Can the Simultaneous Experience of Opposing Emotions Really Occur?

Various investigators have proposed that people may feel simultaneous positive and negative affect. However, experimental evidence from tests of a recent theory about the intensity of emotion (J. W. Brehm, 1999) suggests that even when they are invited by the experimental design, positive and negative emotions do not occur at the same time. When people have been instigated to feel a particular emotion, such as happiness, and then are given a reason (e.g., sad news) for not feeling happy, they report continued happiness but no increase in sadness unless the reason for feeling sad is very great, in which case sadness replaces happiness. The present paper briefly reviews the underlying theory and evidence, and discusses implications.

Uncertainty about the rest of the sentence

A word-by-word human sentence processing complexity metric is presented. This metric formalizes the intuition that comprehenders have more trouble on words contributing larger amounts of information about the syntactic structure of the sentence as a whole. The formalization is in terms of the conditional entropy of grammatical continuations, given the words that have been heard so far. To calculate the predictions of this metric, Wilson and Carroll's (1954) original entropy reduction idea is extended to infinite languages. This is demonstrated with a mildly context-sensitive language that includes relative clauses formed on a variety of grammatical relations across the Accessibility Hierarchy of Keenan and Comrie (1977). Predictions are derived that correlate significantly with repetition accuracy results obtained in a sentence-memory experiment (Keenan & Hawkins, 1987).     

Does threatening imagery sensitize distress during contaminant exposure?

Prominent models of fear focus on the role of cognition in the development and maintenance of maladaptive responses. Little research, however, has evaluated the impact of cognition on distress reduction. The current study uses an experimental design to examine the effect of different types of imagery (moving harm, static harm, and safety) on reduction of distress associated with a contaminating stimulus in a normal university sample. Results indicate that use of moving harm imagery sensitizes distress during a 30-min exposure, whereas static harm and safety imagery reduce distress. These findings demonstrate that cognitive factors can moderate affective response during exposure. Clinical implications for the treatment of anxiety disorders are discussed.     

Emergence,Drop-Back And Reductionism in Living Systems Theory

Millers Living Systems Theory (LST) is known to be very comprehensive. It comprises eight nested hierarchical levels. It also includes twenty critical subsystems. While Millers approach has been analyzed and applied in great detail, some problematic features remain, requiring further explication. One of these is the relationship between reduction and emergence in LST. There are at least four relevant possibilities. One is that LST exhibits neither clear reductionism nor emergence, but is essentially neutral in this regard. Another is that the apparent comprehensiveness of LST is illusory, as the approach remains vulnerable to reduction that could ultimately reduce it to a shadow of its present self. The charge of reductionism has been made by critics leading Miller to defend this theory vehemently as nonreductionist in nature. A third possibility is that LST is not reductionist, but is in fact an emergent theory. Miller makes this claim quite strongly. A fourth possibility, and in some ways the most analytically problematic, is that LST exhibits evidence of both reductionism and emergence simultaneously. Some critics might see this fourth situation as evidence of a troubling paradox or anomaly that must be resolved before further progress can be made in the explication and application of LST. The purpose of the paper is to remove this apparent anomaly. The paper removes this anomaly by differentiating between new-variable emergence and transformational emergence. No concrete evidence is found to contradict Milers claim of emergence in LST, and thus no true anomaly exists.     

Factors Influencing Condom Use Among African American Women: Implications for Risk Reduction Interventions

Examined factors associated with condom use in a community-based sample of 423 sexually active African American women. Measures were selected to reflect the components in prevailing models of health behavior. Condom users were higher on AIDS health priority, prevention attitudes, stage of change, behavioral intentions, reported more frequent and comfortable sexual communication with partners, perceived greater partner and peer approval for condom use, and reported that peers also used condoms. Women in exclusive relationships evidenced earlier stage of change, lower intentions to use condoms, fewer peers who engaged in preventive behaviors, perceived themselves to have lower risk, and had lower rates of condom use, higher education, and family income. Women in fluid relationships were at particularly high risk, with lower rates of condom use relative to women not in a relationship and greater sexual risk for HIV. Implications for HIV-risk reduction interventions with African American women are discussed.     

Separating The Effects Of Trial-specific And Average Sample-stimulus Duration In Delayed Matching To Sample In Pigeons

Pigeons were studied in two experiments employing delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) tasks in which the reduction in delay to reinforcement signaled by the onset of the sample stimulus was manipulated by varying sample-stimulus duration. In Experiment 1, the duration of the sample stimulus was either 5 s or 10 s for one sample stimulus and 10 s or 20 s for the other. Subjects matched more frequently when the sample duration was 10 s following the sample associated with the shorter average duration. This finding is analogous to the memory distribution effect found by Honig (1987) in a successive DMTS task that varied retention interval. In Experiment 2, sample duration was either 5 s or 15 s. In Phases 1 and 3 each sample duration was correlated with a particular sample color, and in Phase 2 sample duration and color were uncorrelated. When sample duration was 5 s, subjects matched more frequently when sample duration and color were correlated than when they were uncorrelated. Overall, subjects matched more frequently when sample duration and color were correlated. The data from both experiments support Wixted's (1989) model, which states that one determinant of choice in a DMTS task is the delay-reduction value of the sample stimulus.     

General estimators for the reliability of qualitative data

We study a proportional reduction in loss (PRL) measure for the reliability of categorical data and consider the general case in which each ofN judges assigns a subject to one ofK categories. This measure has been shown to be equivalent to a measure proposed by Perreault and Leigh for a special case when there are two equally competent judges, and the correct category has a uniform prior distribution. We consider a general framework where the correct category is assumed to have an arbitrary prior distribution, and where classification probabilities vary by correct category, judge, and category of classification. In this setting, we consider PRL reliability measures based on two estimators of the correct category—the empirical Bayes estimator and an estimator based on the judges' consensus choice. We also discuss four important special cases of the general model and study several types of lower bounds for PRL reliability.Bruce Cooil is Associate Professor of Statistics, and Roland T. Rust is Professor and area head for Marketing, Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University. The authors thank three anonymous reviewers and an Associate Editor for their helpful comments and suggestions. This work was supported in part by the Dean's Fund for Faculty Research of the Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University.     

Concerning the integration of sciences: Kinds and stages

The detailed analysis allows to discern seven kinds of integration, namely: I₁ consisting in the synthesis of scientific disciplines from their elements, including disciplinary unification I₁; I₂ inclusion of a science in (reduction to) another, more general; I₃ — links between different sciences, especially establishing of common elements; I₄ — interdisciplines bridging various sciences; I₅ — combination of two (or more) disciplines into a new (complex) science; I₆ — a general approach to several domains or multidisciplinary unification; I₇ — transdisciplinary sciences about relations of the same type in various traditional domains. These kinds of integration are interwoven with processes of differentiation, viz. D₁ — internal differentiation of the sciences resulting of I₁; D₂ — interdisciplinary differentiation concomitant I₄, and D₃ — specialization of I₇ sciences in several sections. As a result integration and differentiation are combined in the pairs I₁ — D₁, I₇ — D₃, and D₂ — I₄. The processes of integration (and differentiation) may be presented schematically in the following (not strictly isolated one of another) sequence: in the 17th century started I₁ followed by D₁, and in the last decades by I₁ during the 18th and the 19th c. cases of I₂ and I₃ appear; I₄ (together with D₂) is unfolding since the late 19th century. Finally, I₇ (and D₃), as well as I₅ and I₆ pertain to the latter half of our century. Representative are for one thing I₁, I₄, and I₇ outlining the main stages of integration and at the same time connected with respective kinds of differentiation.     

Selective punishment of interresponse times: The roles of shock intensity and scheduling

Two experiments investigated the roles of shock intensity and scheduling in selective punishment of interresponse times. In each experiment the punishment contingencies were imposed on a background of rats' responding maintained by a variable-interval schedule of food presentation. In Experiment 1 all interresponse times greater than 8 seconds produced shock. In Experiment 2 all interresponse times greater than 8 seconds but less than 12 seconds produced shock. In each experiment shock intensity was initially 0.3 milliamperes (mA) and then was varied through an ascending sequence ranging from 0.1 mA to 0.4 mA, in 0.1-mA increments. Experiment 1 produced response-rate increases at low intensities (0.1 and 0.2 mA) but eliminated responding at the remaining intensities. Experiment 2 produced response-rate increases only with 0.1-mA shock, although responding was maintained at all shock parameters investigated. Analysis of the interresponse times per opportunity showed differential suppression of the targeted responses in all cases except the high-intensity shock phases of Experiment 1. The current data support and extend previous studies of selective interresponse-time-dependent shock schedules but suggest that response-rate increases are not a necessary outcome of this type of procedure. The view that variable-interval schedules of shock presentation selectively target long interresponse times was also supported.