TheOperational Code of John F. Kennedy During the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Comparison of Public and Private Rhetoric

This study examines the manner in which the Cuban missile crisis affected the belief system of President John F. Kennedy. The analysis uses data derived from primary source materials that have become available only in the last 2 years, in addition to well-known public statements by the president. The Verbs in Context System (VICS) was used to generate insights into how Kennedy's operational code differed across sources and changed during the period of the crisis. The results provide evidence of Kennedy's initial private belligerence and provisional support for the 'Gettysburg thesis' while calling into question some other potential interpretations of the effects of the crisis on the president's beliefs.     

Understanding the context of suicide in master's level counselling programmes in Australia

The purpose of this study was to understand the context of suicide in master's level counselling courses in Australia. The sample comprised courses accredited by the Australian Counselling Association (ACA) and the Psychotherapy and Counselling Federation of Australia (PACFA). A mixed methods content analysis was used to identify the explicitness of suicide in these courses and identify themes that emerged during the analysis. The sample consisted of 405 units of study contained in 26 courses. Suicide was explicit in 23 units in 17 courses. Suicide content was overshadowed by cultural diversity, ethics, morality and philosophy, research and self-awareness, which was explicit in all 26 courses.     

从语言到思想:基于指称问题考察分析哲学的范式转移

本文通过追溯当代内容理论的语言哲学和现象学起源,以指称性概念和意向性概念为核心,简要刻画了指称理论和内容理论的发展线索。在此基础上,本文试图借助语言指称问题和心理指称问题的平行关系,为当代分析哲学的主流从语言哲学到心灵哲学的范式转移的动机和方法勾勒出一个考察纲要。     

Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra

Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense of Standard Russellianism is to hold that spectrum inversion without illusion is conceivable but not in fact possible. I argue that this response fails. As a consequence, either phenomenal content is not Russellian, or experiences do not represent mind-independent physical properties.     

Intentionalism and Change Blindness

According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can vary despite sameness of phenomenal character.

Threat in dreams: an adaptation?

Revonsuo's influential Threat Simulation Theory (TST) predicts that people exposed to survival threats will have more threat dreams, and evince enhanced responses to dream threats, compared to those living in relatively safe conditions. Participants in a high crime area (South Africa: n=208) differed significantly from participants in a low crime area (Wales, UK: n=116) in having greater recent exposure to a life-threatening event (chi([1,N=186])(2)=14.84, p<.00012). Contrary to TST's predictions, the SA participants reported significantly fewer threat dreams (chi([1,N=287])(2)=6.11, p<.0134), and did not differ from the Welsh participants in responses to dream threats (Fisher's Exact test, p=.2478). Overall, the incidence of threat in dreams was extremely low-less than 20% of dreams featured realistic survival threats. Escape from dream threats occurred in less than 2% of dreams. We conclude that this evidence contradicts key aspects of TST.     

Shooting the messenger won’t change the news

Malcolm-Smith, Solms, Turnbull and Tredoux [Malcolm-Smith, S., Solms, M., Turnbull, O., & Tredoux, C. (2008). Threat in dreams: An adaptation? Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1281–1291.] conducted a rigorous study that sampled two populations differentially exposed to threat in real life, and found that critical predictions from the Threat Simulation Theory of dreams [Revonsuo, A. (2000a). The reinterpretation of dreams: An evolutionary hypothesis of the function of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 877-901.; Revonsuo, A. (2000b). Did ancestral humans dream for their lives? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 1063–1082.] were not supported. Specifically, we found no evidence of increased realistic threats to physical survival or enhanced threat avoidance in the dreams of those from the exposed population. Revonsuo and Valli’s [Revonsuo, A., & Valli, K. (2008). How to test the threat simulation theory. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1292-1296.] commentary on our study argues that the methods we used are so flawed as to render the results meaningless. In this response article, we address the criticisms raised in their commentary.     

IMAGINATION'S GRIP ON SCIENCE

Abstract: In part because “imagination” is a slippery notion, its exact role in the production of scientific knowledge remains unclear. There is, however, one often explicit and deliberate use of imagination by scientists that can be (and has been) studied intensively by epistemologists and historians of science: thought experiments. The main goal of this article is to document the varieties of thought experimentation, not so much in terms of the different sciences in which they occur but rather in terms of the different functions they fulfil. I argue that thought experimentation (and hence imagination) plays a role not only in theory choice but in singular causal analysis and scientific discovery as well. I pinpoint, moreover, some of the rules governing the use of thought experiments in theory choice and in singular causal analysis, that is, some of the criteria they should meet in order to fulfil those functions successfully.