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611.
Christopher J. Insole 《The Journal of religious ethics》2008,36(3):447-489
Constitutional liberal practices are capable of being normatively grounded by a number of different metaphysical positions. Kant provides one such grounding, in terms of the autonomously derived moral law. I argue that the work of Edmund Burke provides a resource for an alternative construal of constitutional liberalism, compatible with, and illumined by, a broadly Thomistic natural law worldview. I contrast Burke's treatment of the relationship between truth and cognition, prudence and rights, with that of his contemporary, Kant. We find that in each case where Kant's system is constructed from the first principle of autonomy, Burke's thought is oriented toward an end that is not of our making. Readings of Burke as a natural law thinker are currently out of fashion among Burke commentators; without relying, for the main thesis, on historical claims about Burke's “Thomism,” I nonetheless explore and challenge some of the assumptions that underlie the current orthodoxy. 相似文献
612.
Implicit Association Tests (IATs) often reveal strong associations of self with positive rather than negative attributes. This poses a problem in using the IAT to measure associations involving traits with either positive or negative evaluative content. In two studies, we employed non‐bipolar but evaluatively balanced Big Five traits as attribute contrasts and explored correlations of IATs with positive (e.g. sociable vs. conscientious) or negative (e.g. reserved vs. chaotic) attributes. Results showed (a) satisfactory internal consistencies for all IATs, (b) explicit–explicit and implicit–implicit correlations that were moderate to high and comparable in strength after both were corrected for attenuation and (c) better model fit for latent variable models that linked the implicit and explicit measures to distinct latent factors rather to the same factor. Together, the results suggest that IATs can validly assess the semantic aspect of trait self‐concepts and that implicit and explicit self‐representations are, although correlated, also distinct constructs. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
613.
Matthew Walhout 《Zygon》2010,45(3):558-574
People discussing science and religion usually frame their conversations in terms of essentialist assumptions about science, assumptions requiring the existence (but not the specification) of criteria according to which science can be distinguished from other forms of inquiry. However, criteria functioning at a level of generality appropriate to such discussions may not exist at all. Essentialist assumptions may be avoided if science is understood within a broader context of human practices. In a philosophy of practices, to label a practice as “scientific” is to make a practically motivated provision for a way of speaking. Charles Taylor and Joseph Rouse have produced complementary philosophies of practice that promote this kind of understanding. In this essay I review the work of Taylor and Rouse, identify apparent residues of essentialism that each seems to harbor, and offer a resolution to some of their disagreements. I also criticize a form of essentialism commonly employed in Christian circles and outline an anti‐essentialist view of science that may be helpful in science‐and‐religion discussions. 相似文献
614.
Tom Rockmore 《Metaphilosophy》2005,36(3):259-271
Abstract: Pragmatism as it originally arose in America has always been pluralist, always willing to find space for those who understood it in other ways. But in the emergence of neo‐analytic pragmatism it is possible that the term has been stretched beyond its limits in a way that does more harm than good in veiling if not actually obscuring central tenets that are well worth preserving. The aim of this article is to describe some aspects of this phenomenon and to draw some tentative conclusions. 相似文献
615.
KAREN GREEN 《Theoria》2005,71(2):92-117
Abstract: In his earlier writings, Dummett made a distinction between deep and shallow arguments for being suspicious of bivalence. Deep arguments brought with them a commitment to anti‐realism, shallow arguments did not. This distinction was motivated by a certain understanding of the significance of the context principle, according to which it is the sentence which is the primary vehicle of meaning. In later writings Dummett has despaired of making clear the distinction between deep and shallow arguments for rejecting bivalence. He has adopted the position that all deviations from bivalence involve anti‐realism of some kind. In this paper I argue that this in effect removes any clear connection between Dummettian anti‐realism and idealism. A suspicion of bivalence should often be interpreted as the result of an anti‐realim of the error theoretic kind. 相似文献
616.
Hinshelwood RD 《The International journal of psycho-analysis》2008,89(3):503-521
An attempt is made to compare two psychoanalytic concepts which by ‘belonging’ to different psychoanalytic groups have come to be defined and used differently. The paper is also an inquiry into the possibility of a comparative psychoanalytic method. The two concepts are ‘repression’ and ‘splitting of the ego’ and an examination is made of the semantic similarities and differences. Some clinical material is offered that adds indicative clinical evidence to test the semantic comparison. The aim is to answer the question: Are the terms simply alternative ones for similar clinical phenomena? The paper offers one method which could provide an answer. It represents a general method for clarifying and maybe reconciling the differing points of view of competing psychoanalytic schools. 相似文献
617.
This article presents findings on the restructuring component of the decision process. Two experiments are described employing hypothetical vacation choice dilemmas. The aim was to explore the conditions under which outcomes common to two risky prospects with the same probabilities of occurrence are or are not cancelled and how consequent decisions are influenced. The design of the options presented to participants was based on pilot work to establish appropriate contexts. The key independent variable was the semantic relatedness between outcomes of the same risky prospect. The main finding was that the participants did not cancel the outcome shared by two prospects when it was semantically related to another outcome within the same prospect. In this case, the prospect with greater risk was chosen significantly more frequently in comparison to when the common outcome was unrelated to other outcomes. An interpretation of the findings is presented in terms of contingent editing processes. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
618.
ANTTI KESKINEN 《Theoria》2012,78(2):128-145
W. V. Quine describes himself as a “robust realist” about physical objects in the external world. This realism about objects is due to Quine's naturalism. On the other hand, Quine's naturalistic epistemology involves a conception of objects as posits that we introduce in our theories about the world. This conception of objects can be seen as anti‐realist rather than realist. In this article, I discuss the questions whether there is a tension between Quine's realism and his epistemological conception of objects, and how Quine's conception of objects should be understood if he is also to be regarded as a realist. I also address the question whether Quine should be placed on the realist or the anti‐realist side of the current realism debate. I argue that Quine's conception of objects as posits is a general account of the nature of objects, and that this account does not conflict with Quine's realism as long as this realism is properly understood. I also argue that Quine cannot be placed on either side of the contemporary realism debate, since his realism is not metaphysical realism and his conception of objects is not an anti‐realist doctrine according to which objects would be less than real. 相似文献
619.
David Runciman 《Metaphilosophy》2012,43(1-2):58-70
In the study of politics, Cambridge is sometimes associated with a school of political philosophical “realism.” This article discusses what realism in political philosophy might mean, by examining first what might count as “unrealistic” political philosophy (looking at Sidgwick and Rawls), and then some recent attempts to identify a more realistic philosophical approach to politics. It argues that realistic political philosophy tends to emerge as a thin account of politics that falls between the stools of either more philosophical (i.e., more idealistic) or less philosophical (i.e., more historical) accounts. It illustrates this in relation to Sidgwick and also Hobbes, who is often held up as the quintessential realist in the history of political philosophy. 相似文献
620.
Michael Ruse 《Zygon》2012,47(4):666-685
Abstract Ernan McMullin's 1982 presidential address to the Philosophy of Science Association dealt with the issue of science and values, arguing that although scientists are rightfully wary of the infiltration of cultural and social values, their work is guided by “epistemic values,” such as the drive for consistency and predictive fertility. McMullin argued that it is the pursuit of these epistemic values that drives nonepistemic values (like religious yearnings) from science. Using the case study of the fate of the nonepistemic value of progress in the history of evolutionary theorizing, I show that, vital though McMullin's thinking was for my own scholarship, in fact the study shows that the connections between epistemic and nonepistemic values in science are more complex than either of us supposed. 相似文献