Does a sensory processing deficit explain counting accuracy on rapid visual sequencing tasks in adults with and without dyslexia?

The experiments conducted aimed to investigate whether reduced accuracy when counting stimuli presented in rapid temporal sequence in adults with dyslexia could be explained by a sensory processing deficit, a general slowing in processing speed or difficulties shifting attention between stimuli. To achieve these aims, the influence of the inter-stimulus interval (ISI), stimulus duration, and sequence length were evaluated in two experiments. In the first that used skilled readers only, significantly more errors were found with presentation of long sequences when the ISI or stimulus durations were short. Experiment 2 used a wider range of ISIs and stimulus durations. Compared to skilled readers, a group with dyslexia had reduced accuracy on two-stimulus sequences when the ISI was short, but not when the ISI was long. Although reduced accuracy was found on all short and long sequences by the group with dyslexia, when performance on two-stimulus sequences was used as an index of sensory processing efficiency and controlled, group differences were found with presentation of stimuli of short duration only. We concluded that continuous, repetitive stimulation to the same visual area can produce a capacity limitation on rapid counting tasks in all readers when the ISIs or stimulus durations are short. While reduced accuracy on rapid sequential counting tasks can be explained by a sensory processing deficit when the stimulus duration is long, slower processing speed in the group with dyslexia explains the greater inaccuracy found as sequence length is increased when the stimulus duration is short.     

Transfer effects between moral dilemmas: A causal model theory

Evaluations of analogous situations are an important source for our moral intuitions. A puzzling recent set of findings in experiments exploring transfer effects between intuitions about moral dilemmas has demonstrated a striking asymmetry. Transfer often occurred with a specific ordering of moral dilemmas, but not when the sequence was reversed. In this article we present a new theory of transfer between moral intuitions that focuses on two components of moral dilemmas, namely their causal structure and their default evaluations. According to this theory, transfer effects are expected when the causal models underlying the considered dilemmas allow for a mapping of the highlighted aspect of the first scenario onto the causal structure of the second dilemma, and when the default evaluations of the two dilemmas substantially differ. The theory’s key predictions for the occurrence and the direction of transfer effects between two moral dilemmas are tested in five experiments with various variants of moral dilemmas from different domains. A sixth experiment tests the predictions of the theory for how the target action in the moral dilemmas is represented.     

When to cooperate and when to compete: Emotional intelligence in interpersonal decision-making

This study examined the relationship between emotional intelligence (EI), assessed with an ability test, and interpersonal decision-making using the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG). Previous research found that individuals who self-report high EI tend to cooperate more than others in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We relativize these findings by showing that individuals scoring high on an ability measure of EI choose effective strategies to deal with three different PDG conditions during real interactions. This suggests that emotionally intelligent individuals are not rigidly predisposed to cooperate regardless of others’ behavior. Instead, EI is associated with the capacity to respond flexibly to others’ strategies and to the interaction context in order to maximize long-term gains – even when this means competing rather than cooperating.     

The Goal Circuit Model: A Hierarchical Multi‐Route Model of the Acquisition and Control of Routine Sequential Action in Humans

Human control of action in routine situations involves a flexible interplay between (a) task‐dependent serial ordering constraints; (b) top‐down, or intentional, control processes; and (c) bottom‐up, or environmentally triggered, affordances. In addition, the interaction between these influences is modulated by learning mechanisms that, over time, appear to reduce the need for top‐down control processes while still allowing those processes to intervene at any point if necessary or if desired. We present a model of the acquisition and control of goal‐directed action that goes beyond existing models by operationalizing an interface between two putative systems—a routine and a non‐routine system—thereby demonstrating how explicitly represented goals can interact with the emergent task representations that develop through learning in the routine system. The gradual emergence of task representations offers an explanation for the transfer of control with experience from the non‐routine goal‐based system to the routine system. At the same time it allows action selection to be sensitive both to environmental triggers and to biasing from multiple levels within the goal system.     

Heuristics versus direct calculation,and age-related differences in multiplication: an evidence accumulation account of plausibility decisions in arithmetic

We offer a new theoretical angle for cognitive arithmetic, which is that evidence accumulation may play a role in problem plausibility decisions. We build upon previous studies that have considered such a hypothesis, and here formally evaluate the paradigm. We develop the finding that performance differences, due to variations in strategy use and aging effects, can indeed be reasonably explained through these accumulation-to-bound cognitive models. Results suggest that these models may be effectively used to learn more about the underlying cognitive processes. In this study, we modelled young (18–24) and older (68–82) adults’ solution times in performing arithmetic verification (e.g. whether 8?×?5?=?41 is true/false). The domain-relevant factors in strategy use (problem-verification heuristics) and aging differences (older/younger adult groups) were analyzed by a response process model of the latency data, that is fit by participant and item. Lower thresholds accounted for the faster response times (RTs) for problems solved with heuristics (arithmetic rule-violation checking strategies), as opposed to problems solved by calculation approaches. A more rapid accumulation accounted for faster RTs on problems in which two arithmetic rules were violated (strategy combination) rather than one. Third, higher thresholds (i.e. preferring to have greater certainty before responding) accounted for older adults’ slower speed. These findings are in support of accumulation models being relevant for more complex cognitive tasks, as well as to account for the age-related differences therein.     

Admissions of racism in discourse on migration in Greece: Beyond the norm against prejudice?

The turn to language in social psychology is closely related to the study of prejudice as racist discourse has been the subject matter of some of the ground‐breaking discourse analytic work. A widely accepted argument was that there seems to be a norm against prejudice informing Western societies: people commonly engage in denials of prejudice when they make negative comments about minorities. Recent work has argued that, due to ideological shifts in the wider societal context or because denying prejudice may not be people's only rhetorical concern, it is possible to find people admitting prejudice. We examine how people in Greece, Greek majority and immigrants, formulate admissions of racism in interviews on migration and citizenship in Greece. Drawing on Ideological Dilemmas and Critical Discursive Social Psychology, we argue that these admissions ironically operate within the norm against prejudice and discuss our findings in relation to the wider socio‐political Greek context.     

3～6岁儿童人格发展的群组序列追踪研究

目的:运用自编幼儿人格发展教师评定问卷对幼儿人格进行追踪测量,探讨其年龄及性别发展特点。方法:用整群抽样法选取3~3.5岁、3.5~4岁、4~4.5岁3个年龄群组幼儿为被试,采用群组序列的追踪设计,进行为期1年半的追踪测量,结合潜变量增长曲线模型和多层线性模型处理数据,探讨幼儿在3~6岁间人格的发展特点。结果:(1)幼儿的智能特征、认真自控、外倾性、亲社会性、情绪稳定性5个人格维度在3~4岁发展最快,4~5岁持续增长但发展速度放缓,到5~6岁时趋于平稳;(2)女孩的认真自控和亲社会性在3岁时显著高于男孩,但在3~6岁间的增长率不存在差异,即女孩的认真自控和亲社会性在幼儿阶段发展水平始终高于男孩。结论:从家庭进入幼儿园的环境变迁促使了幼儿人格的进一步发展,5岁左右幼儿人格开始初步形成;女孩的认真自控和亲社会性水平在幼儿阶段始终高于男孩。     

A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision

What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to take action to maximize utility. Their judgments contradicted a utilitarian principle they otherwise strongly endorsed. Exposure to this scenario led participants to revise their belief in the utilitarian principle, and this revision persisted over several hours. This method provides a new avenue for inducing belief revision.     

‘Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is!’: Effects of Streaks on Confidence and Betting in a Binary Choice Task

Human choice under uncertainty is influenced by erroneous beliefs about randomness. In simple binary choice tasks, such as red/black predictions in roulette, long outcome runs (e.g. red, red, red) typically increase the tendency to predict the other outcome (i.e. black), an effect labeled the “gambler's fallacy.” In these settings, participants may also attend to streaks in their predictive performance. Winning and losing streaks are thought to affect decision confidence, although prior work indicates conflicting directions. Over three laboratory experiments involving red/black predictions in a sequential roulette task, we sought to identify the effects of outcome runs and winning/losing streaks upon color predictions, decision confidence and betting behavior. Experiments 1 (n = 40) and 3 (n = 40) obtained trial‐by‐trial confidence ratings, with a win/no win payoff and a no loss/loss payoff, respectively. Experiment 2 (n = 39) obtained a trial‐by‐trial bet amount on an equivalent scale. In each experiment, the gambler's fallacy was observed on choice behavior after color runs and, in experiment 2, on betting behavior after color runs. Feedback streaks exerted no reliable influence on confidence ratings, in either payoff condition. Betting behavior, on the other hand, increased as a function of losing streaks. The increase in betting on losing streaks is interpreted as a manifestation of loss chasing; these data help clarify the psychological mechanisms underlying loss chasing and caution against the use of betting measures (“post‐decision wagering”) as a straightforward index of decision confidence. © 2014 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.