Making too many enemies: Hutto and Myin’s attack on computationalism†

We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard Problem of Content targets computationalism that relies on semantic notion of computation, claiming that it cannot account for the natural origins of content. The Intentionality Problem is targeted against computationalism using non-semantic accounts of computation, arguing that it fails in explaining intentionality. The Abstraction Problem claims that causal interaction between concrete physical processes and abstract computational properties is problematic. We argue that these arguments are flawed and are not enough to rule out computationalism.     

Association splitting of the sexual orientation-OCD-relevant semantic network

There is little research on treating symptoms of sexual orientation-obsessive-compulsive disorder (SO-OCD). Semantic networks represent a new cognitive approach for understanding cognitive mechanisms of SO-OCD. Specifically, we tested whether the self-help cognitive technique of association splitting (AS) developed from this approach would be efficacious in reducing SO-OCD symptoms and thought suppression. One hundred and twenty heterosexual undergraduates (82 females, 38 males) were randomly assigned to either the AS or waitlist control group. At baseline and four weeks later, participants completed items assessing SO-OCD symptoms, measures of sexual obsessions and thought suppression, and an association task in which they generated associations to different cue words. Generated associations were coded based on SO-OCD relevance and emotional valence. Results indicated reductions in SO-OCD-relevant associations across levels of emotional valence and SO-OCD-irrelevant negative associations, and increases in SO-OCD-irrelevant positive and neutral associations, only in the AS group. Furthermore, there were reductions in SO-OCD symptoms, sexual obsessions, and thought suppression only in the AS group. Importantly, these findings were obtained with overall large effect sizes. AS appears to be an efficacious self-help technique in reducing SO-OCD symptoms, sexual obsessions, and thought suppression. Clinical implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

语义联系对关联再认神经机制的调节

已有研究显示,关联再认可记录到分别反映双重加工模型的两阶段（即熟悉和回忆）的ERP成分（即FN400和LPC成分）,且具有高语义联系配对的关联再认可通过整合在基于熟悉加工的基础上完成。然而,不同语义联系对关联再认神经机制的影响及单个项目的熟悉和回忆加工的调节作用尚未揭示。为此,本研究比较了主题相关和类别相关图形关联再认的波形波幅异同,并分析了单个项目的熟悉和回忆加工对配对识别的影响。结果显示,主题相关和类别相关条件的旧配对、重组配对和“旧+新”配对均记录到反映熟悉加工的FN400成分,主题相关条件的旧配对、重组配对和“旧+新”配对均记录到反映回忆加工的LPC成分,类别相关条件的旧配对记录到LPC成分。表明关联再认的神经机制受语义联系所调节,单个项目的熟悉程度可影响配对识别时的神经机制,上述结论支持双重加工模型。     

The contribution of executive control to semantic cognition: Convergent evidence from semantic aphasia and executive dysfunction

Semantic cognition, as described by the controlled semantic cognition (CSC) framework (Rogers et al., 2015 , Neuropsychologia, 76, 220), involves two key components: activation of coherent, generalizable concepts within a heteromodal ‘hub’ in combination with modality‐specific features (spokes), and a constraining mechanism that manipulates and gates this knowledge to generate time‐ and task‐appropriate behaviour. Executive–semantic goal representations, largely supported by executive regions such as frontal and parietal cortex, are thought to allow the generation of non‐dominant aspects of knowledge when these are appropriate for the task or context. Semantic aphasia (SA) patients have executive–semantic deficits, and these are correlated with general executive impairment. If the CSC proposal is correct, patients with executive impairment should not only exhibit impaired semantic cognition, but should also show characteristics that align with those observed in SA. This possibility remains largely untested, as patients selected on the basis that they show executive impairment (i.e., with ‘dysexecutive syndrome’) have not been extensively tested on tasks tapping semantic control and have not been previously compared with SA cases. We explored conceptual processing in 12 patients showing symptoms consistent with dysexecutive syndrome (DYS) and 24 SA patients, using a range of multimodal semantic assessments which manipulated control demands. Patients with executive impairments, despite not being selected to show semantic impairments, nevertheless showed parallel patterns to SA cases. They showed strong effects of distractor strength, cues and miscues, and probe–target distance, plus minimal effects of word frequency on comprehension (unlike semantic dementia patients with degradation of conceptual knowledge). This supports a component process account of semantic cognition in which retrieval is shaped by control processes, and confirms that deficits in SA patients reflect difficulty controlling semantic retrieval.     

Solving the problem of creeping minimalism

Abstract

In this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar concepts. I argue that Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of meaning more generally.     

Representing ethical reality: a guide for worldly non-naturalists

Abstract

Ethical realists hold (i) that our ethical concepts, thoughts, and claims are in the business of representing ethical reality, by representing evaluative or normative properties and facts as aspects of reality, and (ii) that such representations are at least sometimes accurate. Non-naturalist realists add the further claim that ethical properties and facts are ultimately non-natural, though they are nonetheless worldly. My aim is threefold: to elucidate the sort of representation involved in ethical evaluation on realist views; to clarify what exactly is represented and how non-naturalism comes into the picture for non-naturalists; and to defend worldly non-naturalism against some objections. The first question addressed is how we should model evaluation on any realist view, which should in turn guide the identification of which properties and facts are credibly regarded as ‘evaluative’ ones. Then the question is: what role might non-natural properties and facts play, and how are they related to what is represented in ethical evaluation? Once that is clear, we will be in a position to answer certain objections to non-naturalist realism from Jackson, Gibbard, Bedke, and Dreier. I argue that the objections all mischaracterize the role played by non-natural properties and facts on plausible versions of non-naturalist realism.     

On Quantitative and Qualitative Parsimony

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony is supposed to allow David Lewis to dismiss one of the charges against his modal realism: that is, the charge of bloated ontology. The aim of this paper is to undermine Lewis's response to this objection. In order to do this, a distinction between multipliable and nonmultipliable objects is introduced. Based on this it is argued that the acceptance of Lewis's response requires one to believe in modal realism in the first place—that is, one has to believe in the view that the existence of nonactual spatiotemporal worlds does not affect the quality of the ontological commitment. Although the paper focuses on the problem of the metaphysics of possible worlds, this should be regarded merely as a case study. Accordingly, the results of this analysis should find applications in other metaphysical debates as well.     

The Normativity of Meaning: Guidance and Justification

Abstract

The thesis that meaning is normative has come under much scrutiny of late. However, there are aspects of the view that have received comparatively little critical attention which centre on meaning’s capacity to guide and justify linguistic action. Call such a view ‘justification normativity’ (JN). I outline Zalabardo’s (1997) account of JN and his corresponding argument against reductive-naturalistic meaning-factualism and argue that the argument presents a genuine challenge to account for the guiding role of meaning in linguistic action. I then present a proposal regarding how this challenge may be met. This proposal is then compared to recent work by Ginsborg (2011; 2012), who has outlined an alternative view of the normativity of meaning that explicitly rejects the idea that meanings guide and justify linguistic use. I outline how Ginsborg utilises this notion of normativity in order to provide a positive account of what it is to mean something by an expression which is intended to serve as a response to Kripke’s semantic sceptic. Finally, I argue that Ginsborg’s response to the sceptic is unsatisfactory, and that, insofar as it is able to preserve our intuitive view of meaning’s capacity to guide linguistic action, my proposal is to be preferred.     

Hallucination And Imagination

What are hallucinations? A common view in the philosophical literature is that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of perceptual experience. I argue instead that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of sensory imagination. As well as providing a good account of many actual cases of hallucination, the view that hallucination is a kind of imagination represents a promising account of hallucination from the perspective of a disjunctivist theory of perception like naïve realism. This is because it provides a way of giving a positive characterisation of hallucination—rather than characterising hallucinations in negative, relational, terms as mental events that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptual experiences.