God, Genes, and Cognizing Agents

Much ink has been spilled on the claim that morality and religion have evolutionary roots. While some attempt to reduce morality and religion to biological considerations, others reject any link whatsoever. Any full account, however, must acknowledge the biological roots of human behavior while at the same time recognizing that our relatively unique capacity as cognitive agents requires orienting concepts of cosmic and human nature. While other organisms display quasi-moral and proto-moral behavior that is indeed relevant, fully moral behavior is only possible for organisms that attain a higher level of cognitive ability. This, in turn, implies a significant role for religion, which has traditionally provided an orientation within which moral conduct is understood.     

An own-age bias in mixed- and pure-list presentations: No evidence for the social-cognitive account

The own-age bias (OAB) is suggested to be caused by perceptual-expertise and/or social-cognitive mechanisms. Bryce and Dodson (2013, Psychology and Aging, 28, 87, Exp 2) provided support for the social-cognitive account, demonstrating an OAB for participants who encountered a mixed-list of own- and other-age faces, but not for participants who encountered a pure-list of only own- or other-age faces. They proposed that own-age/other-age categorization, and the resulting OAB, only emerge when age is made salient in the mixed-list condition. Our study aimed to replicate this finding using methods typically used to investigate the OAB to examine their robustness and contribution to our understanding of how the OAB forms. Across three experiments that removed theoretically unimportant components of the original paradigm, varied face sex, and included background scenes, the OAB emerged under both mixed-list and pure-list conditions. These results are more consistent with a perceptual-expertise than social-cognitive account of the OAB, but may suggest that manipulating age salience using mixed-list and pure-list presentations is not sufficient to alter categorization processes.     

Trump,Kierkegaard, and a nation divided

This article depicts the United States as a nation divided, as it suffers from two major deficiencies: in societal income equality and in individual formation of selves. It offers reflections on how Søren Kierkegaard's writings and those of Kierkegaard-world are a resource for critiquing Donald Trump and addressing the disruption and divisiveness he and Trump-world are bringing to America's national life. Contours of a theological ethic focusing on the formation of ethical selves are delineated and examples of practicing resurrection are given.     

Social class and interpersonal trust: Partner's warmth,external threats and interpretations of trust betrayal

The present research investigated the effects of social class on interpersonal trust. In a series of experiments, we showed how the contextualist socio-cognitive tendencies of the lower class and the solipsistic tendencies of the upper class were reflected in their trusting attitudes and behaviors. In Study 1 (N = 491), upper class individuals expressed the same levels of trust towards all partners, while lower class individuals adjusted their trust choices to the affect-rich information about their interaction partner and trusted warm partners more than cold partners. The results of Study 2 (N = 210) showed that when threatened, lower class individuals had generally less trusting attitudes, while upper class members were equally trusting as in a neutral situation. Study 3 (N = 200) revealed that upper class individuals explained a betrayal of their trust with dispositional factors to a higher degree than lower class individuals. We discuss how these differences contribute to perpetuating the disadvantage of the lower class.     

Varieties of the extended self

This article provides an overview and analysis of recent work on the extended self, demonstrating that the boundaries of selves are fluid, shifting across biological, artifactual, and sociocultural structures. First, it distinguishes the notions of minimal self, person, and narrative self. Second, it surveys how philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists argue that embodiment, cognition, emotion, consciousness, and moral character traits can be extended and what that implies for the boundaries of selves. It also reviews and responds to various criticisms and counterarguments against the extended self. The main focus is on the link between the extended mind and extended self, which has received the most attention in recent literature. But accounts of the extended self developed independently of the extended mind are also briefly discussed. This article ends by drawing out some of the conceptual, methodological, and normative implications of the extended self and suggesting some directions for future research.     

Common mechanisms of executive attention underlie executive function and effortful control in children

Executive Function (EF) and Effortful Control (EC) have traditionally been viewed as distinct constructs related to cognition and temperament during development. More recently, EF and EC have been implicated in top‐down self‐regulation ‐ the goal‐directed control of cognition, emotion, and behavior. We propose that executive attention, a limited‐capacity attentional resource subserving goal‐directed cognition and behavior, is the common cognitive mechanism underlying the self‐regulatory capacities captured by EF and EC. We addressed three related questions: (a) Do behavioral ratings of EF and EC represent the same self‐regulation construct? (b) Is this self‐regulation construct explained by a common executive attention factor as measured by performance on cognitive tasks? and (c) Does the executive attention factor explain additional variance in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) problems to behavioral ratings of self‐regulation? Measures of performance on complex span, general intelligence, and response inhibition tasks were obtained from 136 preadolescent children (M = 11 years, 10 months, SD = 8 months), along with self‐ and parent‐reported EC, and parent‐reported EF, and ADHD problems. Results from structural equation modeling demonstrated that behavioral ratings of EF and EC measured the same self‐regulation construct. Cognitive tasks measured a common executive attention factor that significantly explained 30% of the variance in behavioral ratings of self‐regulation. Executive attention failed to significantly explain additional variance in ADHD problems beyond that explained by behavioral ratings of self‐regulation. These findings raise questions about the utility of task‐based cognitive measures in research and clinical assessment of self‐regulation and psychopathology in developmental samples.     

The social foundation of executive function

In this study, we propose that infant social cognition may ‘bootstrap' the successive development of domain‐general cognition in line with the cultural intelligence hypothesis. Using a longitudinal design, 6‐month‐old infants (N = 118) were assessed on two basic social cognitive tasks targeting the abilities to share attention with others and understanding other peoples' actions. At 10 months, we measured the quality of the child's social learning environment, indexed by parent's abilities to provide scaffolding behaviors during a problem‐solving task. Eight months later, the children were followed up with a cognitive test‐battery, including tasks of inhibitory control and working memory. Our results showed that better infant social action understanding interacted with better parental scaffolding skills in predicting simple inhibitory control in toddlerhood. This suggests that infants' who are better at understanding other's actions are also better equipped to make the most of existing social learning opportunities, which in turn may benefit future non‐social cognitive outcomes.     

Individual differences in neonatal “imitation” fail to predict early social cognitive behaviour

The influential hypothesis that humans imitate from birth – and that this capacity is foundational to social cognition – is currently being challenged from several angles. Most prominently, the largest and most comprehensive longitudinal study of neonatal imitation to date failed to find evidence that neonates copied any of nine actions at any of four time points (Oostenbroek et al., [2016] Current Biology, 26, 1334–1338). The authors of an alternative and statistically liberal post‐hoc analysis of these same data (Meltzoff et al., [2017] Developmental Science, 21, e12609), however, concluded that the infants actually did imitate one of the nine actions: tongue protrusion. In line with the original intentions of this longitudinal study, we here report on whether individual differences in neonatal “imitation” predict later‐developing social cognitive behaviours. We measured a variety of social cognitive behaviours in a subset of the original sample of infants (N = 71) during the first 18 months: object‐directed imitation, joint attention, synchronous imitation and mirror self‐recognition. Results show that, even using the liberal operationalization, individual scores for neonatal “imitation” of tongue protrusion failed to predict any of the later‐developing social cognitive behaviours. The average Spearman correlation was close to zero, mean r_s = 0.027, 95% CI [?0.020, 0.075], with all Bonferroni adjusted p values > .999. These results run counter to Meltzoff et al.'s rebuttal, and to the existence of a “like me” mechanism in neonates that is foundational to human social cognition.     

Finding a home: Developmental and neurobiological perspectives on cultural models

This article looks at cultural models in the light of human development, and neurobiological findings in motivation, learning, and cognition. It is argued that at the individual level, the acquisition of cultural models relies on several innate, neurobiologically based motivational, learning, and cognitive systems. These are: (a) a primary motivation to form social bonds which is driven by affect; (b) highly specialized social learning circuits, involving, but not limited to, mirror neuron systems, that facilitate the encoding of social information through implicit, embodied, imitational learning processes; and (c) the formation of culturally based templates for behavior and cognition centered around structures, collectively known as the “default mode network,” which is essential to self‐understanding, autobiographical memory, social cognition, prospection, and theory‐of‐mind. Cultural models, it is argued, are acquired through innate motivational processes that tie the individual emotionally to a secure base of familiar people and customs. This instinctual desire for proximity to others facilitates the efficient, largely implicit, patterning of knowledge and expectations. Shared knowledge and expectations, in turn, create a common, mostly implicit or unconscious, experience of subjectivity within groups. This allows each individual to automatically and effortlessly interact with similarly enculturated others.     

Knowing minds: Culture and perceptions of mental state access

How does culture influence the ways in which individuals reflect upon their knowledge of others’ mental states? We addressed this question in a two‐study cross‐cultural investigation examining perceptions of mental state access in the United States and Japan. Study 1 (n = 100) revealed that American participants reported greater mental state access than did Japanese participants. Study 2 (n = 146) showed that both Americans and Japanese perceived greater access to the mental states of a close friend relative to a casual friend and that the observed cultural differences in perceived mental state access to a close friend’s mental states were mediated by how much access was considered appropriate. Overall, the results indicate that culturally variable norms specifying appropriate levels of mental state access play an important role in how individuals estimate their knowledge of other people’s minds in close relationships.