Depressive symptoms are associated with unrealistic negative predictions of future life events

This study examined the relationship between depressive symptoms and bias in the prediction of future life events. Responding to internet announcements, 153 participants varying widely in self-reported depression symptom severity estimated the probability of 40 events occurring over the succeeding 30 days. After the 30-day period, participants reported which events occurred. Optimistic/pessimistic biases were related to level of depressive symptoms. A non-significant optimistic bias characterized participants with low depressive symptoms whereas a significant pessimistic bias characterized participants with high depressive symptoms. Those reporting mild symptoms did not exhibit a systematic pessimistic or optimistic bias. General imprecision in predictions for undesirable events was associated with depressive symptoms. These findings suggest that depression is associated with pessimistic bias rather than accuracy in judgment.     

Semantic false memories in the form of derived relational intrusions following training

Contemporary behavior analytic research is making headway in characterizing memory phenomena that typically have been characterized by cognitive models, and the current study extends this development by producing "false memories" in the form of functional equivalence responding. A match-to-sample training procedure was administered in order to encourage participants to treat groups of unrelated English words as being interchangeable. Following training, participants were presented with a list of words from within one of the groups for a free recall test and a recognition test. Results showed that participants were more likely to falsely recall and recognize words that had been assigned to the same group as the list words during prior training, relative to words not assigned to the same group and relative to words that co-occurred with list words. These results indicate that semantic relatedness can be experimentally manipulated in order to produce specific false memories.     

Mill on Happiness: A question of method

There are issues in Reid scholarship as well as the primary texts that seem to suggest that Reid is not a direct realist about visual perception. In this paper, I examine two key issues – colour perception and visible figure – and attempt to defend the direct realism of Reid's theory through an interpretation of ‘directness’ as well as what Reid calls ‘acquired perception’, which is ‘mediate’ in that it requires prior perception of signs, but nonetheless constitutes direct perception.     

On misunderstanding science

Abstract

The paper examines the differences between Kuhn's account, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, of the sciences as necessarily communal activities with internally set standards of procedure and achievement, and that view of the sciences which calls itself ‘Scientific Realism’ and regards them as striving toward, and perhaps asymptotically approaching, some external and objective reality that bestows truth or falsity on scientific theories.

The main argument turns on Poincaré's demonstration that Newton's Second Law (f = ma) is not a testable, provable proposition with a truth value, but something that is simply adopted. It is adopted in the light of experience, certainly, but there is no logical necessity in the adoption. My suggestion is that it is a ‘way of looking’ and ‘a method of analysis’ and that the necessity of its adoption by any individual lies in its being a necessary condition of entry into the scientific community. That community itself adopts ways of looking or methods of analysis for their fruitfulness in dealing with old problems and defining new ones.

Incoherences in the ‘approach’ account of scientific progress are looked at, and the individualistic assumptions that motivate it. These require the sciences to be presented as the source and basis of agreement and community amongst separated individuals. This picture and its requirement inverts reality as well as Kuhn's account, which makes community and agreement the starting point. The notion of reality as a transcendental convergence point becomes redundant.

The old problem of the incommensurability of paradigms is discussed by relating them to the notions of ways of looking and methods of analysis. These may be incompatible in that one cannot look at things in two different ways at once, but at the same time they cannot be measured on any common scale.     

In Defence of Kripkenstein: On Lewis’ Proposed Solution to the Sceptical Argument

Abstract

In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke argues for an extreme form of meaning scepticism. One influential reply to Kripke’s arguments was developed by David Lewis. The reply developed by Lewis makes use of the notion of mind-independent relations of similarity and difference. The aim of the paper is to argue that Lewis’ reply is not satisfactory: the challenge to find a refutation of Kripke’s sceptical arguments remains unmet.     

Goodbye and farewell: Siegel vs. Feyerabend∗

The discussion between Searle and the Churchlands over whether or not symbolmanipulating computers generate semantics will be confronted both with the rulesceptical considerations of Kripke/Wittgenstein and with Wittgenstein's privatelanguage argument in order to show that the discussion focuses on the wrong place: meaning does not emerge in the brain. That a symbol means something should rather be conceived as a social fact, depending on a mutual imputation of linguistic competence of the participants of a linguistic practice to one another. The alternative picture will finally be applied to small children, animals, and computers as well.     

N400 and P600 or the Role of the ERP Correlates in Sentence Comprehension: Some Applications to the Italian Language

In the present study, event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were applied to the study of language comprehension in the Italian language. The ERPs were recorded from 10 electrodes while the participants read (Experiment 1) or listened (Experiment 2) to sentences containing semantic or syntactic anomalies. Final words that were inconsistent with the sentence context elicited a negative wave at about 400 ms poststimulus that was more concentrated in the posterior sites of the scalp, whereas final words that were incongruous with the grammatical structure (subject-verb nonagreement) elicited a positive wave at about 600 ms poststimulus that was homogeneously distributed on the scalp. The authors found no differences based on the perceptual modality of the stimulus (visual or auditory), nor did they find different ERP correlates as a function of task relevance (explicit-implicit task induction). The available evidence indicated that the ERP response to semantic anomalies was at least partially distinct from the ERP response to syntactic anomalies, and that a syntactic parser is a plausible process included in sentence comprehension. The two semantic and syntactic effects appear as automatic processes of the decoding of the anomalies and also modality-independent processes. Cross-linguistic applications are considered in the general discussion.     

A Longitudinal Study of Semantic Grouping Strategy Use in 6–11-Year-Old Children: Investigating Developmental Phases,the Role of Working Memory,and Strategy Transfer

This two-cohort longitudinal study on the development of the semantic grouping strategy had three goals. First, the authors examined if 6–7-year-olds are nonstrategic before becoming strategic after prompting at 8–9 years of age, and if 8–9-year-olds are prompted strategic before spontaneous strategy use at 10–11 years of age. Children 6–7 and 8–9 years old performed two sort-recall tasks (one without and one with a grouping prompt) at two time points separated 1.5 years from each other. Second, the authors investigated whether short-term or working memory capacity at time point 1 predicted recall in children who did or did not use the semantic grouping strategy 1.5 years later. Third, the authors investigated whether prompted strategic children and children who used the strategy spontaneously differed in strategy transfer to a new task. Developmental results confirmed previous cross-sectional results, but in a longitudinal two-cohort study 6–7-year-olds were nonstrategic, and became prompted strategic around 8–9 years of age, followed by spontaneous strategy use at age 10–11 years. The authors found that memory capacity was not predictive of later use of the strategy. New findings were that prompted strategic children were as equally able as spontaneously strategic children to transfer the strategy to a new task, albeit with smaller recall benefits.     

Our world is more than physics: a constructive – critical comment on the current science and theology debate

“Critical realism” is one of the most important positions in the current science and theology debate. An analysis of its origin and meaning leads to the question if this position mostly propagated by physicist-theologians could miss an intrinsic feature of the personal dimension of reality. A deeper meaning of the personal dimension sets human science apart. Taking into account social science's insight that persons responsible for their conclusions and actions drive the process of science, the moral dimension of science has to be emphasized. To integrate these aspects into a coherent position, a more differentiated epistemological model is needed. The solution proposed in this paper is to modify critical realism to constructive-critical realism. Theologically interpreted, constructive-critical realism remembers humankind's purpose to shape nature in cooperation with God and with the means of culture toward increasing realization of freedom in relationship. The argument is widely influenced by an analysis of the works of John Polkinghorne.     

Altered working memory capacity for social threat words in high versus low social anxiety

ABSTRACT

Background and objectives: Differences in working memory capacity (WMC) have been suggested in individuals with high levels of social anxiety (SA). Specifically, these individuals may preferentially maintain socially threatening material in working memory.

Design and methods: We adapted the digit span task to a series of word span tasks. We assessed WMC for lists of words that varied in terms of their threat-relatedness, in individuals either high or low in SA.

Results: Experiment 1 revealed reduced WMC for socially threatening words in those with high compared to low SA. Importantly, this relative reduction in WMC was driven by the low SA group showing expanded capacity for socially threatening words relative to neutral or generally threatening words. Furthermore, reductions in WMC for social threat were uniquely predicted by SA, and not by other theoretically related constructs such as state general anxiety, trait general anxiety, or depression. Experiment 2 showed that the semantic similarity of the words within each list was not responsible for the differences in WMC between list type or SA group.

Conclusions: Our findings suggest that individuals high in SA may fail to upregulate WMC for social information due to the activation of, or rumination upon, socially threatening concepts.