Opening up Openness to Experience: A Four‐Factor Model and Relations to Creative Achievement in the Arts and Sciences

Openness to experience is the broadest personality domain of the Big Five, including a mix of traits relating to intellectual curiosity, intellectual interests, perceived intelligence, imagination, creativity, artistic and aesthetic interests, emotional and fantasy richness, and unconventionality. Likewise, creative achievement is a broad construct, comprising creativity across the arts and sciences. The aim of this study was to clarify the relationship between openness to experience and creative achievement. Toward this aim, I factor analyzed a battery of tests of cognitive ability, working memory, Intellect, Openness, affect, and intuition among a sample of English Sixth Form students (N = 146). Four factors were revealed: explicit cognitive ability, intellectual engagement, affective engagement, and aesthetic engagement. In line with dual‐process theory, each of these four factors showed differential relations with personality, impulsivity, and creative achievement. Affective engagement and aesthetic engagement were associated with creative achievement in the arts, whereas explicit cognitive ability and intellectual engagement were associated with creative achievement in the sciences. The results suggest that the Intellectual and Openness aspects of the broader openness to experience personality domain are related to different modes of information processing and predict different forms of creative achievement.     

Memory for Frequency of Bizarre and Common Stimuli: Limitations of the Automaticity Hypothesis

In 2 experiments, the influence of intention to process frequency on accuracy of memory for frequency of bizarre and common sentences was investigated. The results from multiple regression analyses indicated that intentional processing increased the accuracy of frequency judgments when memory for frequency was tested after a 2-min (Experiment 1) and after a 48-hr (Experiment 2) retention interval. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 2 indicated that unintentional processors tended to overestimate frequencies of bizarre relative to common items after a delay. The implications of the results are discussed with regard to L. Hasher and R. T. Zacks's (1984) automaticity hypothesis, human performance, and the accuracy of judgments of frequency of occurrence of unusual events.     

N400 and P600 or the Role of the ERP Correlates in Sentence Comprehension: Some Applications to the Italian Language

In the present study, event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were applied to the study of language comprehension in the Italian language. The ERPs were recorded from 10 electrodes while the participants read (Experiment 1) or listened (Experiment 2) to sentences containing semantic or syntactic anomalies. Final words that were inconsistent with the sentence context elicited a negative wave at about 400 ms poststimulus that was more concentrated in the posterior sites of the scalp, whereas final words that were incongruous with the grammatical structure (subject-verb nonagreement) elicited a positive wave at about 600 ms poststimulus that was homogeneously distributed on the scalp. The authors found no differences based on the perceptual modality of the stimulus (visual or auditory), nor did they find different ERP correlates as a function of task relevance (explicit-implicit task induction). The available evidence indicated that the ERP response to semantic anomalies was at least partially distinct from the ERP response to syntactic anomalies, and that a syntactic parser is a plausible process included in sentence comprehension. The two semantic and syntactic effects appear as automatic processes of the decoding of the anomalies and also modality-independent processes. Cross-linguistic applications are considered in the general discussion.     

Child Care in The Netherlands: Trends in Quality Over the Years 1995-2005

The authors assessed the quality of child care in a representative national sample of 42 child-care centers in the Netherlands and compared it with the quality of care that researchers have found using similar samples in 1995 (M. H. van IJzendoorn, L. W. C. Tavecchio, G. J. J. M. Stams, M. J. E. Verhoeven, & E. J. Reiling, 1998) and 2001 (M. J. J. M. Gevers Deynoot-Schaub & J. M. A. Riksen-Walraven, 2005). In the present study, results showed a low level of overall process quality for the 2005 sample, measured by the Infant/Toddler Environment Rating Scale-Revised (T. Harms, D. Cryer, & R. M. Clifford, 2003) and the Early Childhood Environment Rating Scale-Revised (T. Harms, R. M. Clifford, & D. Cryer, 1998). The present authors found a significant decline in process quality in comparison with the 1995 and 2001 findings. They concluded that, from an international perspective, the Netherlands has lost its leading position in child-care quality compared with that from 10 years ago.     

A Longitudinal Study of Semantic Grouping Strategy Use in 6–11-Year-Old Children: Investigating Developmental Phases,the Role of Working Memory,and Strategy Transfer

This two-cohort longitudinal study on the development of the semantic grouping strategy had three goals. First, the authors examined if 6–7-year-olds are nonstrategic before becoming strategic after prompting at 8–9 years of age, and if 8–9-year-olds are prompted strategic before spontaneous strategy use at 10–11 years of age. Children 6–7 and 8–9 years old performed two sort-recall tasks (one without and one with a grouping prompt) at two time points separated 1.5 years from each other. Second, the authors investigated whether short-term or working memory capacity at time point 1 predicted recall in children who did or did not use the semantic grouping strategy 1.5 years later. Third, the authors investigated whether prompted strategic children and children who used the strategy spontaneously differed in strategy transfer to a new task. Developmental results confirmed previous cross-sectional results, but in a longitudinal two-cohort study 6–7-year-olds were nonstrategic, and became prompted strategic around 8–9 years of age, followed by spontaneous strategy use at age 10–11 years. The authors found that memory capacity was not predictive of later use of the strategy. New findings were that prompted strategic children were as equally able as spontaneously strategic children to transfer the strategy to a new task, albeit with smaller recall benefits.     

Psychophysiological Arousal and Perceived Support during Couple Support Interactions: The Role of Attachment Anxiety and Avoidance

Abstract

Couple support processes—typically occurring in the context of non-relationship distressing issues—are crucial to our understanding of relationships (Pasch, Bradbury, & Sullivan, 1997 Pasch, L. A., Bradbury, T. N., & Sullivan, K. T. (1997). Social support in marriage: An analysis of intraindividual and interpersonal components. In G. R. Pierce, B. Lakey, & I. G. Sarson (Eds.), Sourcebook of social support and personality (pp. 229–256). New York, NY: Plenum Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). These couple support processes influence important relationship outcomes, including relationship satisfaction and longevity (i.e., Collins & Feeney, 2010 Collins, N. L., & Feeney, B. C. (2010). An attachment theoretical perspective on social support dynamics in couples: Normative processes and individual differences. In K. T. Sullivan, & J. Davila (Eds.), Support processes in intimate relationships (pp. 89–120). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). In this study, we examined 51 couples’ support perceptions and physiological arousal during individually distressing support conversations. Using dyadic data analysis, results reveal important findings in terms of avoidant attachment and couple support perceptions. Additionally, significant results were found between attachment anxiety and psychophysiological arousal. Implications of the current findings for couple relationships and therapy are discussed.     

Our Cosmos,from Substance to Process

Philosophies of nature over the past three centuries have gone through three distinct phases, beginning with classical views and now evolving into a process view at the dawn of the 21st century. These phases derive from a complex weaving of two frameworks of physics since Newton's time [classical, modern] with two principal metaphysical frameworks[substance, event]. Problematic fin de siècle claims at the end of both the 19th and 20th centuries appear to have a common root in substance metaphysics and part/whole reductionism. Going beyond such simplistic forms of modernism requires a more integrated, ecological worldview, or process view of nature.     

The Work Process as Spatial Situation: A Sketch

Interacting with the work of art entails a spatial situation, which is double. On a mental plane it is encapsulated reverie, on a physical plane it is production and consumption. These two are woven together as an orthogonal text or texture. The space of the work of art thus contains both the process of its making and its viewing. Seen as a dimensional space it is non linear. It is characterized by oscillations, discepancies, misalignements, multiplicity and recurrence. There is a correspondance between the studio and the exhibition area, as well as a dialogue between privileged and unprivileged spaces. The situation has something in common with oneiric space, where weightlessness and gravity oscillate.     

The Cognitive Processes Underlying Risky Choice

In this article, we tested two concepts of decision making: expected utility theory and heuristic choice. In Experiment 1, we applied think‐aloud protocols to investigate violations of expected utility theory. In Experiments 2 to 4, we introduced a new process‐tracing method—called predict‐aloud protocols—that has advantages over previously suggested research methods. Results show the following: (i) people examine information between rather than within gambles; (ii) the priority heuristic emerges as the most frequently used strategy when problems are difficult; and (iii) people check for similarity when problems are easy. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.