Mental Simulation, Affect, and Personality: A Conceptual Framework

Recent advances in theory and research on the relations among mental simulation, affect, and personality are summarized and combined. Research has shown that (a) affect and mental simulations can influence each other, (b) mental simulations can serve diverse self-motives, and (c) personality characteristics are related to divergent functions of mental simulations. Findings in these three areas are synthesized into a conceptual framework on the basis of three attributes of mental simulations: (a) time, whether simulations are prospective or retrospective; (b) direction, whether simulations are upward or downward; and (c) focus, whether simulations are contrasted or assimilated. This integrated framework not only may enable a greater understanding of existing findings, but also suggests novel and unique predictions for future research on understanding personality processes, automaticity in simulations, and coping with life events.     

The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits

This paper re‐examines the commonly observed inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit. We propose that this relationship occurs because people rely on affect when judging the risk and benefit of specific hazards. Evidence supporting this proposal is obtained in two experimental studies. Study 1 investigated the inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgments under a time‐pressure condition designed to limit the use of analytic thought and enhance the reliance on affect. As expected, the inverse relationship was strengthened when time pressure was introduced. Study 2 tested and confirmed the hypothesis that providing information designed to alter the favorability of one's overall affective evaluation of an item (say nuclear power) would systematically change the risk and benefit judgments for that item. Both studies suggest that people seem prone to using an ‘affect heuristic’ which improves judgmental efficiency by deriving both risk and benefit evaluations from a common source—affective reactions to the stimulus item. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

消费行为研究中的联合分析法

联合分析(Conjoint Analysis)是一种定量的研究消费者选择偏好的方法。虽然从它诞生到现在只有40年的历史,但它对消费者行为学的影响很大,它的发展更是日新月异。文章首先介绍了联合分析的基本概念,然后重点阐述了联合分析的原理、步骤和发展历程,最后对联合分析的发展方向作了一个简要概括。     

Analysing multisource feedback with multilevel structural equation models: Pitfalls and recommendations from a simulation study

When multisource feedback instruments, for example, 360-degree feedback tools, are validated, multilevel structural equation models are the method of choice to quantify the amount of reliability as well as convergent and discriminant validity. A non-standard multilevel structural equation model that incorporates self-ratings (level-2 variables) and others’ ratings from different additional perspectives (level-1 variables), for example, peers and subordinates, has recently been presented. In a Monte Carlo simulation study, we determine the minimal required sample sizes for this model. Model parameters are accurately estimated even with the smallest simulated sample size of 100 self-ratings and two ratings of peers and of subordinates. The precise estimation of standard errors necessitates sample sizes of 400 self-ratings or at least four ratings of peers and subordinates. However, if sample sizes are smaller, mainly standard errors concerning common method factors are biased. Interestingly, there are trade-off effects between the sample sizes of self-ratings and others’ ratings in their effect on estimation bias. The degree of convergent and discriminant validity has no effect on the accuracy of model estimates. The χ² test statistic does not follow the expected distribution. Therefore, we suggest using a corrected level-specific standardized root mean square residual to analyse model fit and conclude with further recommendations for applied organizational research.     

Can imagined intergroup contact change (internal) dialogues on differences between ingroup and outgroup?

Several positive functions have been ascribed to integrative internal dialogues (IDs), which are based on mutual openness to a partner's viewpoint and a readiness to consider his/her arguments in order to potentially modify one's own stance. As the technique of imagined intergroup contact (IIC) favorably influences attitudes towards outgroup members, it was hypothesized that IIC would have a beneficial impact on IDs with an outgroup member when the dialogue is focused on differences between ingroup and outgroup. In the experiment, 151 people (80 women) participated. It revealed that after IIC, both the dialogue author's confrontational attitude and the interlocutor's integrative attitude decreased. Thus, IIC made participants less inclined to gain an advantage over their imagined outgroup interlocutors and more inclined to give them freedom in IDs. However, the effect was significant only when the author's involvement in ID was high or medium.     

Forward inference in risky choice: Mapping gaze and decision processes

The study of cognitive processes is built on a close mapping between three components: overt gaze behavior, overt choice, and covert processes. To validate this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision‐making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between risky gamble problems. Applying a forward inference paradigm, participants were instructed to use specific decision strategies to solve those gamble problems (maximizing expected values or applying different choice heuristics) during which gaze behavior was recorded. We revealed differences between overt behavior, as indicated by eye movements, and covert decision processes, instructed by the experimenter. However, our results show that the overt–covert mapping is for some eye‐movement measures not as close as expected by current decision theory, and hence question reverse inference as being prone to fallacies due to a violation of its prerequisite, that is, a close overt–covert mapping. We propose a framework to rehabilitate reverse inference.     

The test taker's fallacy: How students guess answers on multiple‐choice tests

Many students and applicants take multiple‐choice tests to demonstrate their competence and achievement. When they are unsure, they guess the most likely answer to maximize their score. Despite the impact of guessing on test reliability and individual performance, studies have not examined how patterns of answer sequences in multiple‐choice tests affect guessing. This research presents the test taker's fallacy, which refers to an individual's tendency to expect a different answer to appear for the next question given a run of the same answer choices. The test taker's fallacy exhibits negative recency, similar to the gambler's fallacy. However, extending the sequential judgment literature, the test taker's fallacy shows that negative recency arises even when sequences may or may not be randomly generated. In three studies, including a survey and experiments, the test taker's fallacy is robustly observed. The test taker's fallacy is consistent with the operation of the representativeness heuristic. This research explains what and how test takers guess given a streak of answers and extends judgment under uncertainty to the test‐taking context.     

Validation of a reflective thinking instrument for third-year undergraduate nursing students participating in high-fidelity simulation

Background: nursing students are required to think reflectively in both real and simulated clinical practice. Although the Reflective Thinking instrument is reliable in its measurement of reflective thinking, its validity is unknown. Method: confirmatory factor analysis was undertaken in an iterative manner within a non-equivalent control-group study to measure nursing students’ reflective thinking and satisfaction with high-fidelity simulation. The validity and reliability of the Reflective Thinking instrument was tested. Results: the resulting instrument consisted of 15 items across four factors. The final model was plausible as it demonstrated ‘goodness of fit’; however, it had neither convergent or discriminatory validity, nor reliability. Internal consistency was fair to reasonable for the four subscales. Conclusion: the testing of the Reflective Thinking instrument using confirmatory factor analysis is a vital initial step in the modification of this instrument. Further development using exploratory factor analysis will enhance the instrument’s relevance within high-fidelity simulation.     

A realist social ontology of religion

Jonathan Z. Smith famously pointed out that the concept of ‘religion’ is not universal but emerged only in the modern West. Several scholars have drawn from Smith the non-realist implication that the existence of religion apart from that concept is an illusion. The word ‘religion,’ they say, does not refer to something out there in the world. In this article, the author argues that Smith’s point is open to a realist interpretation according to which religion exists in the world, as a transhistorical and transcultural reality, even apart from the concept. To make this case, the author outlines and responds to non-realist positions that draw on genealogical, deconstructive, and linguistic arguments, as well as to the alternative proposal that ‘religion’ is simply a heuristic device. In short, the goal of this article is to argue that a realist social ontology provides the better understanding of the central theoretical term in our field.