A plausible role of imagination in pretend play,counterfactual reasoning,and executive functions

A notable observation is the similarities in the cognitive processes of pretend play (PP) and counterfactual reasoning (CFR) as both involve thinking about alternatives to reality. It is argued by Weisberg and Gopnik (Cogn. Sci., 37, 2013, 1368) that alternative thinking in PP and CFR is underpinned by an imaginary representational capacity but few studies have empirically investigated this link. We use a variable latent modelling approach to test a hypothetical model of the structural relationship of PP and CFR predicting that if PP and CFR are cognitively similar; they should have similar patterns of associations with Executive Functions (EFs). Data were collected on PP, CFR, EFs and Language from 189 children (M = 4.8 years, males = 101, females = 88). Confirmatory factor analyses showed that measures of PP and CFR loaded onto single latent constructs and were significantly correlated (r = .51, p = .001) with each other. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed that EF accounted for unique significant variance in both PP (β = 21) and CFR (β = 22). The results of the structural equation modelling revealed that the data were a good fit for the hypothetical model. We discuss the plausible role of a general underlying imaginative representational capacity to explain similarities in the cognitive mechanisms of different states of alternative thinking like PP and CFR.     

Medical Decision-Making: An Argument for Narrative and Metaphor

This study examines the processes ofdecision-making used by intensive care(critical care) specialists. Ninety-ninespecialists completed a questionnaire involvingthree clinical cases, using a novel methodologyinvestigating the role of uncertainty andtemporal-related factors, and exploring a rangeof ethical issues. Validation and triangulationof the results was done via a comparison studywith a medically lay, but highly informed groupof 37 law students. For both study groups,constructing reasons for a decision was largelyan interpretative and imaginative exercise thatwent beyond the data (as presented), commonlyresulting in different reasons supporting thesame conclusions and similar reasons supportingopposite conclusions. The skills of ethicalimagination and interpretation were related toan individual's prior lived experience,construed in the broadest sense. Application ofthese skills of ethical imagination andinterpretation always occurred, to some degree,in a state of uncertainty and almost alwaysinvolved temporal relationships.Using these results, a theory of ethicaldecision-making is proffered. Three levels ortypes of reasoning processes may be present.Type I decision-making involves the applicationof rules, usually in a deductive fashion. TypeII decision-making is characterised by aprocess where a plurality of reasons arebalanced, weighed and sifted with each other.Type III decision-making is intimately linkedwith respondents lived experiences and `crafts'the content of type I and II reasoningprocesses, via the application of ethicalimagination and interpretation. Relationshipsbetween these three types of reasoningprocesses, and with narrative ethics, are alsodiscussed.     

Richard Zaner’s “Troubled” Voice In <Emphasis Type="Italic">Troubled Voices</Emphasis>: Poseur,Posing, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Possibilizing</Emphasis>?

This essay considers Richard Zaner’s storytelling in Troubled Voices as a form of possibilizing which uses the stories to exemplify important moral themes such as contingency and freedom. Distinguishing between activities of moral discovery through the telling of a story and “posing” in the sense of writing to tell the “moral” of the story, I suggest that something crucial goes on for Zaner in his own tellings. Several of the more insistent implications Zaner reveals about the moral relationships encountered in the activity of clinical ethics consultation are examined in that light, especially regarding this question: is it more beneficial, or harmful, to articulate elements of core meanings and values that are entailed in individual viewpoints, which, prior to an ethics consultant’s participation, may have remained unspoken and possibly unacknowledged?     

On the development of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of imagination and its use for interdisciplinary research

In this paper I trace Husserl’s transformation of his notion of phantasy from its strong leanings towards empiricism into a transcendental phenomenology of imagination. Rejecting the view that this account is only more incompatible with contemporary neuroscientific research, I instead claim that the transcendental suspension of naturalistic (or scientific) pretensions precisely enables cooperation between the two distinct realms of phenomenology and science. In particular, a transcendental account of phantasy can disclose the specific accomplishments of imagination without prematurely deciding upon a particular scientific paradigm for its experimental investigation; a decision that is best left to the sciences themselves.You will find a more extensive version of the first sections of this paper in Rudolf Bernet, Donn Welton, Gina Zavota (eds), in press. Husserl: Critical Assessments (5 vol.). London: Routledge.     

6～14岁儿童对想象物的文字与图画描述

本研究采用开放式问卷法,通过调查810名6-14岁儿童头脑中想象物的文字与图画描述,考察了儿童想象发展的特点。结果发现：(1)儿童对想象物的文字与图画描述可以分划分为3种水平：表象的记忆水平、表象的再造水平和表象创造水平。其中,对想象物的文字描述水平,年龄发展趋势明显,从小学一至二年级之间和四到五年级之间的发展变化最大;而对想象物的图画描述水平,年龄发展趋势不明显。(2)根据儿童对想象物的文字描述和图画描述的发展的匹配程度,可以把儿童的想象发展分为3种类型：文字与图形符号均衡发展型、文字符号型和图形符号型。     

Countertransference as active imagination: imaginative experiences of the analyst

Active imagination is at the heart of Jung's elucidation of depth psychology. Yet, in the discourse of present day analytical psychology theory it is not always given the serious attention accorded to some other Jungian concepts. Active imagination emerges spontaneously within the 'third' area--the imaginal or dynamic field--in-between patient and analyst. It is commonly regarded as the patient's experience but I am proposing that, looked upon as the analyst's experience as well, active imagination offers a distinctly Jungian way of understanding some forms of countertransference. I am describing what I think many present-day analytical psychologists already do in their clinical practice but, as far as I know, it has not been theorized in quite this way before. The intention is to exploit the unique contribution of our Jungian heritage by reframing certain profoundly symbolic countertransference-generated imagery as active imagination. In this article these are differentiated from other less complex forms of imaginative countertransference through examples from clinical practice. The point is that such countertransference experiences may activate the symbolic function in the analyst and thus contribute to the mediation of emergent consciousness in the analysand.     

Revealing obstacles to the consumer imagination

The research proposes that the consumer imagination combines information about a current sensory stimulus (product) with triggered episodic memories to use as inputs in making product evaluations. Two studies reveal that the consumer imagination can be suppressed when preferred haptic sensory information is missing and when a situation is unambiguous, reducing the need for relying on episodic memory. The research findings support the general notion that the consumer imagination enhances purchase intentions compared to considering product attributes because the imagination enables consumers to integrate the information in a more efficient way. In both studies, perceived ownership mediates the effect. Contributions to theory and practical implications are provided.     

Against the Additive View of Imagination

According to the additive view of sensory imagination, mental imagery often involves two elements. There is an image-like element, which gives the experiences qualitative phenomenal character akin to that of perception. There is also a non-image element, consisting of something like suppositions about the image's object. This accounts for extra-sensory features of imagined objects and situations: for example, it determines whether an image of a grey horse is an image of Desert Orchid, or of some other grey horse. The view promises to give a simple and intuitive explanation of some puzzling features of imagination, and, further, to illuminate imagination's relation to modal knowledge. I contend that the additive view does not fulfil these two promises. The explanation of how images come to be determinate is redundant: the content constituting the indeterminate mental images on which the view relies is sufficient to deliver determinate images too, so the extra resources offered by the view are not required. When applied to modal epistemology, the view either delivers implausible results or offers no distinctive insight. Since the view is sold on its explanatory merits, and since these are dubious, the additive view should be rejected.