The mediating role of mood in the relationship between perseverative cognition,sleep and subjective health complaints in music students

Objective: Subjective health complaints (SHC) are frequent in musicians. These complaints may be particularly distressing in this population because they are performance relevant. This paper aims at testing a model positing that (a) perseverative cognition (PC) predicts sleep duration/quality, (b) sleep duration/quality predicts SHC and (c) mood is a mediator of these associations.

Design: Participants were 72 music students (mean age (SD): 22.7 (3.0) years), and the assessment period consisted of seven consecutive days, with a solo performance on the fifth day.

Main outcome measures: Self-reported total sleep time (TST) and sleep quality were assessed 30?min after wake-up, and objective TST/sleep quality were assessed with an actigraphy watch. PC and mood were measured five times a day. Daily SHC were assessed at 9 p.m.

Results: PC did not significantly predict sleep duration/quality. Self-reported and objective TST and sleep quality were all significantly associated with SHC. Mood played a mediating role in each of these relationships with the exception of objective sleep quality.

Conclusion: The tested model on the association among PC, sleep and SHC and the mediating role of mood received partial support, highlighting the importance of sleep and mood in the emergence of SHC among university music students.     

Sleep quality and treatment of social anxiety disorder

Background and Objectives: Poor sleep is prevalent among individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) and may affect treatment outcome. We examined whether: (1) individuals with SAD differed from healthy controls (HCs) in sleep quality, (2) baseline sleep quality moderated the effects of treatment (Cognitive–behavioral group therapy [CBGT] vs. mindfulness-based stress reduction [MBSR] vs. waitlist [WL]) on social anxiety, (3) sleep quality changed over treatment, and (4) changes in sleep quality predicted anxiety 12-months post-treatment.

Design: Participants were 108 adults with SAD from a randomized controlled trial of CBGT vs. MBSR vs. WL and 38 HCs.

Methods: SAD and sleep quality were assessed pre-treatment and post-treatment; SAD was assessed again 12-months post-treatment.

Results: Participants with SAD reported poorer sleep quality than HCs. The effect of treatment condition on post-treatment social anxiety did not differ as a function of baseline sleep quality. Sleep quality improved in MBSR, significantly more than WL, but not CBGT. Sleep quality change from pre- to post-treatment in CBGT or MBSR did not predict later social anxiety.

Conclusions: MBSR, and not CBGT, improved sleep quality among participants. Other results were inconsistent with prior research; possible explanations, limitations, and implications for future research are discussed. ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT02036658.     

Brief Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Insomnia in Parkinson's Disease: A Case Series Study1

Parkinson's disease (PD) patients frequently suffer from insomnia and insomnia can result in reduction of quality of life in PD. Although pharmacotherapy is most applicable for insomnia, it may cause side-effects in PD. The purpose of the study was to investigate the efficacy of brief cognitive behavioral therapy for insomnia (CBTI) in PD. A total of 11 PD patients aged 43–84 years with chronic insomnia received two sessions of CBTI. Patients reported a significant decrease in total score for the Insomnia Severity Index (ISI). The total score for the Parkinson's Disease Sleep Scale (PDSS) improved. Although objective sleep measured by actigraph did not improve, subjective sleep measured by sleep diary improved. Functional impairment measured by the Sheehan Disability Scale (SDS) significantly decreased. These results revealed that brief CBTI was effective in improving insomnia in PD, with improvements extending to functional impairments that had been affected by insomnia. Additionally, this non-pharmacotherapy treatment could be easily applied to PD patients who may have difficulty coming to the clinic frequently due to physical symptoms.     

The minimal self hypothesis

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.     

Crawling in and out of sleep

The goal of the study was to examine the link between motor attainments and sleep–wake regulation by comparing the sleep characteristics of infants who are crawling with the sleep of same‐age infants who have not yet acquired the locomotion milestone. The participants were 59 healthy 8‐month‐old infants with no developmental delays, who were recruited through well‐baby clinics and childcare centers. The measurements included objective sleep recordings (actigraphy), sleep questionnaire, and motor milestones checklist. The main finding was that the sleep of crawlers was more fragmented in comparison to the sleep of pre‐crawlers. While the findings of this report give support to the hypothesized link between sleep regulation and motor development, more studies are needed to clarify why crawling might provide a marker of nightwaking. In discussing the results, it is proposed that the association between fragmented sleep and crawling could be related to maturational, constitutional, and relational factors. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.