Honesty pays: On the benefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining

People typically think of negotiations as competitive, which often leads them to engage in secrecy and even deception. In three experiments we show that this approach can backfire in coalition bargaining. Results show that, even though bargainers with an outcome advantage only obtain favorable outcomes when this information is public, they rarely choose to reveal this information. Fairness motivations fueled decisions to reveal this information and make attractive offers whereas self-interest fueled decisions not to reveal and make unattractive offers. Finally, perspective taking increased proselfs' inclinations to keep their advantage private whereas it increased prosocials' inclinations to reveal. These findings suggest that many people are not naturally inclined to reveal private information when they have an outcome advantage, but that fairness motives encourage revelation and, ironically, increase revealers' outcomes in coalition bargaining. Thus, in this context, honesty pays.     

人体实验失范原因分析及对策

人体实验是一种特殊的交易活动。信息不完备与不对称、交易制度监督漏洞都使卫生研究机构在交易博弈中处于优势地位。集体机会主义行为是导致违规人体实验的重要因素。对违规人体实验的宽容在一定程度上怂恿了这种行为。从健全制度、完善法治、加强教育等方面提出了对策。     

A comparison of prompting methods to teach sight words to students with autism spectrum disorder

Time delay procedures are one of the most commonly used and effective strategies for teaching sight words to learners with disabilities. However, less is known about whether they are differentially effective and efficient with learners. This study compared the effectiveness and efficiency of progressive time delay and simultaneous prompting on sight word acquisition among three learners with autism spectrum disorder using an adapted alternating treatments design across word sets. For two participants, both procedures led to skill acquisition with no clear differences in efficiency. For the remaining participant, neither procedure was effective; therefore, the reading task was changed to a receptive one, and a stimulus fading intervention package was implemented.     

Dyadic processes of disclosure and reciprocity in bargaining with communication

We offer a study revealing the mechanisms through which communication helps actual bargaining behavior outperform economic predictions. The possibility of individually strategic behavior in the presence of private information leads to game‐theoretic predictions of less than full efficiency. We present a one‐stage, simultaneous offers bargaining game in which buyers and sellers have independent, privately held valuations for the item being sold (i.e. a bilateral auction with two‐sided private information). In three communication treatments, parties are: (a) allowed face‐to‐face communication prior to submitting offers; (b) allowed written communication prior to submitting offers; or (c) allowed no‐communication prior to submitting offers. When parties are allowed pre‐play communication, we find nearly full efficiency (98%). We examine two systematically predictable aspects of dyadic interaction—disclosure and reciprocity—to explain how negotiators achieve this efficiency. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are Faculty Strikes Unethical?

It has been argued that strikes are morally objectionable in the university context. They injure third parties – the students – and for this reason ought to be rejected. More generally, the strike weapon has led to a reduction of the power of Boards of Governors to adjust universities to changing times. And furthermore, the use of the strike weapon and the ensuing conflicts can injure the collegial form of governance that is essential to higher education. It is here argued that these arguments are hardly conclusive, and that there are virtues to having the strike as a means to resolve disputes. But keeping things on track requires both parties to adhere to the moral and social virtue of civility.     

Coupling and decoupling of unfairness and anger in ultimatum bargaining

Although previous research has demonstrated the importance of emotions in ultimatum bargaining, this research provides a more direct, convergent test of the role of anger in explaining rejections of unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. First, using appraisal theory of emotions, this research examines the extent to which the cognitive appraisal of unfairness leads to the emotion of anger, which in turn, drives punitive behavior (i.e., rejection of offers). Second, this research explores the possibility of decoupling the emotion of anger from its antecedent appraisal of unfairness in order to attenuate responders' inclination to reject unfair offers. Third, following the current research tradition that goes beyond a valence‐based approach, we differentiate between the negative emotions of anger and sadness and examine whether it is the specific emotion of anger that is relevant to the cognitive appraisal of unfairness or the general negative valence of the emotion. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multivariate analysis with linearizable regressions

We study the class of multivariate distributions in which all bivariate regressions can be linearized by separate transformation of each of the variables. This class seems more realistic than the multivariate normal or the elliptical distributions, and at the same time its study allows us to combine the results from multivariate analysis with optimal scaling and classical multivariate analysis. In particular a two-stage procedure which first scales the variables optimally, and then fits a simultaneous equations model, is studied in detail and is shown to have some desirable properties.     

The Logic of Quantum Measurements in terms of Conditional Events

This paper shows that the non-Boolean logic of quantum measurementsis more naturally represented by a relatively new 4-operationsystem of Boolean fractions—conditional events—thanby the standard representation using Hilbert Space. After therequirements of quantum mechanics and the properties of conditionalevent algebra are introduced, the quantum concepts of orthogonality,completeness, simultaneous verifiability, logical operations,and deductions are expressed in terms of conditional eventsthereby demonstrating the adequacy and efficacy of this formulation.Since conditional event algebra is nearly Boolean and consistsmerely of ordered pairs of standard events or propositions,quantum events and the so-called "superpositions" of statesneed not be mysterious, and are here fully explicated. Conditionalevent algebra nicely explains these non-standard "superpositions"of quantum states as conjunctions or disjunctions of conditionalevents, Boolean fractions, but does not address the so-called"entanglement phenomena" of quantum mechanics, which remainphysically mysterious. Nevertheless, separating the latter phenomenafrom superposition issues adds clarity to the interpretationof quantum entanglement, the phenomenon of influence propagatedat faster than light speeds. With such treacherous possibilitiespresent in all quantum situations, an observer has every reasonto be completely explicit about the environmental–instrumentalconfiguration, the conditions present when attempting quantummeasurements. Conditional event algebra allows such explicationwithout the physical and algebraic remoteness of Hilbert space.