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Matthew Boyle 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2019,49(7):1012-1039
ABSTRACTMuch recent work on self-knowledge has been inspired by the idea that the ‘transparency’ of questions about our own mental states to questions about the non-mental world holds the key to understanding how privileged self-knowledge is possible. I critically discuss some prominent recent accounts of such transparency, and argue for a Sartrean interpretation of the phenomenon, on which this knowledge is explained by our capacity to transform an implicit or ‘non-positional’ self-awareness into reflective, ‘positional’ self-knowledge. 相似文献
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Julie Kirsch 《Ratio》2020,33(1):68-78
This essay looks at the important, but often neglected, contribution that self-interpretation makes to emotional self-knowledge. We engage in acts of self-interpretation when (A) we try to understand what it is that we are feeling, or, relatedly, what it is that we ought to be feeling. On such occasions, we draw upon social and personal narratives as well as on the emotional conceptual repertoires at our disposal. We also engage in acts of self-interpretation when (B) we try to ascertain the meaning or significance of an emotion, treating it as a datum, or piece of evidence, upon which to make inferences or further Interpretations. Although we often seem to have first-person privileged access to our mental states, the third-person strategy of self-interpretation can be a valuable source of self-knowledge. I focus here upon the role that self-interpretation plays in providing us with knowledge about our emotional experiences. 相似文献
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Thomas Khurana 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2019,49(7):956-979
ABSTRACTThe paper argues that Kant’s distinction between pure and empirical apperception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self-knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant’s account interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the realm of theoretical cognition but can be put to work and made productive in terms of practical self-knowledge. 相似文献