuss results from our learning experiments, where we have examined the development and changes in cognitive representation over time. From these experiments we have found that cognitive reference structures include task-specific spatial information, which provides the basis for action control in skilled voluntary movement. We have implemented these results on various robotic platforms. We argue that the insights gained from various experimental approaches in the field of cognitive psychology and motor control enable researchers to explore the possibilities and limitations of artificial control architectures in robot systems. Finally, we argue that this is not a unidirectional process. Researchers from the field of cognitive psychology and motor control can profit from the advances in technological systems, which enhance the understanding of human motor control in skilled voluntary action.     

Are there unconscious perceptual processes?

Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of unconscious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and colleagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under scrutiny. Recent findings seem to show that information processed by the dorsal stream for online action contributes to visual awareness. Some interpret these results as showing that some dorsal stream processes are conscious visual processes (e.g., Gallese, 2007; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). The aim of this paper is to provide new support for the more traditional view that blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious perceptual processes. I argue that individuals with blindsight do not have access to the kind of purely qualitative color and size information which normal individuals do. So, even though people with blindsight have a kind of cognitive consciousness, visual information processing in blindsight patients is not associated with a distinctly visual phenomenology. I argue further that while dorsal stream processing seems to contribute to visual awareness, only information processed by the early dorsal stream (V1, V2, and V3) is broadcast to working memory. Information processed by later parts of the dorsal stream (the parietal lobe) never reaches working memory and hence does not correlate with phenomenal awareness. I conclude that both blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious visual processes.     

What are self-generated actions?

The concept of self-generated action is controversial, despite extensive study of its neural basis. Why is this concept so troublesome? We analyse the concept of self-generated action as employed by [Passingham et al., 2010a] and [Passingham et al., 2010b] . There are two definitions of self-generated action; as operant action and as underdetermined action. The latter draws on subjective experience. Experiments on action awareness suggest that experience may not be a good guide for defining self-generated action. Nevertheless, we agree with Passingham and colleagues that self-generated actions exist distinct from operant actions. But defining ‘self-generated’ by the degree of involvement of an endogenous process risks regress. We sketch an alternative account of self-generated action that tries to avoid these problems to make self-generated actions accessible to experimental science.     

"When did I learn and when shall I act?": The developmental relationship between episodic future thinking and memory

This study investigated the development of the ability to reflect on one’s personal past and future. A total of 64 4- to 6-year-olds received tasks of delayed self-recognition, source memory, delay of gratification, and a newly developed task of future-oriented action timing. Although children’s performance on delayed self-recognition, source memory, and action timing improved with age, their performance on delay of gratification did not. Children’s errors in source memory and action timing were solely and strongly associated with each other in older children (5–6 years) even after controlling for age and verbal ability. Results are discussed in terms of mental time travel underlying episodic memory and future thinking that includes both the projection of oneself into the past and future and the appreciation of events’ temporal relations.     

Mind control? Creating illusory intentions through a phony brain–computer interface

Can one be fooled into believing that one intended an action that one in fact did not intend? Past experimental paradigms have demonstrated that participants, when provided with false perceptual feedback about their actions, can be fooled into misperceiving the nature of their intended motor act. However, because veridical proprioceptive/perceptual feedback limits the extent to which participants can be fooled, few studies have been able to answer our question and induce the illusion to intend. In a novel paradigm addressing this question, participants were instructed to move a line on the computer screen by use of a phony brain–computer interface. Line movements were actually controlled by computer program. Demonstrating the illusion to intend, participants reported more intentions to move the line when it moved frequently than when it moved infrequently. Consistent with ideomotor theory, the finding illuminates the intimate liaisons among ideomotor processing, the sense of agency, and action production.     

THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE REALISTIC UTOPIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Abstract: Human rights developed in response to specific violations of human dignity, and can therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity, their moral source. This internal relationship explains the moral content and moreover the distinguishing feature of human rights: they are designed for an effective implementation of the core moral values of an egalitarian universalism in terms of coercive law. This essay is an attempt to explain this moral‐legal Janus face of human rights through the mediating role of the concept of human dignity. This concept is due to a remarkable generalization of the particularistic meanings of those “dignities” that once were attached to specific honorific functions and memberships. In spite of its abstract meaning, “human dignity” still retains from its particularistic precursor concepts the connotation of depending on the social recognition of a status—in this case, the status of democratic citizenship. Only membership in a constitutional political community can protect, by granting equal rights, the equal human dignity of everybody.     

A Case Study of Participatory Action Research in a Public New England Middle School: Empowerment, Constraints and Challenges

PAR recognizes teachers and students as co-creators in a learning process that builds self-efficacy essential to long-term educational success. In enabling contexts, PAR projects also allow teachers to critically deconstruct societal power, examine how these dynamics are reproduced in the classroom, and work against the silencing of student voices. This case study describes the process of implementing an inquiry-based PAR model into a formal urban middle school program intended to reduce drop out rates. The anthropologist/researchers employed participant observation, interviews, and review of student work to explore the dynamics, challenges, and constraints confronted during the process. The intervention demonstrated the gap between practice and theory in a middle school environment marked by well-defined hierarchies and roles as well as high-stakes testing.