急诊科医生要重视构建和谐的医患关系

随着目前医患关系日趋紧张的状况,构建和谐的医患关系成为急诊科医生面临的一个重要课题.从救死扶伤为灵魂、有效解除患者痛苦、尊重和理解患者、良好的医患沟通、语言艺术为桥梁等不同角度深入探讨了急诊科医生如何构建和谐的医患关系.     

当代大学生非理性学习心理实证分析

本文在大量学生学习心理调查资料的基础上,发现当代大学生中普遍存在着“非理性学习心理”状态,通过对典型心理资料的实证分析,探讨造成他们“非理性学习心理”的各种因素,对改变目前学生不良的学习心理状态具有一定的现实意义。     

惟我与无我：中西方自我观比较新解

该文从自我意识发展的轨迹来诠释中西方自我观的差异。认为从自我意识发展的动态过程来看。中西方自我处于不同的发展阶段：西方心理学将自我视为精神发展的核心,是“惟我”的;中国人文主义心理学则认为执着于自我将阻碍个体发展,心理发展的最高境界是对自我的超越．因而是“无我”的。自我研究方法的差异,表现为寻找自我实体的西方实证方法与可以深入自我背后本源的东方式禅定。     

Analytic Phenomenology (or “What It Is Like”) vs. Husserlian Phenomenology

I begin this paper by outlining two senses of “phenomenology.” First, the “what it is like” or “analytic tradition” sense: the verbalization of qualitative states of consciousness of which we are aware. Second, the “Continental” sense: the rigorous study of the structures of consciousness. I outline the ways in which these two senses diverge. First, Continental phenomenology involves a diversified account of consciousness, states of awareness, and the human person. The phenomenologist articulates this account not by introspection but via acts of phenomenological reflection concerning eidetic intuitions about essential structural features. Second, via the method of “sense explication,” the phenomenologist can articulate an account of passive and subconscious states which we are not strictly “aware” of. The conclusion shows these divergences of senses are sometimes overlooked, leading to equivocation. Zahavi and Gallagher must be employing the “what it is like” sense when they make certain “phenomenological” arguments concerning social cognition, yet Spaulding’s ensuing critique of phenomenology is directed at Continental phenomenology. Also, it is only phenomenology in the “what it is like” sense which cannot contribute to subpersonal psychology. Genetic Continental phenomenology describes the lawful relations amongst the precursors and preconditions which give rise to conscious experience, constituting a type of (non-causal) subpersonal explanation.     

认知元反应理论--IRT直接应用于多值记分题

0-1记分测验的项目反应理论已经得到广泛的研究和应用.但是,许多测验都含有多值记分题,所以需要将IRT推广到此类情况.从认知理论的观点看,每个0-1记分题(项目)和多值记分题的每个测试点都可同样地看成一个由若干知识点构成的集合,称之为认知元;根据认知元之间存在的关系可以确定各受测者对各试题作出特定答案的概率,从而不需要引用任何其它假设就可将IRT的方法直接应用于含多值记分题的测验.本文应用这一理论分析了某些测验样本,结果表明是可行的.     

Is Theism a Simple,and hence Probable,Explanation for the Universe?

Abstract

Richard Swinburne, in his The Existence of God (2004), presents a cosmological argument in defence of theism (Swinburne 1991: 119, 135). God, Swinburne argues, is more likely to bring about an ordered universe than other states (ibid.: 144, 299). To defend this view, Swinburne presents the following arguments: (1) That this ordered universe is a priori improbable (2004: 49, 150, 1991: 304 et seq.), given the stringent requirements for life (cf. also Leslie 2000: 12), and the Second Law of Thermodynamics (Giancoli 1990: 396); (2) That it seems as if this ordered universe can be explained by theism; (3) A theistic explanation for the universe is more probable because it is a simple explanation. To this end, Swinburne makes use of Bayes’ Theorem. Symbolically, this claim can be represented as (e) for the evidence of the existence of a complex universe, and (h) for a hypothesis. Swinburne’s argument is that theism has a higher prior probability, P(h_theism) > P(h_materialism), since theism is simpler than materialism. He concludes that P(e|h_theism) > P(e|h_materialism). In this paper I will address only this argument (3) above, and defend the view that it is false: theism is not simpler than materialism, nor it is more probably true. I conclude that theism is less probable than materialism, expressed by P(h_theism) < P(h_materialism) : 2/N(2n+1) < 1/n, where N is the number of possible universes and n the number of entities in existence.     

Approximated adjusted fractional Bayes factors: A general method for testing informative hypotheses

Informative hypotheses are increasingly being used in psychological sciences because they adequately capture researchers’ theories and expectations. In the Bayesian framework, the evaluation of informative hypotheses often makes use of default Bayes factors such as the fractional Bayes factor. This paper approximates and adjusts the fractional Bayes factor such that it can be used to evaluate informative hypotheses in general statistical models. In the fractional Bayes factor a fraction parameter must be specified which controls the amount of information in the data used for specifying an implicit prior. The remaining fraction is used for testing the informative hypotheses. We discuss different choices of this parameter and present a scheme for setting it. Furthermore, a software package is described which computes the approximated adjusted fractional Bayes factor. Using this software package, psychological researchers can evaluate informative hypotheses by means of Bayes factors in an easy manner. Two empirical examples are used to illustrate the procedure.     

Subliminal or not? Comparing null-hypothesis and Bayesian methods for testing subliminal priming

A difficulty for reports of subliminal priming is demonstrating that participants who actually perceived the prime are not driving the priming effects. There are two conventional methods for testing this. One is to test whether a direct measure of stimulus perception is not significantly above chance on a group level. The other is to use regression to test if an indirect measure of stimulus processing is significantly above zero when the direct measure is at chance. Here we simulated samples in which we assumed that only participants who perceived the primes were primed by it. Conventional analyses applied to these samples had a very large error rate of falsely supporting subliminal priming. Calculating a Bayes factor for the samples very seldom falsely supported subliminal priming. We conclude that conventional tests are not reliable diagnostics of subliminal priming. Instead, we recommend that experimenters calculate a Bayes factor when investigating subliminal priming.     

Experience and Reason in Einstein's Epistemology

Albert Einstein insists that his epistemology made his discovery of relativity possible. He believed it was his understanding of the relationship of experience and reason that allowed him to reconsider certain “truths” of physics. Specifically, he believed that reality and thought were independent but related, and that conceptual systems are independent of but conditioned by experience. Failure to understand the relation between experience and reason had, Einstein believed, limited progress in science. His understanding of the relation, on the other hand, enabled him to formulate relativity theory and therefore provides one example of the relevance of philosophy to scientific inquiry.     

知情交互作用的实证研究现状与展望

知情交互作用(the interaction of cognition-emotion)是指认知与情绪之间相互作用,相互影响,二者密不可分.当前,知情交互作用的研究主要涉及两个方面:一是认知对情绪的影响,即认知对情绪的产生和情绪调节的影响;二是情绪对认知的影响,即情绪对感知觉、记忆和思维的影响.本文从实证角度,综合相关文献选取各自领域具有代表性的最新研究成果进行了概要述评,并进一步指出未来的研究应该在无意识情绪的脑机制、情绪-想象的交互作用、情绪-语言的交互作用,以及知-情-行的整合等方面进一步探讨.