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91.
Häyry M 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2003,24(3):199-214
Are there distinctly European values in bioethics, and if there are, what are they? Some Continental philosophers have argued that the principles of dignity, precaution, and solidarity reflect the European ethos better than the liberal concepts of autonomy, harm, and justice. These principles, so the argument goes, elevate prudence over hedonism, communality over individualism, and moral sense over pragmatism. Contrary to what their proponents often believe, however, dignity, precaution, and solidarity can be interpreted in many ways, and it is not clear which reading would, or should, be favored by popular opinion. It is therefore dangerous to think that any one understanding of "European", or any other, values could be legitimately imposed on those who have different ideas about morality in health care and related fields. Bioethical principles should be employed to promote discussion, not to suppress it. 相似文献
92.
Ziman J 《Science and engineering ethics》2001,7(2):165-176
Research scientists are trained to produce specialised bricks of knowledge, but not to look at the whole building. Increasing public concern about the social role of science is forcing science students to think about what they are actually learning to do. What sort of knowledge will they be producing, and how will it be used? Science education now requires serious consideration of these philosophical and ethical questions. But the many different forms of knowledge produced by modern science cannot be covered by any single philosophical principle. Sociology and cognitive psychology are also needed to understand what the sciences have in common and the significance of what they generate. Again, traditional modes of ethical analysis cannot deal adequately with the values, norms and interests activated by present-day technoscience without reference to its sociological, political and economic dimensions. What science education now requires is ‘metascience’, a discipline that extends beyond conventional philosophy and ethics to include the social and humanistic aspects of the scientific enterprise. For example, students need to learn about the practices, institutions, career choices, and societal responsibilities of research scientists, and to rehearse in advance some of the moral dilemmas that they are likely to meet. They need also to realise that science is changing rapidly, not only in its research techniques and organisational structures but also in its relationships with society at large. 相似文献
93.
Ton van den Beld 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2001,4(4):383-399
What I set out to do is to cast some doubt on the thesis that, in Bernard Williams's words, any appeal to God in morality either adds nothing at all, or it adds the wrong sort of thing. A first conclusion is that a morality of real, inescapable and (sometimes) for the agent costly obligations, while being at home in a theistic metaphysic, does not sit easily with metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. The second conclusion is that Christine Korsgaard's impressive ethical project which is neutral towards theism and atheism fails in giving a satisfying account of such obligations. My final claim is that a theistic account in terms of a strong divine command theory might succeed where non- and atheistic accounts seem to founder. 相似文献
94.
Bernard Gert 《Metaphilosophy》1999,30(1&2):13-24
This article summarizes the account of morality presented in Morality: Its Nature and Justification (Oxford, 1998), with emphasis on that aspect of morality that deals with justifying violations of the moral rules. Such justification requires a two-step procedure; the first is describing the situation using only morally relevant features. I list these features, noting how diverse they are, and describe their characteristics. The second step is estimating the consequences of publicly allowing a violation with the same morally relevant features, that is, allowing a violation when everyone knows that it is allowed to violate the rule in the same circumstances, and comparing this to the estimated consequences of not publicly allowing that kind of violation. I then explain why fully informed, impartial rational persons can sometimes disagree about whether a violation should be publicly allowed and note that such weakly justified violations are the controversial cases. 相似文献
95.
Solomon H. Katz 《Zygon》1999,34(2):237-254
The human community faces today the most serious challenges ever to have confronted the planet in the areas of health, environment, and security. Science and technology are essential for responding to these challenges. More is needed, however, because science is not equipped to deal adequately with the values dimensions and the political issues that accompany the challenges. For an adequate response, there must be cooperative effort by scientists and statespersons, informed for moral leadership by the religious wisdom that is available. The religious communities can provide this spiritual dimension, thereby fulfilling their traditional role, but it will require their coming to terms with the character of the scientific and technological base of contemporary culture. The paper lays the conceptual groundwork for understanding these issues. 相似文献
96.
Recapturing the Person in the Therapist: An Exploration Of Personal Values, Commitments, and Beliefs
The authors encourage an approach to personal exploration that attempts to recapture the person in the therapist. Person in the therapist training is aimed at helping therapists discover or re-capture their own values, beliefs, and personal ethics. A personal approach to theory development and the practice of therapy is offered and discussed. Activities to recapture the person in the therapist focus on developing a personal theoretical orientation, exploring the values of family therapy theories, and exploring the values of the stance of the therapist in the therapy session. The authors offer their own personal beliefs throughout the article and encourage further development of these issues.Co-director of The Re-Authoring Center and a PhD student in Marriage and Family Therapy at Iowa State UniversityCo-director of The Re-Authoring Center and a PhD student in Marriage and Family Therapy at Iowa State University 相似文献
97.
Nicholas B 《Science and engineering ethics》1999,5(4):515-530
Senior molecular geneticists were interviewed about their perceptions of the ethical and social implications of genetic knowledge.
Inductive analysis of these interviews identified a number of strategies through which the scientists negotiated their moral
responsibilities as they participated in generating knowledge that presents difficult ethical questions. These strategies
included: further analysis and application of scientific method; clarification of multiple roles; negotiation with the public
through public debate, institutional processes of funding, ethics committees and legislation; and personal responsibility. 相似文献
98.
Susan Wolf 《The Journal of Ethics》1999,3(3):203-223
According to one influential conception of morality, being moral is a matter of acting from or in accordance with a moral point of view, a point of view which is arrived at by abstracting from a more natural, pre-ethical, personal point of view, and recognizing that each person's personal point of view has equal standing. The idea that, were it not for morality, rational persons would act from their respectively personal points of view is, however, simplistic and misleading. Because our nonmoral reasons cannot all be adequately captured as falling within any single, unified and coherent point of view, morality cannot be adequately understood as a matter of abstracting from such points of view and taking them all equally into account. After considering several ways of modifying the initial conception of morality in a way that accommodates the variety of nonmoral reasons that do not have their source in a personal point of view, the paper concludes with the suggestion that we free ourselves more thoroughly from the grip of the metaphor that takes morality as a whole to be a matter of acting in accordance with the judgments of a single unified and coherent point of view. 相似文献
99.
Eric Mack 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》1999,2(2):87-115
This paper offers a programmatic philosophical articulation of moral and political individualism. This individualism consists of two main components: value individualism and rights individualism. The former is the view that, for each individual, the end which is of ultimate value is his own well-being. Each individual's well-being has ultimate agent-relative value and the only ultimate values are these agent-relative values. The latter view is that individuals possess moral jurisdiction over themselves, i.e., rights of self-ownership. These rights (along with other rights individuals may come to possess) constrain the manner in which agents may pursue value. For this reason, the articulated individualism is an constrained individualism. Sketches of arguments are offered for both value and rights individualism. And it is argued that the sole legitimate function of legal/political institutions is to further delineate and protect the rights of individuals. However, the paper is also concerned to indicate why this radical moral and political individualism does not have many of the features or implications that are commonly ascribed to it. In this connection, I seek to show how this social doctrine accords with individuals' having concern for the well-being of others, with the emergence of relationships among individuals that have both instrumental and non-instrumental value, with a degree of responsibility for self and others that is often thought to be antithetical to individualism and, in general, with a flourishing of civil order. 相似文献
100.
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》1999,2(2):135-147
What makes killing morally wrong? And what makes killing morally worse than letting die? Standard answers to these two questions presuppose that killing someone involves shortening that person's life. Yet, as I argue in the first two sections of this article, this presupposition is false: Life-prolonging killings are conceivable. In the last two sections of the article, I explore the significance of the conceivability of such killings for various discussions of the two questions just mentioned. In particular, I show why the conceivability of life-prolonging killings renders Frances M. Kamm's attempt to provide an answer to the second question problematic. 相似文献