Changing One’s Mind on Moral Matters

Contemporary moral philosophy assumes an account of what it means to legitimately change one’s mind in ethics, and I wish to challenge this account by enlarging the category of the legitimate. I am just as eager to avoid illegitimate mind-changing brought on by deceit or brainwashing, but I claim that legitimacy should be defined in terms of transparency of method. A social reformer should not be embarrassed to admit that he acquired many beliefs about justice while reading Dickens. As such, appeals to the heart and the imagination are just as legitimate, within limits, as appeals to the mind; and showing can be as legitimate as telling. To demonstrate this, I consider the example of a vegetarian trying to ‘convert’ a carnivore. I then ask what it means when the carnivore claims to have been previously mistaken.     

Imagination after neurological losses of movement and sensation: The experience of spinal cord injury

To what extent is imagination dependent on embodied experience? In attempting to answer such questions I consider the experiences of those who have to come to terms with altered neurological function, namely those with spinal cord injury at the neck. These people have each lost all sensation and movement below the neck. How might these new ways of living affect their imagination?     

THE CRY FOR THE OTHER: THE BIOCULTURAL WOMB OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Abstract. The human experience of meaning-making lies at the roots of consciousness, creativity, and religious faith. It arises from the basic experience of separation from a loved object, suffered by all mammals, and, in general terms, from the experienced gap between ourselves and our environment. We fill the gap with transitional objects and symbols that reassure us of basic continuity in ourselves and in the world. These objects and symbols also serve the neurognostic function of demonstrating what the world is like. Thus, humanity lives by faith, as manifested in its pattern-making capacity, and not by literal sight.     

音乐欣赏过程中三至十岁儿童的情绪判断与想象发展

研究不同年龄儿童音乐欣赏后的情绪判断及想象,结果表明：儿童对喜悦、悲伤两种艺术情绪判断正确率呈极显著差异,学前儿童情绪判断正确性喜悦大大高于悲伤。进入小学学习后的儿童对悲伤情绪判断正确率迅速提高。儿童想象指数随年龄缓慢增加。情绪正确判断人数与产生想象人数呈显著相关。     

Ethics and Imagination

Cognitive semantics has made important empirical findings about human conceptualization. In this paper some findings concerning moral concepts are analyzed and their implications for medical ethics discussed. The key idea is that morality has to do with metaphors and imagination rather than with well-defined concepts and deduction. It is argued that normative medical ethics to be psychologically realistic should take these findings seriously. This means that an imaginative casuistry is to be preferred compared to principlism and to other forms of casuistry. Furthermore, the metaphorical character of central principles in medical ethics such as autonomy, utility, justice, and integrity is indicated. Such principles are interpreted as rules of thumb summarizing the collective wisdom concerning prototype cases.     

Active imagination and the analysis of film

The emotions aroused by the pleasure-generating mechanisms of the cinema are usually benign because they refer to a virtual world. Experiencing affects aroused by fictions can resemble being drawn into a rehearsal for a possible, imagined future that just might (but more likely never will) occur in the individual's life in the real world. Movie-goers, no less than the readers of novels, actively engage with the symbols that film makers inscribe in the screen text. In so doing, they take a measure of control over elements of the fiction. Screened fiction has thus the potential to help the individual grow in self-awareness. Shifting its focus to the work of the film critic, the paper argues that, suitably adapted to the requirements of working with a pre-recorded film or tape, Jung's concept of the active imagination helps us to model, license, limit and endorse the subjective element in textual analysis. Because the method proposed makes it possible formally to recognize that the interpretation of fiction is inevitably integrated with the analyst's personality, interpretation is always a matter of a reader bringing a text into being rather than disinterring a pre-existing object.     

Daydreaming to navigate the social world: What we know,what we don't know,and why it matters

A substantial portion of daily life is spent daydreaming—that is, engaged in thought independent of, and unrelated to, goals in the external environment. We argue that this naturally occurring, unconstrained cognition is a vital, but currently underappreciated, form of social cognition that enables navigation of the social world. First, we present the results of a meta‐analysis of neuroimaging studies which illustrate the shared neural basis of daydreaming and social cognition (including regions of the anterior temporal lobes and the posterior cingulate cortex). Second, we review evidence regarding the frequency, correlates, and adaptive outcomes of social daydreaming, cumulative findings that point to the adaptive value of imaging others during this offline state. We end by encouraging cross‐fertilization between daydreaming research and domains of social psychology (goal pursuit, social interactions, and close relationships), which we hope will foster mutually beneficial directions for understanding the role that unconstrained thinking plays in social life.     

The New Political Infamy and the Sacrilege of Feminism

Abstract: This essay is about women being crucial to the constitution of the state and the construction of the ideal of the nation. It argues that the role of actual women as reproducers of the nation and as iconic representations of mythological figures at the helm of nation building is bound up with a certain psychical fantasy of woman. It argues further that Women in Black and other political activist groups have developed embodied feminist politics that not only bring the feminine body into public view during wartime but also undermine the place of the good woman as the reproducer of the nation who mourns only for the lost soldiers of her people.     

On the nature of intuitive and delusional thought: Its implications in clinical work with psychotic patients

The author tries to differentiate intuitive imagination from delusional imagination and hypothesises that psychosis alters the system of intuitive thinking, which consequently cannot develop in a dynamic and selective way. Scholars of different disciplines, far removed from psychoanalysis, such as Einstein, Hadamard or Poincar, believe that intuitive thinking works in the unconscious by means of hidden processes, which permit a creative meeting of ideas. Thanks to Bion's work, psychoanalysts have begun to understand that waking thinking is unconsciously intertwined with dream‐work. The delusional construction is similar to a dreamlike sensorial production but, unlike a real dream, it remains in the waking memory and creates characters which live independently of the ‘dreamer's’ awareness. It is a dream that never ends. On the contrary, the real dream disappears when it has brought its communicative task to an end. In the analysis of psychotic patients it is very important to analyse the delusional imagination which dominates the personality and continuously transforms the mental state, twisting emotional truth. The delusional imagination is so deeply rooted in the patient's mental functioning that, even after systematic analysis, the delusional world, which had seemed to disappear, re‐emerges under new configurations. The psychotic core remains encapsulated; it produces unsteadiness and may induce further psychotic states in the patient. The author reports some analytic material of a patient, who, after a delusional episode treated with drugs, shows a vivid psychotic functioning. Some considerations are added on the nature of the psychotic state and on the therapeutic approach used to transform the delusional structure. This paper particularly deals with the difficulty in working through the psychotic episode and in ‘deconstructing’the delusional experience because of the terror connected with it. In the reported case, the analytic work changed the delusional construction into a more benign one characterised by phobic qualities. The analysis of the psychotic transference allowed the focus to be on the hidden work which had been continuously influencing the transferential picture of the analyst and the patient's psychic reality.