Belief-Ful Realism and Scientific Realism

Despite tensions between Tillich's category of belief-ful realism and a view of science that embraces metaphysical and epistemological realism, a constructive relationship can be developed between the two. Both are based on common understandings about reality. Belief-ful or theonomous realism thus affirms scientific realism. On the other hand, scientific realism is open to the ecstatic, self-transcending elements of belief-ful realism. Finally, Tillich's formulation of the relationship between culture and religion can be reformulated specifically to include scientific and technological culture.     

非熟练潮-粤双言者的语义通达：来自听觉词加工的证据

采用听觉跨语言启动的语义判断范式, 考察非熟练潮-粤双言者的两种方言之间的语义通达方式。结果发现, 无论是以潮语词为启动词, 还是以粤语词为启动词, 当二者具有翻译关系时, 启动词均促进对目标词的识别, 但L1对L2的启动量比L2对L1的启动量大。当启动词与目标词具有语义联想关系时, 启动词亦能促进对目标词的识别, 但L1→L2与L2→L1的启动量差异不显著。整个研究表明, 非熟练潮-粤双言者的两种方言的词汇独立表征, 语义共享表征; 第二方言的词汇能够直接通达语义表征, 不需要以第一方言的词汇为中介, 但双言的词汇表征与语义表征的联结强度仍然存在着不对称性。     

错误归因的叠加效应：发生于情感还是语义过程？

错误归因是指将某个效应的来源错认为是其它来源。研究采用修改的、双启动词的情感错误归因程序（AMP）范式,考察了错误归因的叠加效应以及该效应发生于情感还是语义过程。结果表明：(1)经典的AMP范式下,不论是情感启动词还是语义启动词都可以引发错误归因反应。(2)双启动词AMP范式下,先后出现的情感启动词产生了错误归因的叠加效应。（3）双语义启动词AMP范式下,没有发现错误归因的叠加效应。说明双启动词AMP范式下错误归因的叠加效应只发生于情感过程。     

语义分类任务中部件位置在汉字识别中的作用

采用Go/NoGo语义分类任务, 在贴近自然语言理解的任务模式下探讨了部件位置的加工时程问题。实验操纵了部件位置频率, 并进一步区分了造成部件相对位置频率发生变化的两种来源, 一是操纵部件整体频率(包含某部件的所有汉字集合)的变化, 保持特殊位置上的部件频率(某部件出现在特定位置上的汉字集合)不变; 二是操纵特殊位置上的部件频率的变化, 保持整体部件频率不变。结果表明, 无论是变化整体部件频率还是变化特殊位置上的部件频率, 两者都引发了P200和N400的变化, 且所引发的P200在峰潜时(peak latency)上差异不显著。此外, 两种操作都没有引发N/P150的变化。因此本研究在贴近自然语言理解的任务中进一步肯定了部件位置在汉字阅读中的作用, 既可以影响汉字亚词汇水平的字形加工, 也可以影响汉字的语义提取。     

小学生义符一致性意识的发展研究

采用类别一致性判断任务考察汉语儿童义符一致性意识的发展特征。结果表明：(1)儿童的义符一致性意识随着年级增长而提高。三年级儿童尚未获得一致性意识, 四年级儿童初步具备义符一致性意识, 五年级儿童的义符一致性意识获得了长足的发展, 六年级儿童获得了完善的义符一致性意识。(2)义符一致性意识与认知发展水平、已有知识及加工策略有密切关系。应该有意识地培养儿童的义符一致性意识。     

Can Rawls’ Constructivism Avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma? In Reply to Shafer-Landau

In this essay, I consider two challenges implicit in Russ Shafer-Landau’s criticism of constructivists: the realism challenge and the relativism challenge, respectively. I do not try to offer a decisive set of objections to the challenges; instead I argue that some objective versions of constructivism, especially Rawls’s constructivism, are not susceptible to the criticisms.     

Is Intuition Necessary for Defending Platonism?

G?del asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of G?del’s conceptual realism’s basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, G?del asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too na?ve to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. G?del and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, G?del thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of G?del’s conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from na?ve, despite what some philosophers have claimed.     

结构实在论评析

The epistemological version of structural realism, proposed by Cao Tianyu, has great influence in the philosophy of science. Syntheses has published a special volume discussing the topic. Cao criticizes anti-realism, as well as the epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism. From the concepts of structure, ontology, and construction, he analyzes the objectivity of scientific theories as having five aspects: construction, historicity, holism, revision, and revolution. This paper systematically analyzes and comments on Cao's structural realism. The author agrees with his criticism of the under-determination thesis, is neutral to his argument against ontological discontinuity, and questions his universal language argument. Translated by Yu Jinlong from Ziran Bianzhengfa Yanjiu 自然辩证法研究 (Studies in Dialectics of Nature), 2006, (11): 34–38     

The copredication argument

The standard view of truth-conditional semantics is that it is world-involving in the sense that a theory that specifies truth conditions eo ipso is a theory that specifies the way the world must be if the target sentences are to be true. It would appear to follow that the semantic properties of expressions, such as nominals, specify the very worldly objects that make true or false the sentences that host the nominals. Chomsky and others have raised a fundamental complaint against this thought: perfectly quotidian nominals, such as London or book, may occur copredicatively as a single argument of categorically mismatched predicates, which prima facie preclude a coherent uniform construal of the nominal argument. The argument has hitherto been presented via examples that challenge the standard view. My aim here is to present the argument explicitly, defend it against some likely counterclaims, and resolve what might appear to be a decisive consideration against the conclusion of the argument, viz., if nominals as copredicatively occurring do not contribute uniform worldly entities, then how can the copredicative constructions be counted as true?     

Ethical Pragmatism

Beginning with a thought experiment about a mysterious Delphic oracle, this article motivates, explains, and attempts to defend a view it calls Ethical Pragmatism. Ethical Pragmatism is the view that we can and should carry on our practice of moral deliberation without reference to moral truths, or more broadly, without reference to metaethics. The defense the article mounts tries to show that neither suspicions about the tenability of fact‐value distinctions, nor doubts about the viability of global pragmatism, nor worries about the “force” of ethical injunctions without reference to moral truths constitute good reason to reject Ethical Pragmatism.