Book Reviews

Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics
Stephen Frosh, The Politics of Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to Freudian and Post-Freudian Theory
Dennis Chong, Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society
Zsolt Enyedi and Ferenc Erös, Authoritarianism and Prejudice: Central European Perspectives
Stephanie Riger, Transforming Psychology: Gender in Theory and Practice
V. M. Bekhterev, Suggestion and Its Role in Social Life
Ian Glynn, An Anatomy of Thought: The Origins and Machinery of the Mind
David O. Sears, Jim Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo (eds.), Racialized Politics: The Debate About Racism in America
Philip A. Klinkner with Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America     

Social cognition, artefacts, and stigmergy: A comparative analysis of theoretical frameworks for the understanding of artefact-mediated collaborative activity

Collective behaviour is often characterised by the so-called ‘coordination paradox’: looking at individual ants, for example, they do not seem to cooperate or communicate explicitly, but nevertheless at the social level cooperative behaviour, such as nest building, emerges, apparently without any central coordination. In the case of social insects such emergent coordination has been explained by the theory of stigmergy, which describes how individuals can effect the behaviour of others (and their own) through artefacts, i.e., the product of their own activity (e.g., building material in the ants’ case). Artefacts clearly also play a strong role in human collective behaviour, which has been emphasised, for example, by proponents of activity theory and distributed cognition. However, the relation between theories of situated/social cognition and theories of social insect behaviour has so far received relatively little attention in the cognitive science literature. This paper aims to take a step in this direction by comparing three theoretical frameworks for the study of cognition in the context of agent–environment interaction (activity theory, situated action, and distributed cognition) to each other and to the theory of stigmergy as a possible minimal common ground. The comparison focuses on what each of the four theories has to say about the role/nature of (a) the agents involved in collective behaviour, (b) their environment, (c) the collective activities addressed, and (d) the role that artefacts play in the interaction between agents and their environments, and in particular in the coordination of cooperation.     

"When did I learn and when shall I act?": The developmental relationship between episodic future thinking and memory

This study investigated the development of the ability to reflect on one’s personal past and future. A total of 64 4- to 6-year-olds received tasks of delayed self-recognition, source memory, delay of gratification, and a newly developed task of future-oriented action timing. Although children’s performance on delayed self-recognition, source memory, and action timing improved with age, their performance on delay of gratification did not. Children’s errors in source memory and action timing were solely and strongly associated with each other in older children (5–6 years) even after controlling for age and verbal ability. Results are discussed in terms of mental time travel underlying episodic memory and future thinking that includes both the projection of oneself into the past and future and the appreciation of events’ temporal relations.     

Are there unconscious perceptual processes?

Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of unconscious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and colleagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under scrutiny. Recent findings seem to show that information processed by the dorsal stream for online action contributes to visual awareness. Some interpret these results as showing that some dorsal stream processes are conscious visual processes (e.g., Gallese, 2007; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). The aim of this paper is to provide new support for the more traditional view that blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious perceptual processes. I argue that individuals with blindsight do not have access to the kind of purely qualitative color and size information which normal individuals do. So, even though people with blindsight have a kind of cognitive consciousness, visual information processing in blindsight patients is not associated with a distinctly visual phenomenology. I argue further that while dorsal stream processing seems to contribute to visual awareness, only information processed by the early dorsal stream (V1, V2, and V3) is broadcast to working memory. Information processed by later parts of the dorsal stream (the parietal lobe) never reaches working memory and hence does not correlate with phenomenal awareness. I conclude that both blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious visual processes.     

What are self-generated actions?

The concept of self-generated action is controversial, despite extensive study of its neural basis. Why is this concept so troublesome? We analyse the concept of self-generated action as employed by [Passingham et al., 2010a] and [Passingham et al., 2010b] . There are two definitions of self-generated action; as operant action and as underdetermined action. The latter draws on subjective experience. Experiments on action awareness suggest that experience may not be a good guide for defining self-generated action. Nevertheless, we agree with Passingham and colleagues that self-generated actions exist distinct from operant actions. But defining ‘self-generated’ by the degree of involvement of an endogenous process risks regress. We sketch an alternative account of self-generated action that tries to avoid these problems to make self-generated actions accessible to experimental science.     

Naïve definitions of action and inaction: The continuum,spread, and valence of behaviors

The cohesiveness of a society depends, in part, on how its individual members manage their daily activities with respect to the goals of that society. Hence, there should be a degree of social agreement on what constitutes action and what constitutes inaction. The present research investigated the structure of action and inaction definitions, the evaluation of action versus inaction, and individual differences in these evaluations. Action–inaction ratings of behaviors and states showed more social agreement at the ends of the inaction–action continuum than at the middle, suggesting a socially shared construal of this definition. Action–inaction ratings were also shown to correlate with the valence of the rated behaviors, such that the more active the behavior, the more positive its valence. Lastly, individual differences in locomotion, need for closure, and Christian religious beliefs correlated positively with a preference for action. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Creating a research agenda in career counselling: the place of action theory

After identifying historical and current problems in career counselling research, we propose a research agenda based on contextual action theory. This theory has been used as a framework for research in the career field and for general counselling practice. It is advantageous for several reasons including its conceptual basis, its detailed qualitative and quantitative research method, and the significant link it provides between research and practice. It is supported by the action-project method, an integrated set of procedures developed for conducting research. Contextual action theory and the action-project method can address major emerging issues in career counselling, for example the place of emotion and the use of narrative, and advance the research agenda in this field.     

Conceptual agreement theory

For some time now, psychological inquiry on reference has assumed that reference is achieved through causal links between words and entities (i.e., direct reference). In this view, meaning is not relevant for reference or co-reference. We argue that this view may be germane to concrete objects, but not to diffuse objects (that lack clear spatio-temporal limits, thus preventing the use of direct reference in interactions). Here, we propose that meaning is the relevant dimension when referring to diffuse entities, and introduce Conceptual Agreement Theory (CAT). CAT is a mathematized theory of meaning that specifies the conditions under which two individuals (or one individual at two points in time) will infer they share a diffuse referent. We present the theory, and use stereotype stability and public opinion as case studies to illustrate the theory’s use and scope.     

Persisting or Withdrawing? An Insight into the Psychosocial Processes Underlying Sustained Engagement

The study explored the roles of commitment, emotional stress, and interpersonal relationships in sustaining individuals' engagement in collective action. Two collective action cases, differing in duration, issue, and territorial rootedness, were analyzed. The processes underlying sustained engagement were probed in 32 semistructured interviews conducted with antiglobalization activists (N = 13) and opponents to a high‐speed railroad (N = 19). Our findings showed that collective action can be stressful, but that there are proximal and distal factors that can counterbalance the disruption and sustain engagement. The proximal factors are embedded in the circumstances of involvement, and these factors concern interpersonal relationships, organizational mechanisms, and the psychological interface between the individuals and the concrete collective action environment. The distal factors are related partly to the individual and partly to the broader community from which the individual absorbs general values and norms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The European annuals of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis: the benefits of linguistic diversity

This paper presents the Annuals of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, which have been published in Europe since 2003, successively in French, Italian, German, Turkish and Russian. Like the Annuals published since 1985 in Latin America, these are designed to give non-Anglophone readers access to a selection of leading psychoanalytic articles. Each European Annual makes its own selection so the content varies from one Annual to another. Psychoanalysts on the various editorial committees translate the texts from English into their native target language on a voluntary basis. Beyond the geographical and cultural criteria, the desire to translate and the enjoyment of translating are among the key criteria. The Annual editors consider it important that the English language should continue to exist as a psychoanalytic lingua franca, without actually becoming its universal language, so that the richness and diversity of the psychoanalytic languages and terminologies can be preserved. The European Annuals in French, Italian, German, Turkish and Russian, with their linguistic and cultural characteristics, are then presented in turn.